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ABSTRACT 
The distribution of influence in organizational decisions is 
analysed in relation to institutional frameworks and 
characteristics inherent to decision topics. 
Distribution of influence is defined as the concentration of 
participants in decision process and their specific capability 
to influence decision outcomes. This definition encompasses 
two dimensions which are: participation in the decision 
processes and effective influence upon the decision outcomes. 
Institutional frameworks are distinguished according to the 
loci of their genesis and existence, that are: the focal 
organization the task-environment and the larger social 
context. Six characteristics inherent to decision topics are 
identified as related to variables defined as properties of 
decision. 
The analysis is carried out at two distinct stages. At the 
first stage, it examines the relationships of the institutional 
frameworks - existing at the organization and the task- 
environment level - and of the properties of decisions with 
the distribution of influence in decision processes. At the 
second stage, the patterns of influence that emerged out of 
the first stage of analysis are analysed in terms of cultural 
traits prevailing in Brazilian society. 
The results point to variation in the distribution of influence 
in decision processes associated with factors of the task- 
environment, of the context of the organizations and 
characteristics inherent to decision topics. But they do not 
provide a wholly satisfactory explanation of such variation. 
A more general pattern of influence in management decision- 
mahing, characterized by low level of participation and high 
centre of influence in decision processes, appears as the 
dominant profile of the distribution of influence in Brazilian 
organizations. Interpreted in the light of the Brazilian 
social context, this pattern of influence in management 
decision making shows pervasive cultural traits, identified 
in the macro social system. 
Comparing the patterns of influence in management decision- 
making in Brazil and Britain, similarities and differences 
come to light. The comparative analysis corroborates the 
argument that patterns of influence in management decision- 
making are bound to contingent as much as to institutional 
factors. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Organizational Decisions 
The issue of organizational decison making, although 
extensively theorized and empirically analysed, still presents 
many unresolved questions. 
On -theoretical grounds three major approaches can be 
distinguished. The rational utility seeking process to 
maximize benefits which is rooted in economic theory, the 
behavioural approach (Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 1958; 
Lindblom, 1959; Cyert and March, 1963) which incorporates 
the notion of cognitive limits and of conflicting objectives 
to, the rational economic model, and the political approach 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Karpik, 1978; Abell, 1975; Clegg, 
1979) which is centred in the power relations within the 
institutional framework of an organization. 
The behavioural approach has largely dominated the field of 
organizational theory. This is probably due to the fact that, 
in modern societies, organizations have been conceived as 
rational systems, thus organizational decisions are perceived 
as a rational process. As a matter of fact, the behavioural 
approach does not refute the principle of rationality. It 
- 
simply recognizes the cognitive limits to rational behaviour 
but the economic concept of means-end rationality remains 
untouched. This view of organizations as rational systems has 
driven theorists to search for patterned structures, designs 
and processes in organizational decisions (Mintzberg et al, 
1976; Alexander, 1979; Hickson et al, 1986), or to a view of 
decisions as a rational response to environmental changes (Miles, 
1982). Even the analysis which took on a political perspective 
(Murhford and Pettigrew, 1975; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974; 
Butler et al, 1977; Hickson et al, 1978) rest mainly in the 
assumption of a rational competitive world, specially derived 
from Cyert and March's (1963) theory of organizational coalition. 
As Clegg (1979) says: 
"economic models are premised on the assumption of a freely 
competitive market for resources and commodities, in which 
there exist a division of labour and exchange of products 
and labour. It is assumed that each individual inthis market 
would rationally try to maximize his or her gains (or 
minimize the real cost)11. 
and 
"Organization theory rephrases these assumptions but without 
substantially altering the problematicof1equilibriuml which 
they animate. In organizational theory the equilibrium is 
achieved through the creation of Idependenciesl"(pp. 107-108). 
Brown's (1978) observation about American studies of 
organization almost certainly can be generalized. He properly 
points out the rationalistic tendency which hasdominated the 
field and persistently neglected other relevant factors CY 
affecting organizational behaviour. As he says: 
- 
"American studies of organization have concentrated on the 
behavioral aspects of the rational system, and have tended 
to lose sight of the structures of consciousness and society 
that are presupposed in the performance of rational activities" 
(Brow, 1978, p. 366). 
Lack of comprehension of situations to which the assumption 
of rationality does not apply, has led to proposals such as 
the "garbage can model" of Cohen et al (1972). As these 
authors say, these are 
"situations of decision making under goal ambiguity. .. Often 
problems are resolved without recourse to explicit bargaining 
or to an explicit price system market - two common processes .I for decision making in the absense of consensus" (Cohen et 
al, 1972, p. 1). 
Their model is, in fact, an attempt to programme choices 
which are made in strictly political realms or, in other 
words, to translate Political issues to rational language. 
It is a programme that can be recognized as a programme of 
"prospective rationality", legitimated in the "discourse of 
competence", which is based on the ideological belief of 
qualified knowledge (Brown, 1978; Chaui, 1978). As suggested 
by Brown (1978), rationalization, i. e. retrospective or 
prospective rationality, is the means by which political 
actions earn the legitimizing pageantry of rationale. 
According to Allison (1971), a particular phenomenon can be 
explained differently depending on which theoretical assumption 
is taken to analyse it. Studying the Cuban missile crisis, he 
demonstrates that the affair can be explained from a rational, 
a behavioural. or a political perspective. At least two 
- 
conjectures can be made upon Allisonls(1971)analysis. First, 
considering the rationalistic tendency in the study of 
organizations, it could be argued that the principle of 
rationality can be used retrospectively toexplain organizational 
bahaviours. Second, it can be argued that organizational 
decisions convey rational-bahavio*ural as well as political 
components. But-the best contribution of Allison's (1971) 
analysis was to show how the interpretation of a phenomenon 
is tied up to the underlying assumption of the analysis. A 
way to avoid this sort of bias would be to integrate disparate 
perspective in a more comprehensive conceptual framework. 
As this study deals with patterns of influence in management 
decisions, it lays a strong focus on the political nature of 
decisions. Yet is does not disregard the -rational -behavioural 
component of decisions, and in this sense it is an attempt 
to get an integrative perspective. This does not mean that a 
new theory of organizational decisions is intended, the aim 
is a more comprehensive analytical model. 'In the rational- 
behavioural perspective, it approaches decisions as bargaining 
processes in which individuals or groups, comprising the -total 
organization's coalition, vie for their preferences within 
the decision arena. In the political perspective, as processes 
tailored according the social relationships legitimated in 
the social settings in which organizational decisions take 
place. 
-5- 
1.2 The Perspective of the Study 
The objective of this study is to identify patterns of 
influence in management decisions. To this end a pattern of 
influence is defined as a recurrent distribution ofinfluence 
in decision processes in organizations. Two questions were 
the point of departure of the research: who participates in 
the decision processes in the organizations studied? and, 
amongst the participants, who was the most influential actor? 
Moreover, it is hypothesized that the distribution of 
influence in organizational decisions is shaped within 
institutional frameworks and can also be affected by 
characteristics inherent to topics of decisions. Institutional 
frameworks are understood as the whole set of norms, rules 
and behaviours socially defined, and characteristics inherent 
to topics of decisions means properties of decisions which 
vary from one topic to another. Still, these are very 
incomplete definitions, but both points are taken up in the 
following chapters. 
The conceptual framework is presented in Figure 1.1. It is 
assumed that institutional frameworks are formed at three 
different levels. At the level of social context, the 
institutional framework is conceived as"social organization" 
in the sense advanced by Hall (1972). As he puts it, quoting 
Blau and Scott (1962) , 
it is the "networks of social relations 
and shared orientations ... often referred to as'the social 
-6- 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
SOCIAL CONTEXT 
ORGANIZATION ; ATIO 
TASK-ENVIRONMENT 
ORGANIZATION 
DECISION PROCESS 
PROPERTIES OF 
DECISIONS 
Figure 1.1 
Conceptual Framework 
- 
structure and culture, respectively" (Hall, 1972, p. 6). it 
is assumed that the diffuse and reciprocal relationships 
between the organization and the social context set limits 
to the distribution of influence in decision processes. 
The definition of institutional frameworks at the level of 
the task- environment is based on Butler ls(1984)conceptualization 
of institutional framework, which "includes legal measures 
provided by the State and non-State inspired regul. ations 
emanating from other powerful bodies, such as professional 
associations". As he says, "this- framework provides the 
general rules of the game" (Butler, 1984, p. 2). In other 
words, this means that this institutionalized environment 
sets up the norms and rules within which organizations have 
to abide. It is assumed that the distribution of influence 
in decision process is bound to the reciprocal and specific 
relationships between the organization and its task-enviroment. 
At the level of the organization, the institutional framework 
is conceived as the net of "norms., beliefs and attitudes 
generated around activities and decisions in the focal 
organization" (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 180). As Pfeffer says, it 
is possible to 
"affect feelings about decisions and actions independently 
of the actions themselves, because of the socially constructed 
nature of organizational reality. This means that while events 
have physical referents, such as patterns of promotion, 
budgýt allocation, and so forth, the meaning of these events 
is open to a social interpretation" (Pfeffer, 1981, p. 180). 
This socially constructed nature of organizational reality 
-8- 
provides the rules and norms which confer legitimacy to the 
role played and the influence exerted by social actors in 
decision process. It is assumed that the distribution of 
influence in decision processes is framed by institutionalized 
procedures existent in the focal organization. 
Furthermore, a set of characteristics inherent to decision 
topics are assumed to be associated with the distribution of 
influence in decision processes. These characteristics are 
defined as properties of decisions and refer to: the frequency 
with which the topic occurs; the predictability and irreversability 
of the decision outcomes; the dependencies of the decision 
upon resources and/or information; the locus of control of 
the most important resources and/or information to the decision; 
and the existence of disagreement about the issue. 
The distribution of influence in decision processes is 
theoretically conceptualized and operationally defined in 
Chapter 2. The theoretical concepts. and operational definition 
of the institutional frameworks are treated in Chapter 3, 
and properties of decisions are theoretically and operationally 
defined in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 deals with the research methods 
and the next five chapters describe and analyse the data. 
Chapter 6 gives the description of the organizations where 
the decisions were investigated. Chapter 7 analyses the 
variation in the distribution of influence in decision 
processes among the types of organizations. It also examines 
the relationships of the institutional frameworks - formed 
- 
at the task-environment level and at the organizational level 
- and of the properties of decisions with the distribution 
of influence. A Comparison of Brazilian and British 
management decision-making is carried out in Chapter 8, and 
in Chapters 9 and 10 the observed patterns of. influence in 
Brazil and Britain are examined in terms of the institutional 
framework existent at 'their respective social context. 
Finally, a summary of the results and the conclusions of the 
study are presented in Chapter 11. But, before e'ntering the 
next chapter, a few words have to be said about the possible 
contribution of this study to the field of organizational 
analysis. 
- 10 - 
1.3 Importance and Main Contribution of the Research 
The value and contribution of any research has to be sought 
at least on two grounds. It can be of theoretical and of 
practical value. This means that it can start attempting to 
discover a theory, without aiming at an immediate practical use 
of it, or it can only intend to test a theory for practical 
purposes. Nevertheless, whether a research gives a theoretical 
or a practical contribution is not only a matter of intent. 
The discovery of theory from data can always be given a 
practical contribution, and research which intend-ed only to 
test a theory for practical purposes may end up with the 
discovery of a new theory. 
This research does not have the pretentiousness of constructing 
a new theory, but neither is it a simple test of atheory for 
practical purposes. By attempting to integrate disparate 
theoretical perspective into a more comprehensive analytical 
design, it can be placed in between a theoretical and a 
practical intent. Its contribution to the field of organizational 
analysis would come from the potential of this integrated 
perspective in providing a practical model to identify 
patterns of influence in management decision making. A 
research design which incorporates different theoretical 
assumptions may also have the advantage of avoiding bias 
which can occur in the interpretation of a phenomenon when 
the analysis is grounded on a single assumption. To know 
- 11 - 
about patterns of influence in management decision making 
may be of great interest to very many people, other than this 
researcher herself. If modern societies are dominated by 
formal organizations, what is decided in these organizations 
affects people in various ways. But how can one have a say 
in decisions which affect one's own life? The answer can be 
found if one can understand the fashioning of the distribution 
of influence in organizational decisions and the resulting 
patterns of influence in management decision making. 
The study was conducted in Brazil, which is the author's 
native country, because there is a need toincrease knowledge 
about organizations in new industrialized countries (NIC). It 
seems that it can be of great importance to the extent that 
it provides better knowledge and understanding of organizational 
actions in Brazilian organizations. To this end, the study 
of decision making in organizations may be one of the most 
fruitful veins to explore. If one thinks of organizational 
actions as the outcomes of decisions, one may arguably say 
that decisions are the steering force in organizations, as 
they are in the wider society as well, and the analysis of 
organizational decisions is likely to allowa thorough insight 
into organizational life. 
As for Brazil, it has to be said that although the country 
has passed through a relatively high rate of economic 
development during the last decades, it is still lagging 
- 12 - 
behind, specially in terms of scienti 
field of social science was one of the 
of study during the last twenty years. 
this backwardness is particularly felt 
models, built in other cultural sets, 
the Brazilian social reality. 
fic development. The 
most neglected areas 
The consequence of 
when organizational 
are transplanted to 
As the organizational theory has grown together with the 
modern democratic State and the capitalist order, it has 
generally been presumed by theorists worried about generalizations 
that organizations's structure and process will tend to be 
similar in all cultural sets., differences being a matter of 
stage of industrialization and economic development. So far, 
the analysis of organizations, grounded either on Taylorist 
or behaviourist assumptions, as well as on Marxist assumptions, 
has enforced this view of universal convergence of organizations 
(Child and Kieser, 1981). Only in the sixties this view 
started to be challenged, probably very much influenced by 
Japanese economic development and management. Roberts and 
Boyacigiller (1-983) refer to tendencies inAmerican literature 
calling Zen and the art of Japanese management "today's 
latest fad" (p. 378). Meanwhile, cross- national empirical 
research has shown, on the one hand., that relationships 
between certain variables of organizational context and 
structure hold constant for world organizations in all 
societies, differences being small (Hickson et al, 1981). On 
the other hand, studies which have examined bureaucratic 
- 13 - 
controls and stratification pointed out striking differences 
amongst different cultures (Lammers and Hickson, 1981). 
This evidence seems consistent with Crozierls(1973) argument 
that 
"organizational behavior theories ... tend to be devided hopelessly between a hard side, which pretends to universalism 
while it is in fact culture bound, and a soft side, which 
deals in a very casual way with the problem of how 
organizations in other cultures deviate from the universalistic 
American patterns. If we want to overcome these very basic 
limitations to our understanding, we must see the cultural 
problem not as a secondary problem, but as a central one. 
Organizational systems are cultural answers to the problems 
encountered by human beings in achieving their collective 
ends. Although there are objetive rational constraints that 
limit possibilities, there is no one best way in this 
matter" (Crozier, 1973, p. 219). 
This is not a cross-national study, but it may be important 
to future cross-national research in so far asit shows how 
cultural factors can be brought into the analysis, to 
understand and explain organizational processes. This may 
be the way by which understanding and explanation of the 
existing differences between organizations in different 
nations can be improved. The absense of models which relate 
societal level variables to organizational structure and 
process, or that incorporate cultural factors, into the 
analysis, to explain the structuring of activities and 
processes in organizations, seems to be the main weakness of 
cross-national analysis. Even though tentatively, this study 
may give a contribution to this field as far as it provides 
a reasonable explanation of patterns of influence in 
- 14 - 
organizational decisions, not so much as a political or 
rational process but as a culturally rationalized process. 
Comparison of Brazilian and British decision-making is used 
to illustrate this point. 
CHAPTER 2 
DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE 
Introduction 
This chapter deals with the conceptualization and definition 
of the distribution of influence in decision processes in 
organizations. As it was argued, this study attempts to 
identify patterns in the distribution of influence in decision 
processes. A decision is an issue or problem about which 
people have to make choices and it is there that influence 
is at work. The distribution of influence is defined as the 
concentrat ion/dispers ion of participants in decision processes 
and their specific capability to influence decision outcomes. 
01 This definition encompasses two dimensions of the disiribution 
of influence, which are: participation and ability to influence 
in the decision process. Greater participation means greater 
number of people involved in the decision process. To the 
extent that participation is an opportunity to influence, it 
can be arqued that greater participation may indicate more 
dispersed distribution of influence. Ability to influence 
means the capability of each participant to obtain his/her 
desired outcome. The analysis focuses on the centre of 
influence or, in other words, on the position that influential 
actors hold in the organization. To the extent that decisions 
- 16 - 
are more influenced by people at higher echelons, it can be 
argued that the distribution of influence is less dispersed. 
The full definitions of these two dimensions are given inthe 
next sections. Section 2.2 deals with the concept of influence; 
Section 2.3 gives the definition and operationalization of 
centre of influence; and the definition and operational ization 
of participation is treated in Section 2.4. 
- 17 - 
2.2 The Concept of Influence 
Often influence has been confused with power, using them 
synonymously as did Patchen (1974). To a large extent the 
confusion seems to stem from the definition ofpower in which 
it is identified with the ability to influence. This 
identification exists, for instance, in Parsons' (1951) 
definition of power as "a person's ability to influence 
another person or persons to carry out orders", or Kaplan's 
(1964), as "the ability of one person or group of persons to 
influence the behavior of others" (quoted by Miles, 1981, p. 
165). The distinction between power and-influence is indeed 
a subtle one, but it does not seem wise to assume that they 
are synonymous. Borrowing the term from Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962), one may reasonably say that influence is one of the 
many "faces of power". 
Other authors have been attentive to stress the distinction 
between power and influence. For instance, to Katz and Kahan 
(1966) influence is observed in interpersonal relationships 
when a person acts intentionally to modify the behaviour of 
someone else. They talk of positive influence when the act 
of the influential actor produces the desired effect., and 
negative influence when it produces a non-desired effect. 
Still according to these authors, power and influence are 
distinguished in that power refers to potential acts and to 
some effective interpersonal transaction, where one actor 
- 18 - 
influences the behaviour of some others. In this sense power 
is capacity to influence, and this capacity can or cannot be 
exercised. 
Abell (1975) also distinguishes between influence and power 
or what he calls "bargaining power". As he says: 
"I want to distinguish between situations where B changes 
his objectives because A influences him to do so, and 
situations where B retains his objectives but'loses out' and 
A's objectives prevail" (p. 15). 
According to Abell, influence is the ability of a social 
actor to change someone's mind, while power is the social 
actor's ability to get what he wants out of bargaining, 
despite the opposition of the others. This means that 
influence occurs if A is able to change B's preferences, and 
that the exercise of power does not necessarily imply an act 
of influence, in the sense of changing one's preferences. 
In criticizing the prevalent view of power in organizational 
studies, Clegg (1979) arrives at a definition of power "as 
'potential' or 'capacity' for future action". To make his 
concept more clear he says that 
"in ordinary language, it would be the type of 'power' meant 
when we say that someone 'has power' or when we speak of 
someone 'being in power"' (Clegg, 1979, p. 109). 
Clegg is not explicitly concerned with the distinction 
between power and influence, but between the "exercise of 
power" and the "capacity to exercise power". What he criticizes 
is the concept of power, prevalent in organizational theory, 
19 
as the "exercise of power" which, after all, is understood 
as "ability to influence". Then he argues that 
"to abstract this concept of power as capacity out of 
analysis is to distract our attention from the underlying 
social relations that grant to some positions in organizations 
more or less 'capacity' to 'exercise' power than to others" 
(Clegg, 1979, p. 109). 
His argument is specially valuable at pointing to that aspect 
of power most neglected in empirical analysis of organizations. 
Of course the distinctions made by these authors are not 
exhaustive, nevertheless they are central to understand the 
definition of influence in the scope of this study. For the 
purpose of this research, influence is defined as the capacity 
of a social actor to obtain his desired outcome in a decision 
situation. This is to say that his will prevails over the 
others whether there was agreement or not among the participants 
in the decision. This definition encompasses Abell's notion 
of bargaining power, as it does not pressupose that the 
exercise of influence., in a decision situation, necessarily 
means to change someone's mind. It is a view of influence as 
the exercise of power, in the sense implied by Katz and Kahn 
(1966) of the effective use of power in adecision situation. 
Yet capacity to exercise power is incorporated into the 
analysis as a potential source of influence, without 
disregarding other contingent sources ofinfluence. This means 
that potential source to influence is understood as an 
institutional basis of power. 
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Below are detailed the specific variables of influence used. 
At this point, however, something can be said about the way 
in which influence was operationalized in general terms. To 
infer the distribution of influence in organizational decisions 
this research asks: a) who was involved in this decision? 
(from within, that is, members of the organization, or from 
without the organization), b) what is his/her positionin the 
organization? or, what is his/her relation with the organization? 
and c) how much has each participant influenced the decision 
outcome? Influence was measured in a five point scale, ranging 
from 1-a little, to 5-a great deal. (See Appendix I for 
full details of the scale). 
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2.3 The Centre of Influence in Organizational Decisions 
As stated in Section 2.2 , this research asked how much influence 
each participant exerted upon the decision outcome. The 
purpose of the question is to identify the most influential 
actor or group (as a person may be acting on behalf of others) 
in the decision arena. Individuals were identified according 
to their position in the organization, in the case of internal 
actors, and to their links with the focal *organization, in 
the case of external actors. Moreover, it was required that 
the respondents'inform the researcher of the role that each 
participant had in the decision. lt was thought that this 
information would be especially useful: first, to check the 
amount ofinfluence attributed to each participant. An actor 
who only provided some information but did not attend meetings 
or did not have the opportunity to express his own points of 
view, could not score high in influence. Second, to know the 
actor role in the decision process would also be helpful to 
disclose whether they were acting by themselves or on behalf 
of some group or another person. 
The identification of influential positions represents an 
attempt to locate the effective use of power in decision 
making. Although participation can be seen as a necessary 
condition to exert influence, it does not seem to be sufficient. 
One's influence cannot just be asserted in terms of one's 
participation in decision process. Yet the frequency of 
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participation may increase the opportunity of actors to 
influence but it cannot be understood as effective exercise 
of influence Wage and Aiken, 1967). 
The centre of influence reflects the hierarchical position 
of the influential actor. It is a parameter of the internal 
distribution of. influence in organizational decisions, and 
denotes the extent to which the distribution of influence is 
dispersed across hierarchical levels in the organization. 
The positions reported in the interviews were ordered in a 
five point scale representing hierarchical positions as 
follows: the president scores 5; a director scores 4; an 
advisor scores 3; a department head scores 2; and other 
positions score 1. Other positions refers to cases in which 
the position of the most influential actor did not fit into 
any of the previous four categories but did not represent a 
level below a department head, and one case, in which a council 
was reported as most influential in the decision. The most 
influential actor in each decision - that who scored higher 
in the influential scale - was ranked in the centre of influence 
scale according to his/her position in the organization. 
Lack of anorderly reference precluded the development of a 
scale to rank external influence. This has to be recognised 
as a limitation of this study. It very much restricts the 
assessment of external influence, to participation, in terms 
of the number of external actors involved in the decision. 
I 
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The exercise of influence by external participants can only 
be considered in terms of descriptive considerations about 
the score assigned to external actors in the influential 
scale. 
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2.4 Participation in Decision Process 
The theme of participation in organizational theory has, most 
of the time, been treated within the topic of industrial 
democracy, Stressing worker participation in organizational 
decisions (Heller et al, 1977; Horvath, 1983; Pateman, 1983; 
among others). Sheltered under the umbrella of industrial 
democracy, participation may also take on different forms 
such as indirect (through representatives) and direct 
participation (if the employees 
authority), as referred to by 
have some decision-making 
Rubenowitz et al (1983) in 
relation to Sweden. 
But, more important than forms, which are just the instrument 
to operate participative schemes, are the supporting claims 
that are made for participation (Clegg, 1983). Although all 
the proposals of participation have made claims to formal 
democratic theory, they have to be differentiated in terms 
of commitment to substantive 'democratic claims, or to 
organizational effectiveness. It is the latter which has been 
extensively propagated in the name of industrial democracy. 
As Donaldson and Gowler (1975) put it, there is an "explicit 
and implicit tendency for managers and researchers to link 
participation with performance" (p. 107). This is the sort 
of participation which has taken different forms or appeared 
under different labels, such as job restructuring, self-managing 
groups, works committees, quality control circle, autonomous 
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working groups and so on. One of the main characteristics of 
these schemes is that they are initiated from above, that is 
"for and not by the work force" (Clegg, 1983, p. -9), which 
would be a fundamental prerequisite of democratic participation. 
As put by Clegg (1983): 
"although it cannot be denied that such innovations have 
some democratic potential it may well be that this is more 
apparent than real value. In fact , its real value may 
be for the 
already concentrated power of management rather than formore 
dispersed and fragmented power of individual workers"(p. 7). 
An outstanding overview on the subject has been done by Dachler 
and Wilpert (1978). Taking a critical view of the literature 
on participation, these authors stressed the "proliferation 
of concepts", which they believe is due to the widespread 
interest for the phenomenon in many fields of the social 
sciences. As they say: 
"the questions that are asked about participation, and the 
answers which are sought, are shaped -by various paradigms 
which come from disciplines of psychology, sociology, 
economics, political science, and law" (Dachler and Wilpert, 
1978, p. 1). 
In revising the literature, Dachler and Wilpert present a 
conceptual framework which encompasses "four defining dimensions 
of participatory social arrangement in organizations". The 
first dimension, they say, 
,, refers to the social theories underlying participation which 
represent the basis for the values and assumptions of the 
designers and implementers of participaroty social arrangements 
in organizations as well as the goals and objectives in 
participation; the second dimension involves the properties 
of participatory systems; the third dimension is concerned 
with the contextual boundaries within which participation 
occurs and which limit or enhance the potential of 
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participatory social systems; and the fourth dimension, the 
outcomes of participation, is considered primarily in the 
examination of the first three" (Dachler and Wilpert, 1978, 
p. 3). 
The first dimension defined by Dachler and Wilpert (1978) is 
clearly related to what Clegg (1983) referred to as claims 
made for participation, and the second, to what was referred 
to by Rubenowitz et al (1983) as forms of participation. 
The view of. participation taken in this research is narrower 
than it can be suggested from the concepts advanced, in the 
literature on industrial democracy. First, it only refers to 
participation in decision processes; second, it is not 
concerned with employees' participation, but just anyone, 
from within or from without, whenever involved in decision 
processes; and third, it does not inquire what theoretical 
assumptions underlie participative schemes, or what the 
consequences are of different forms of participation, but 
how concentrated the participation in decision processes is. 
As has been said, the inquiry is only on the involvement of 
social actors in decision processes and the amount of influence 
they had upon decision outcomes. Despite this, features 
related to these two dimensions may emerge out of this 
analysis, so it seems important to be aware of them. For 
instance, greater participation associated with the centre 
of influence at higher echelons may indicate the existence 
of participative schemes grounded in productivity and efficiency 
orientation rather than in democratic theory. 
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In addition, Dachler and Wilpert's (1978) third dimensionj 
that is, the "contextual boundaries for participation", bears 
the basic dimension of this analysis. As they say, referring 
to these contextual boundaries for participation: 
"This defining dimension of participation refers to a broad 
array of both micro and macro levels factor which 'form the 
context for participating systems"(Dachler and Vfilpert, 1978, 
p. 22). 
The three institutional frameworks, related to the distribution 
of influence in this study, can be identified' in their 
characteristics of: society; other relevant organizations; 
and focal organization. Yet this research does not include 
the overall contextual factors suggested by Dachler and 
Wilpert (1978). It is concerned with "institutional frameworks" 
and does not contemplate the "characteristics" of groups and 
individuals within the organization as defining factors for 
participatory systems. Furthermore, it has to be stressed 
that as much as Dachler and Wilpertls(1978)objective differs 
from the objective of this study, their definition of contextual 
boundary factors differs from the definition given ' to 
institutional frameworks here. Yet the consistent identification 
of these broad contextual factors points out their importance 
to the analysis of participation in organizational decisions. 
For the purpose of this research, participation denotes the 
number of people involved in decision processes. Thus the 
terms participation and involvement are used as synonymous 
throughout this text. The interviewees were asRed toindicate 
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all the individuals that had, in any way, participated inthe 
decision processes. This includes everyone who had any role 
in the decision, even if their participation had not gone 
beyond providing some minor information, without any further 
involvement. 
In order to observe the weight of internal and external 
individuals or groups upon the organiZational decisions, 
involvement was unfolded so investigating: 
(a) internal involvement, meaning the number of people 
from within involved in the decision processes; and 
(b) external involvement, meaning the number of people 
from without involved in the decision processes. 
Who the people are from within or from without is not always 
a clear-cut-issue. The distinction is actually a matter of 
where to place the organizational boundary, which is a problem 
not yet resolved in the literature (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978; Mintzberg, 1983). This research did not attempt a priori 
demarcation of the boundary of the organization. This was 
left to the judgement of respondents, who were asked to 
mention all the people, in the organization and outside it 
who had participated in the decision in any way. The answers 
revealed that only those who are genuinely active in the 
organization's daily life are thought of as members. Though 
the nature or form of links which bind people to an organization 
may be indicative of membership, it does not seem to be the 
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decisive criterion. The attribution of membership in terms 
of people's activity in the organization, lends credit to 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) who suggest that organization'-s 
boundaries have to be drawn around behaviours'and activities 
and not individuals. 
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TABLE 2.1 
DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Variables Definition 
Denotes the 
Centre of hierarchical 
Influence position of the most 
influential actor 
The number of 
Internal people from within 
Involvement involved in the 
decision process 
The number of 
External people from without 
Involvement involved in the 
decision process 
Operationalization 
Most influential person scored 
S. President 
4. Director 
3. Advisor(eg staff position) 
2. Department head 
1. Other 
Who was involved in this 
decision: number of 
individuals in the 
Organization who had any 
form of participation in 
the decision process 
Who was involved in this 
decison: number of 
individuals outside the 
organization who had any 
form of participation in 
the decision process 
CHAPTER 3 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
3.1 Introduction 
This study relates the distribution of influence in organizational 
decisions to institutional frameworks. In this sense, it is 
an attempt to explain the ascendancy of institutions and"their 
fashioning of relative spheres of influence for both groups 
and individuals" in decision-making situations in organizations 
Wilson, 1984, p. 4). 
An institutional framework represents the whole set ofnorms, 
rules and behaviours socially defined and legitimated*in any 
social setting. It is argued that organizational decisions 
cannot be isolated from the context in which they take place 
and that they are embedded in institutional frameworks existent 
in these contexts. As it was posited in Chapter 1, organizational 
decisions are assumed to be bound by three institutional 
frameworks, distinguished according to their loci of formation, 
which are: 
(a) the focal organization; 
(b) the task-environment; and 
(c) the social context. 
These institutional frameworks are defined in the following 
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sections, but to understand their definition it is necessary 
to spell out, in more detail, what is meant by institutions 
and institutionalization, and this is the subject ofthe next 
section. 
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3.2 Perspective on Institutions and Institutionalization 
"Although sociologists have long and- frequently spoken of 
'social institutions', the term has no precise and uniform 
usage. It is generally applied to aspectsofsocial behaviour 
regulated by well-established, easily recognized and 
relatively stable Inorms', values and laws. Institutionalization 
as a process means the gradual growth and crystallization of 
rules of behaviour in various social and organizational 
settings" (The MacMillan Student Encyclopaedia of Sociology, 
1983, p. 172). 
These simple and clear-cut definitions seem a good starting 
point to understand the meaning of institutions and 
institutionalization. By institutions it is meant social 
forms which are established in any given social setting. 
These social forms are born in the process of crystallization 
of values and beliefs into social norms and rules, which is 
the process of institutionalization. According to this 
reasoning, established social forms exist as institutions 
when they came into life through the process of institutionalization 
of accepted and traditional values and beliefs. 
Reference to accepted and traditional values and beliefs 
presupposes that legitimated values and beliefs can be 
institutionalized into lasting social forms. This legitimacy 
appears as the basic support of institutions. But acceptance 
and tradition have to be separated conceptually. Acceptance 
corresponds to the legitimation of values and beliefs by a 
social entity or, in other words, acceptance means the 
recognition and approval necessary to substantiate legitimacy. 
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Tradition reflects the enduring character of the institutions. 
Once values and beliefs are legitimated and translated into 
social norms and rules, they can become traditional. As 
Zucker (1977) points out (quoting from Hughes, 1936: 180): 
"the only idea common to all usages of the termlinstitution' 
is that of some sort of establishment of relative permanence 
of a distinctly social sort" (p. 726). 
At the same time, as tradition bestows identity tothe social 
setting, it strengthens the process oflegitimation of social 
norms and rules (Habermas, 1976). 
To say that institutions are traditional is not to disbelieve 
in social evolution. Change in values and beliefs that occur 
in a social setting makes a claim for changes in its institutions. 
Thus one may expect that institutions will be reinterpreted 
as values and beliefs are redefined. But the very existence 
of institutions follows a process of institutionalization of 
values and beliefs which can only happen if they have been 
stably shared. To Zucker (1977): 
"I institutionalization is both a process and a property 
variable. It is the process by which individual actors 
transmit what is socially defined as real and, at the same 
time, at any point in the process the meaning of an act can 
be defined as more or less a taken-for-granted part of this 
social reality" (p. 278). 
Zucker (1977) suggests that "cultural persistence" is directly 
related to the degree of institutionalization. This means 
that more institutionalized values and beliefs result in norms, 
rules, attitudes and behaviours more resistant to change. 
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By distinguishing the larger social context, the task- 
environment context and the context of the organizations, 
this study is treating each of these defined contexts as a 
particular social setting. Then it is argued that, in each 
social setting, norms and rules of behaviour are socially 
defined according to shared values and beliefs. Furthermore, 
it is assumed that the frameworks of institutionalized norms 
and rules that exist in each social setting shape the social 
forms and process in their own sphere and in the sphere of 
those social settings related to them. 
By their very definition, norms and rules of behaviour in 
interrelated social settings do not happen in isolated spheres. 
The relationships between social organized systems may create 
interdependencies that, in turn, demand some consistency 
between their norms and rules of behaviour. Yet, as has been 
consistently argued, people living in modern societies have 
their lives linked to different organized systems in which 
they participate (Blau and Scott, 1964; Crozier, 1964; among 
others). If the values and beliefs of these individuals - 
values and beliefs that they acquired in their own process 
of socialization - bestow identity to organized social systems, 
the social definition of norms and rules of behaviour in 
these settings might necessarily be interrelated. 
The extent to which people are linked to the various existing 
organized systems, the shared values and beliefs underlying 
the existing institutional frameworks are likely to bear the 
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same basic ethos. According to this argument, it may be 
expected that the institutions which exist within a larger 
social context strongly affect each other, and are likely to 
portray many commom cultural traits. 
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3.3 The Institutional Framework at the Organizational Level 
To keep control over activities and to legitimate their actions, 
organizations tend to standardize procedures by rules as 
well as by incorporating norms and practices socially defined 
(Meyer and Rowan, 1977). These institutionalized procedures 
may well support some desired involvement and influence in 
decision process while keeping others out. As Wilson (1984) 
says, 
"the ways in which organizations are organized have a 
pervasive influence on the ways in which relations between 
interests are fashioned and how they are manifested in 
decision process" (p. 5). 
According to these arguments it may be expected that the 
distribution of influence in decision processes will be 
commanded, on the one side, by the structurally defined roles 
and relations within the. organizations and, on the other, by 
standardized procedures. 
For a long time the concept of rational structures as the 
effective means of control and co-ordination, congruent with 
the ends to be achieved, has dominated organizational theory. 
In this view the structuring of activities in organizations 
is a technical rational matter. As Meyer and Rowan (1977) 
observe, 
"by focusing on the management of complex relational networks 
and the exercise of co-ordination and control, prevailing 
theories have neglected an alternative Weberian source of 
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formal structure: the legitimacy of rationalized formal 
structure" (P. 343). 
Although these authors touched very well the core of the 
problem, they drove their attention to the way-in which the 
institutionalized environment constrains the co-ordination 
and control of productive activities in organizations. Their 
argument is that the structures of formal organization reflect 
rationalized institutional rules., thus they cannot serve pure 
efficiency criteria, or, in other --words, maintain close 
alignments between structure and activities inpure technical 
terms. As they say: 
"Categorical rules conflict with the logic of efficiency. 
Organizations often face the dile mma that activities 
celebrating institutionalized rules, although they count as 
virtuous ceremonial expenditures, are pure cost from the 
point of view of efficiency" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977, p. 355). 
By trying to explain the political face of the structuring 
of activities as the genuine fruit of rationalized institutional 
environment, Meyer and Rowan (1977) lose sight of the 
organizations themselves as social realities. 
This study looks at the organizations as a social reality 
capable of creating their own myths, rituals and norms which 
-reflect the organizational culture(Pettigrew, 1979; Pfeffer, 
1981). This view does not contradict the argument advanced 
in Section 2.3. that the institutional framework existing in 
each organized social system is influenced by the institutional 
framework existing in other social settings related to it. 
To see organizations as social realities is actually to assume 
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that apart from the institutional and contingent constraints, 
which may impose limits on them, they still have some 
discretion to set up their rules and to define the structure 
of roles and relations within their realm (Child, 1972). In 
other words, this is to assume that norms and rules which are 
socially defined in each organization. reflect particular 
traits of the organization's culture, and can be manifested 
in the structurally defined roles and relations and in the 
standardization of procedures. Then it is argued that the 
distribution of influence in decision processes is bound to 
the way roles and relations are structured and procedures are 
standardized in the focal organization. 
As Wilson (1984) says, "the ways in which organizations are 
organized", or, as it is posited here, the structure of roles 
and relations in organizations, may serve to define the 
distribution of influence in decision processes. This argument 
is an interpretation of Weber's analysis of bureaucracy, that 
the hierarchical positions define and legitimize the roles 
and authority of the social actors in the organizations. 
To identify the position of the infuential actors indecision 
processes, and whether their influence derives from structurally 
defined roles and relations, this study starts with a 
description of the organizations. Though brief, this description 
also focuses on the origin, history and activities of the 
organizations, to paint a picture of the organizational 
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context. 
It has been argued that "procedures are standardized when 
there are rules or definitions that cover all circumstances 
and that apply invariably" (Pugh et al, 1968). This argument 
suggests that only when events can be predicted, can they be 
defined and rules applied, and therefore standardized procedures 
can be established. 
Evidence of a negative correlation of standardization of 
procedures with delegation of responsibilities for decisions, 
has led to the conclusion that organizations tend to 
decentralize the locus of decision making when they can rely 
on standardized procedures (Blau, 1970; Hinings and Lee, 1971; 
Child, 1972). On the other hand, the nature of the correlations 
found -between centralization and standardization., in the Aston 
study, led Pugh et al (1968) to suggest that there is no 
clear relationship between them. Different , if not contradictory 
interpretations have been given to these correlations.. Blau 
(1970) has interpreted the negative correlation that he found 
between these variables'as standardization resulting in 
decentralization of power. Then he argues that itcontradicts 
the Weberian bureaucratic model of organization, which in 
his interpretation presupposes apositive correlation between 
standardization and centralization of decisions. Retaining 
the same interpretation of the bureaucratic model, Pugh et 
al (1968) also reject the Weberian formulation on the grounds 
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that centralization 'is independent. of standardization, and of 
other structural variables as well. Yet, these interpretations 
have been refuted and counterbalanced with the argument that 
standardization is actually an alternative form of control 
and represents itself a form of centralization (Bates, 1970; 
Child, 1970/1972). 
For the purpose of this research, standardization is defined 
as the extent to which there are predetermined procedures to 
steer the decision process. If standardization of procedures 
does serve as an alternative form of control, it may be 
expected that it will result in lower involvement and lower 
centre of influence in decision processes. But it may also 
be hypothesized that procedures are standardized to legitimate 
-roles, and decisions themselves. In this case, it may even 
Tesult in greateT involvement, but it is likely do not have 
any relation. with. the centre of influence. 
A five-point ordinal scale was developed to measure 
standardization. A decision which followed regular established 
procedures scored 5 and when no established procedure on how 
to behave existed, the score 1 was assigned to the decision 
(see Appendix 1 for full details of the scale). 
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3.4 The Institutional Framework at the Task-Environment 
Level 
Over the last decades. theorists of organizations have shown 
increasing interest *in organization- environment relations 
(Burns and Stalker, 1961; Chandler, 1962; Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1961). This approach usually portrays the relationships of 
contingent factors with the organization's structure and 
process. Departipg from- a perspective which saw the organizations 
no longer as entities governed according to universal principles 
of control and co-ordination but enacted by a process of 
adjustment to its environment, the organizational theory 
developed to arrive at a mutual adjustment perspective. Miles 
and Snow (1978) have termed the latter the neo-contingency 
perspective, 
Itas one that (1) views managerial or strategic choice as the 
primary link between the organization and its environment; 
(2) focuses on management's ability to create, learn about, 
and manage the organization's environment; and (3) encompass 
the multiple ways that organizations respond toenvironmental 
conditions" (p. 263). .. 
These theories indicate that the task-environment af f ects the 
organizations, forcing them to take actions either to adjust 
to the environment demands or to manipulate it. 
The environment of an organization can be understood as the 
context surrounding the focal organization. It encompasses 
all collectivities and individuals which interact with and/ 
or are relevant to the organization, and has been identified 
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as task-environment (Dill, 1959; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1961). 
A more inclusive view of the environment of organizations is 
advanced by Hall (1972) who first sees it as a "range of 
conditions that appear to have important influence on 
organizations" (p. 297). Then he divides the environmental 
conditions into two categories: the first he says "contains 
those general conditions that must be of concern to all 
organizations" - the ec'Onomiq conditions, the political 
conditions and so on. 
the second category contains specific environmental 
influences on fhe organization, such as other organizations 
with which it interacts or particular individuals who are 
crucial to it" (P. 298). 
As Hall says, his definition of environmental conditions "is 
a modification of William Dill's notion of "task- environment " 
(p. 298). His division is based on the distinction he makes 
between conditions which imply direct interaction of the focal 
organization with the environment, and conditions which are 
important but do not imply direct interation of an organization 
with the environment. These are general conditions in the 
sense that they are the same for all, but particular 
organizations will be concerned with the conditions that are 
relevant to them. The societal context, as it is defined here, 
is included in Hall's (1972) general conditions. It is very 
similar to what he defines as "cultural condition", but this 
is the subject of the next section. For now, it seems 
important to note that his other "general conditions" are 
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very much culturally determined. The political conditions, 
certainly, are the best example of this. 
This study perferred to assume Dill's (1959) definition of 
task-environment which encompasses: (1) customers, both 
distributors and users; (2) suppliers, of material, equipment, 
labour, capital and work-space; (3) competitors, for both 
markets and resources; and (4) regulatory groups, government 
agencies, unions and inter-firm associations. But it has to 
be stressed that two perspectives have been used tointerpret 
this environment: the resource dependence perspective(Levine 
and White, 1961; Thompson, 1967 ; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) ; 
and the perspective on institutions (Zucker, 1977; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Karpik, 1978). Though these two perspectives 
have been taken as conceptually different, theymayhave much 
more to complement than to contradict each other. 
Butler's (1984) proposals of "a theory of institutional 
frameworks" is an example of how to profit from both the 
resource dependence and the institutional perspectives. By 
blending these two perspectives, he derives a taxonomy of 
organizations which relates the types of organizations to 
co-ordination norms and institutional rules built up at the 
task-environment. A summary of his typology is presented 
in Table 3.1. It suggests that the institutional framework 
formed at the task- environment level can be split and related 
to different types of organizations. If organizational 
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structure and process are constrained by these institutional 
frameworks, as Butler (1984) suggests, his typology may be 
used as an analytical tool to observe how the distribution 
of influence in organizational decisions is associated to 
these institutionalized norms and rules. 
TABLE 3.1 
TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Organization Go-oTdination Norms 
Market economic 
Bureaucracy instrumental 
Professional referent 
Institutional Formal Rules 
law of tort, contract and 
companies 
act or bill of legislature 
license to practice 
registration 
Collective moral law of equity, charities 
and trusteeships 
(Adapted from Richard J Butler "Institutional Frameworks", 1984). 
It is assumed that the institutional framework existent at 
the task-environment provides norms and rules which apply 
particularly to different types of organization. The extent 
to which these norms and rules actually give the rules of 
the game to organizational processes, it can be expected 
that the different types of organization shall portray a 
particular pattern of influence in management decision-malýing. 
Furthermore, it was inquired as to whether the decisionwas 
constrained by some regulation settled from outside, or by 
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expectations, of performance or behaviour, that were held by 
other organizations or individuals in relations to the focal 
organization. It has been said that "the literature on regulation 
is so extensive and eclectic as to defy any neat taxonomy" 
(Owen and Braeutigam, 1978). Regulations may have social and 
economic inspiration. Economic regulations set up the general 
norms of economic transaction, but they -may still be very 
specific, i. e. designed to control specific industry or even 
specific organization. Some examples of economic regulations 
are taxation, monopoly and price control. Referring to 
economic regulations, Stigler (1971) observes that 
"the central tasks of the theory of economic regulation are 
to explain who will receive the benefits or burdens of 
regulation, what form regulation will take, and the effects 
of regulation upon the allocation of resources" (p. 3). 
Yet quoting Stigler, Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) talk about 
"two views to explain why governments regulate or intervene 
in markets" (P. 203). These views explain regulations as 
related to the beneficiaries that couldbe the general public 
or a particular industry. Social regulations usually embody 
environmental pollution, occupational safety, consumer 
protection, etc. Though they may also be specific - for 
example, be addressed to regulate a specific industry's 
pollution effects - their main distinctive feature. resides 
in their character of safeguard of social equity. 
This research is not concerned with specific regulations but 
on how the very existence of regulations may affect the 
distribution of influence in the decision process. The 
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question it asks is whether some regulation constrained the 
decision outcome and, in the case of an affirmative answer, 
which regulation? Either because or-ganizations may benefit 
from or pay the burden of regulations, these are recognized 
as dependencies, and it has been argued that the organizations 
pursue special strategies to manage these dependencies (Pfeffer 
and Salancik,, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Moreover, to cope with 
uncertainty has been pointed up as a source of power in 
organizations (Crozier, 1964; Hickson, et al, 1971). Thus it 
can be expected that the more the decision is constrained by 
regulations the greater the influence o-f those who deal with 
external dependencies. 
The definition of expectation was not anticipated iheoretically. 
It came out during the test of the interview schedule. 
Explaining the non-existence of regulations on the specific 
matter of the decision, the interviewee revealed thata factor 
which could have induced the organization to the decision 
was the expectation of a supplier. This supplier showed 
worries about the organization's performance and hinted at 
the difficulties in their relationship in the future if some 
corrective action was not taken. From this evidence, it was 
postulated that besides regulation there should exist some 
implicit norms of behaviour and performance that the organizations 
must satisfy to keep good relationship with the environment. 
Thus expectation, together with regulation, are viewed as 
external constraints and defined as the extent to which 
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decisions are bound by regulations and normative practices. 
It resulted in a three-point Ordinal scale of external 
constraint. Regulation is interpreted as a greater constraint, 
and decisions constrained by regulation scored 3; decisions 
constrained by expectation scored 2; and decisions that were 
not constrained scored 1. This means to presume that regulations 
impose greater constraint on decisions than expectation, and 
it is expected that the greater the external constraint the 
greater the number of outside people involved in the decision. 
3.4.1 External Dependence 
To arrive at a decision or to implement a decision, organizations 
are usually dependent on various resources, either physical 
resources or information. When the organizations control the 
resources they need to make a decision, they have the 
necessary discretion to make and implement the decision. But 
if these resources are controlled by other organizations or 
persons outside the focal organization, the decision is 
dependent on the external actors who control the resources. 
For instance, a decision to launch a new product may depend 
on the suppliers to deliver the raw materials in due time 
and quantities. Of course that external dependence willexist 
if the resource is important and cannot be substituted. 
Resources that are not important or that can be substituted 
cannot create a situation of dependence (Pfeffer and Salancick, 
1978). 
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Although the dependence on external resources, by itself, 
cannot be understood as institutional constraint, some 
association can still exist between the organizations' external 
dependence and the institutionalized task-environment. As 
far as the rules of the game, forexchanges between organizations, 
can be set up in the institutionalized task-environment - 
and as these rules may apply differently to different types 
of organizations - it seems reasonable to assume that the 
way in which these external dependencies affect the distribution 
of influence in organizational decisions might differ from 
one type of organization to another. As Pfeffer q-nd Salancik 
(1948) say: 
"an organization's vulnerability to extraorganizational 
influence is partly determined by the extent to which the 
organization has come to depend on certain typesofexchanges 
to its operation" (p. 46). 
For the purpose of this research, external dependence is 
defined as the extent to which *decisions depend on. external 
resources. It is assumed that the more the decision depends 
on external resources the greater the involvement of outside Cý 
people in the decision process. 
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3.5 The Institutional Framework at the Macro Social Level 
Studies focusing the relationships between organizations and 
environment have been limited to the analysis of the task- 
environment/organization interaction. A rare exception is 
Crozier's (1964) remarkable study of bureaucracy in France. 
In his comparison of British and Japanese factories, Dore 
(1973) also points up the cultural differences behind the 
observed patterns of industrial relations in the two countries. 
Van Doorn (1981) suggests that "the genesis of organizations 
can be understood from the influence of dominant ideas"(-p. 67), 
that is from the pervasiveness of institutionalized values 
and beliefs. 
But analysis relating organizations totheir societal context 
has not progressed very much indeed. Cross- cultural researchers 
are divided between the divergence and the convergence thesis 
as differences and similarities have been found. However 
explanations of these findings have been rather speculative. 
Hofstede's (1980) seminal research in subsidiaries of a 
multinational in about 40 countries is specially notable in 
pointing up the differences and similarities among such a 
multitude of nations. The four culture-value dimensions that 
he derives from the data give clear evidence of the 
importante of culture to organizations. He is quite aware of 
this and relates his findings to a lot of cultural factors. 
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But the greatness of his work makes its, weakness. Even 
grouping the nations in smaller clusters, according to the 
observable common features, which can be related to commom 
cultural traits, does not seem satisfactory in understanding 
the complexity of his findings. Diversity seems tobe greater 
than that. 
It appears that two major difficulties have hindered the 
analysis of the organizations in terms of 'their relations 
with the cultural setting to which they belong. First, as 
Hofstede (1981) says, 
"the cultural component inall kinds of behavior is difficult 
to grasp for people who remain embedded in the same cultural 
environment; it takes a prolonged stay abroad and mixing with 9> the people there to recognize the numerous and often subtle 
differences in the way they and we behave because that is 
how our society has programmed us" (p. 27). 
Hofstedels observation suggests that the researcher has to 
be predisposed to recognize cultural relativity for him to 
start drawing attention to cultural components. Second., to 
relate organizations to social cultural systems certainly 
implies an incursion into other fields of social sciences, 
such as anthropology, political sciences, psychology, etc. 
This also requires of the researcher a special mood. 
An additional complication that arises in cross -cultural 
analysis of organizations is that, besides the bulk of 
information about the social system, it requires a clear 
understanding of the cultural traits of these societies. 
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Specially when organizations in more than two countries are 
being compared, the researcher, a student of organizations, 
seldom has enough knowledge about a large number of foreign 
cultures. 
Nevertheless, experience has provided commom sense on the 
impact of cultural differences upon organizations, not only 
across countries but in different regions of the same country 
(Crozier, 1964; Hall., 1972). As Hall (1972) observes, 
"the experiences of organizations that attempt to establish 
new operating units across national boundaries or in different 
regions of the United States provide commom sense examples 
of the inportante of cultural differences. Unless the values 
and behaviors of the indigenous population are understood 
and appreciated, such projects are likely to fail"(p. 305). 
This research is concerned with basic institutions prevailing 
in one society (in this case the Brazilian society)and their 
modelling effects upon organizational decisions. Social, 
political, religious and economic institutions carry on 
societal norms which portray particular cultural traits of a 
given society. This view embodies 
"a fundamental idea of sociology - namely, that the 
institutions which exist in the different spheres of society 
are not merely co-existent but are connected with each other 
by relations of concordance or contradiction and mutually 
affect each other" (Bottomore, 1966, p. 122). 
It is argued that as part of a society the organizations 
present the same cultural traits that are found in these 
larger institutions. Thus it is expected that patterns of 
influence in organizational decisions follow the same general 
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norms institutionalized in the society where they exist. But 
the range of institutions is too extensive to be tacRied all 
at once. Hence this research concentrates on two institutions, 
more closely related to organization and supposedly more 
relevant to the intended analysis. These are: the political- 
administrative system and the productive system. 
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TABLE 3.2 
DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF STANDARDIZATION, 
EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT AND EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE 
Variables Definition Operationalization 
Standardization 
of 
Procedures 
The extent to which 
there are pre- 
determined procedures 
to steer the decision 
process 
Decision came on: 
5. through regular procedures 
4. within some regular 
procedures 
3. rules were settled at the 
beginning 
2. following loose guidelines 
1. without any pattern 
The extent to which 
External decisions are bound by 
Constraint regulations and 
normative practices 
External 
Dependence 
The extent to which 
decisions depend on 
external resources 
Decision is constrained: 
3. by regulation 
2. by expectation 
1. not constrained 
Decision depended on: 
0 suppliers 
o customer 
o goverment 
o other, as quoted by 
respondents 
CHAPTER 4 
PROPERTIES OF DECISIONS 
4.1 The Range of Organizational Decisions 
organizations are making decisions all the time', and these 
decisions refer to many different subjects. They have to 
decide when and who to hire and fire; what is going to be 
produced; how much price for the product; where and when to 
buy raw materials, machineries, etc. This means that the 
range of organizational decisions is quite ample, not only 
in terms of the number of decisions that are made, but also 
in terms of the variety of topics that the decisions are 
about. 
A rather simple defininition of a decision topic is that it 
refers to the subject of the decision. Most frequently, the 
subject of decisions has been identified with the functional 
task it refers to. Thus decisions have usually been referred 
to as personnel decisionst finance decisions, purchase 
decisions and so forth. Some researches have concentrated on 
a single decision topic, for instance, as Patchen (1974) who 
analysed purchase decisions, or Mumford and Pettigrew (1975) 
who were still more specific by analysing the purchase of 
computers. Analysis centred on a single topic of decision 
seem to imply that each topic is very particular so that 
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features of decision processes are associated with that 
particular topic and are likely to be different in decisions 
of different topics. As a matter of fact, there seems to 
exist some evidence that the topic of a decision is associated 
with features of decision processes, and are very similar in 
some characteristics (e. g. Mintzberg et al, 1976; Hickson et 
al, 1986). But it does not seem that one can exactly predict 
how a decision is likely to be handled by knowing the subject 
of the decision. 
Despite the similarity in characteristics, that all finance 
decisions or all personnel decisions etc may present, there 
is not a clear-cut demarcation which indicates they are unique 
in their own. It really appears that different subjects may 
present commom characteristics, while the same subject may 
show differences in characteristics indifferent circumstances. 
For instance, a decision to invest in new technology is not 
necessarily more unpredictable or is likely to give rise to 
greater controversies than a decision to implement a new 
payment system. Meanwhile, two decisions to invest in new 
technology may sharply differ in the degree they are 
predictable; for instance, in two different firms, if one 
firm has little knowledge about the new technology and the 
other a great domain of it. 
This -research refers to characteristics inherent to decision 
topic to mean that under different circumstances these 
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characteristics might vary as one passes from one topic to 
another. Thus, attempting to increase the variability of 
characteristics inherent to decisions, this research proposes 
to cover a variety of topics as numerous as possible. 
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4.2 Inherent Characteristics of Decisions and Related 
Variables 
Characteristics inherent to decision topics have been associated 
with characteristics of decision-making processes. For 
instance, Simon (1957) differentiates programmed and non- 
programmed decisions. His concept of programmed decisions 
bears the assumption that the frequency and predictability 
of a decision topic indicate how the process might be worked 
out and even who might be responssible for the decision. In 
these situations, solutions are given to individuals who have 
just to choose the appropriate solution when he/she receives 
a stimulus. 
Extending Simon's argument, Thompson and Tuden(1959) suggest 
a typology of decision issues based on the level of agreement 
about "consequences of alternative courses of action" and on 
"preferences about outcomes". According to these authors, if 
there is no disagreement about possible outcomes and a perfect 
knowledge about means/end is available , the decision process 
is a utilitarian calculation of consequences. They call it 
decision by computation and it is the equivalent of Simon's 
programmed decisions. If there is agreement about preferred 
outcomes but knowledge about means/end is incomplete, they 
say that decision must follow a judgmental process. This is 
equivalent to those decision situations that Simon (1957) 
describes as "satisfacing search". When there is perfect 
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knowledge about causation but disagreement about possible 
outcomes, Thompson and Tuden (1959) suggest that bargaining 
is the means to arrive at a decision, and they termed it 
"decision by compromise". Their last type of decision is 
"decision by inspiration" which will happen when there is 
neither knowledge about causation nor agreement about possible 
outcomes. According to these authors the existing cleavage 
around a decision topic marks out the decision processes. 
It has also been said that the division oflabour begets both 
distinctive points of view and interdependence(Crozier, 1964; 
ITIckson et al, 1971; MUMfOTd and Pettigrew, 1975). People 
performing different jobs have different references, training, 
experience and preferences. Organizations create specialized 
units to cope with special uncertainties, but these parties 
have to work together, as a whole that forms the organization, 
-resulting in interdependence. Thus decisions can be distinguished 
as being more or less interdependent. 
Yet as Hickson et al (1971) argue, 
"intraorganization dependence can be associated with two 
contributing variables: (1) the degree to which a subunit 
copes with uncertainty for other subunits, and (2) the 
extent to which a subunit *s coping activities are substitutable. 
But if coping with uncertainty, and substitutability, are to 
be in some way related to power, there is a necessary 
assumption of some degree of task interconnection among 
subunits. By definition, organization requires a minimum 
link. Therefore, a third variable, centrality, refers to the 
varying degree above such a minimum with which the activities 
of a subunit are linked with those of other subunits"(P. 218). 
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This argument suggests that individuals or groups who have 
control of the most critical resources to a decision are in 
the centre of the decision process or, in other words, that 
control of critical resources is a potential source to 
influence the decision outcome. 
Last but not least there is the problem of the commitment that 
a decision may represent to the organization. While some 
decisions may be easily reversed, others may imply a long- 
term commitment to the organization (Staw and Ross, 1978). 
Courses of action which cannot beeasily changed characterize 
a non-reversible decision and these situations may be 
associated with characteristic features ofdecision processes. 
These six characteristics are recognized as inherent to 
decision topics and are defined here as properties of 
decisions. It is assumed that decision topics can be 
characterized according t o the intensity o f these variable 
properties, and that the distribution of influence in 
organizational decisions can be linked to t he variability of 
these properties of decis ion topics. 
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4.2.1 Predictability 
It has been argued that mankind is 
limits which render it impossible 
subjected to cognitive 
for decision makers to 
know all available alternatives in a decision situation 
(Simon, 1957; March and Simon, 1958). According to this 
argument, decisions can never be completely predicted, as a 
certain degree of uncertainty will always exist in decision 
situations. One may imagine that the predictability of 
organizational decisions might vary from 
situation, like Simon's (1957) programmed 
high uncertain situation, like Thompson's 
decisions. 
In this study, the definition of predicta 
Thompson's (1967) concept of uncertainty 
an almost certain 
decisions, to a 
(1967) judgmental 
bility is based on 
due to lack of 
knowledge about "cause-and-effect relationships". It denotes 
the extent to which there is certainty about the alternative 
solutions to a decision. As Thompson (1967) observes: 
11as areas within the organization shift from characteristically 
conrputational to characteristically judgmental decision 
strategies, the dominant coalition will expand to include 
their representatives" (p. 136). 
It may be expected that the lower the predictability about 
alternative solutions to a decision, the greater the number 
of people involved in the decision process. As for the centre 
of influence, it may be expected that more predictable 
decisions can be programmed and are likely to be delegated 
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to lower echelons. On the'other hand, to the extent that 
lower predictability may demand greater participation, itmay 
signify the inclusion of lower echelons in decision processes, 
and this may result in a more dispersed distribution of 
influence. Yet it has to be remembered that participation 
may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition toexercise 
influence. This research inquires who the most influential 
actor was among the participants in the decision processes. 
A five-point ordinal scale was developed to measure 
predictability (see interview schedule 2, question 13, 
Appendix 1). A hi-gh predictable decision scored 1, and means 
that the decision makers knew everything they believed was 
important to the decision. A decision assigned a score 5 
means that the decision makers did not have any information 
about the possible alternative solutions to the decision. 
4.2.2 Frequency 
The frequency of a decision topic means the regularity at 
which it has occurred. It seems obvious that some topics of 
decision come up very often, others occur occasionally and 
others will happen very rarely. It still may happen that an 
organization will be dealing with a decision topic for the 
first time. 
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To say that frequent decisions are those which occur regularly 
may seem to be referring to topics of decision which occur 
at regular intervals. But this is not the concept of frequency 
of decision topics adopted in this study. For the purposes 
of this study, topics of decision -which occur regularly means 
how often the organization has dealt with decisions which 
are similar., not necessarily equal, to that being investigated. 
What is important is the organization's accumulated experience 
in the matter, so it can refer to its past experience to 
orientate the new decision. 
When a decision topic 67ccurs frequently, the organizations 
enhance their knowledge about possible alternatives to the 
decision (Simon, 1957). So it is expected that frequency 
might be positively correlated with predictability, and also 
that the lower the frequency of a decision, the greater the 
number of people involved in the decision processes. On the 
other hand, more frequent decisions; are more likely to be 
delegated to lower echelons and less frequent . decisions, if 
demanding greater involvement, are liable to be influenced 
by actors at lower echelons. 
The interviewees were asked to assign to each decision a score 
from 1 to S. If the organization had experienced many similar 
situations in the past, the'decision scored 5, and if it had 
never had a similar experience, the decision scored (see 
interview schedule 2, question 12, in Appendix 1). 
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4.2.3 Clcavagc 
The processes of decision making in organizations have been 
pictured as a process of negotiation amongst the different 
parties involved in the decisions (Cyert and March, 1963; 
Abell, 1975). It seems obvious that as far as the decision 
arena is the locus of debate about future actions, it is 
there that conflict is more likely to emerge. But conflicting 
preferences do not have the same intensity for all decision 
topics (Thompson and Tuden, 1959; Thompsoi), 1967). People 
may totally agree about some topics and have totally 
contradictory preferences about others. In the scope of this 
study, cleavage is defined as the extent to which individuals 
or groups have different preferences about decision outcomes. 
It has been said that cleavage "denotes the political face 
of decision-making" (Astley et al, 1982, p. 361). This means 
that there is not one best rational way, when the debate. is 
about different preferences. 
To arrive at a decision when cleavage occurs may require 
extensive negotiation amongst participants. Furthermore, to 
gain support to one's preferred outcome, onemaytry to bring 
one's supporters into the decision arena, enhancing the number 
of participants in the decision process. But the greater 
involvement, in this case, may not result in a lower centre 
of influence. Even when new participants come from lower 
echelons, they are only supporting the preferences of someone 
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else, earlier in the decision arena. On the other hand, to 
quieten opposition, a person in a higher hierarchical position 
may use his/her authority to arrive faster at the decision. 
In this case, cleavage may result in a still higher centre 
of influence. 
Cleavage was measured in a five-P'oint ordinal scale which 
represents the number of different points of view about the 
decision outcome (see interview schedule 2, question 14, in 
Appendix 1). 
4.2.4 Interdependence 
People are brought together into organizations to sum their 
effort toward an objective. At the same time different tasks 
are ascribed to different people ensuing the division of 
labour which creates interdependence and claims for co- 
ordination (Barnard, 1938). Due to interdependence, it is 
difficult to imagine a topic of decision which does not 
require the involvement of at least two persons. At the same 
time, different topics of decisions might present different 
sorts of interdependence. 
For the purposes of this research, interdependence is defined 
as the extent to which parties to a decision have their 
activities interconnected. Thompson (1967) defines three 
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sorts of organizational interdependence, which are: pooled, 
sequential and reciprocal interdependence. The pooled 
interdependence means that the activities of the parties are 
not directly linked, and only have to be pooled to arrive at 
the decision. The sequential interdependence involves achain 
of links in which the activity of one party has to be 
completed with the activity of another party to arrive at 
the decision. The reciprocal interdependence means that the 
activities are linked and have to be worked simultaneously. 
The operational definition of interdependence is based on 
Thompson's (1967) three categories of interdependence. The 
reciprocal activities are clearly more interdependent than 
both the sequential and the pooled activities; and the 
sequential activities are more interdependent than the pooled 
activities. It may be expected that the greater the interdependence, 
the greater the number of people involved in decision processes. 
At the same time, higher interdependence may be associated 
with lower centre of influence, specially if the control of 
the most critical resources to the decision is in the hands 
of those at lower echelons. 
The three-point scale used to measure interdependence expresses 
Thompson's (1967) three categories of interdependence (see 
interview schedule 2, question 17, in Appendix 1). 
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4.2.5 Centre of Control 
The centre of control signifies the place that retains the 
most important resources to the decision. Different decisions 
require different resources which are under the control of 
different persons or groups. If these resources are unique, 
that is if they cannot be replaced, and those who control 
them are in a central position, they become asource of power 
in the organization (Mechanic, 1962; Hickson et al, 1971). 
For the purpose of this research, resources needed in a 
decision situation may take the form of material resource as 
well as of information. It is hypothesized that when a 
decision is dependent upon some critical resource, people who 
control this resource may influence the decision outcome. Thus, 
centre of control and centre of influence mightbepositively 
associated. 
Critical resource means a resource that is essential to the 
decision and cannot be found elsewhere. Hickson et al (1971) 
use the term substitutability denoting "the ability of the 
organization to obtain alternative performance for the 
activities of a subunit" (p. 221). These authors unfold 
substitutability to allude to "availability of alternatives" 
and "replaceability of personnel". 
This research departed from the assumption that for a resource 
- 68 - 
to be critical to a decision, it is because it cannot be 
replaced. What is inquired is who controlled the most critical 
resource to the decision. Thus it is also assumed that those 
who controlled these resources could not be replaced. 
Like the centre of influence, the centre of control also 
reflects the hierarchical position of the participant, in 
this case the position of those who control the most critical 
resource to the decision. When it was asked who participated 
in the decision and the position that each participant held 
in the organization, it was also asked how important to the 
decision were the resources that each of them controlled. 
Each participant was scored in a five-point scale from very 
much important to very little important. Then the centre of 
control in each decision was scored - according to the position 
of the participant who scored higher in that decision - in a 
five-point scale representing the same hierarchical positions 
as that of the centre of influence scale. 
4.2.6 Non-Reversibility 
Some decisions are characterized by the great commitment that 
they represent to the organization. This is to say that these 
aTe non-reversible decisions, in the sense that once their 
implementation has started they cannot be changed. When the 
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decision outcome is a failure and it does not allow any 
adjustment, the alternative left is to abandon it. Nevertheless, 
a mechanism of self -reinforcement seems to operate when there 
is commitment to a course of action (Staw and Ross, 1978). 
In these circumstances, the organization may accumulate more 
and more losses as it becomes more and more committed to a 
blunder course of action. To mitigate the hazards of non- 
reversible decisions, organizations may adopt an incremental 
strategy. This is a step-by-step decision process that Lindblom 
(1959) termed "successive limited comparison". By splitting 
the decision, this strategy works as an attempt to create room 
for adjustments, at each evaluation of the decision outcomes. 
In fact, it is an attempt to transform a non-reversible into 
a reversible decision. 
But decisions are not reversible or non-reversible, they are 
more or less reversible. The non-reversibility of decisions 
denotes the extent to which changes are allowed, once the 
implementation of the decision has started. it may be 
expected that the greater the non-reversibility of adecision 
the greater the number of people involved. An incremental 
strategy as well as the effort to gain support for less 
reversible decisions may result in greater involvement. 
Nevertheless, as greater non-reversibility alsomeans greater 
risk and high commitment, it may be associated with a higher 
centre of influence. 
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The five-point scale used to measure non-reversibility 
represents situations that run from a totally non-reversible 
decision to situations which could be changed through several 
incremental actions (see interview schedule 2, question 11, 
in Appendix 1). 
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TABLE 4.1 
DEFINITION AND OPERAIrIONALIZATION OF PROPERTIES OF DECISIONS 
Variables Definition OperationaUation 
How much did you know about alternative solutions 
to the decision: 
T he extent to which there Is 5. all we needed 
Predictability certainty about the alternative 4. quite a lot 
solutions to a decision 3. a little 
2. very little 
1. not at all 
How often the organization has dealt with similar 
decisions: 
5. this sort of decision Is frequent 
Frequency The regularity at which the 4. many similar decisions 
decision topic has occurred 3. some similar decisions 
2. very little similarity to previous decisions 
1. no similarity to previous decisions 
Were there disagreements during the discussion: 
The extent to which individuals 5. many people disagreed 
Cleavage or groups have different preferences 4. there were distinct factions 
about decision outcomes 3. few people disagreed 
2. one person disagreed 
1. no disagreement 
Parties involved co-ordinate their activities: 
Interdependence The extent to which parties to a 3. working simultaneously 
decision have their activities 2. working in particular order 
interconnected 1. working Independently 
Who controls the most important resources scored: 
Denotes the hierarchical position 5. President 
Centre of Control of those who control the most 4. Director 
Important resource to a decision 3. Advisor (e. g. staff position) 
2. Departmental Head 
1. Other 
Decision allows: 
The extent to which changes 5. no change 
Non-reversibility are allowed once the implementation 4. stop implementation 
of decision has started 3. start again 
2. make adjustment 
1. take further steps 
CHAPTER 5 
ANALYTICAL METHOD, STRATEGY AND TECHNIQUES 
5.1 Introduction 
Controversies on methodological issues in social sciences 
are today as vivid as they have been for many years. The 
debate has emerged from a widespread questioning of the 
appropriateness of natural sciences methodology to social 
sciences (Kaufmann, 1977). 
Quantitative methods, indeed a fairly recent approach to 
social sciences, came to oppose the classic traditioh of 
logical reasoning and historical reference, by asserting itself 
as the one scientific method., thus denying validity to the 
old way of thought. Even recognizing the real difficulty of 
getting measures to a large number of social phenomena, 
researchers affiliated to survey research and quantitative 
methodology have preferred to urge the necessity ofimproving 
and developing measures, as well as defining their own 
concepts. As Blalock (1982) affirms: 
"it does not appear as though the very extensive literature 
on the philosophy of science will be of rnuch help in enabling 
us to define our basic concepts" (p. 25). 
From his point of view, 
"as often as not, the philosophy of science literature has 
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been used, ideologically, to support one or another 'school' 
of social thought, rather than in a more constructive way to 
help provide insights as to how to proceed". 
This, he continues, 
"is in contrast with the scaling and measurement literature, 
developed primarily by psychologists, that has been more 
effectively integrated among the working toolsofempirically 
minded investigators" (Blalock, 1982, p. 25). 
This seems an extreme, radical point of view, as it seems to 
imply that there were no social sciences prior to the advent 
of survey research and quantitative methods. Obviously, one 
may not say that it is not necessary to improve and develop 
measures and concepts, of course it is, but it does not mean 
that this is the only ave. nue to progress in social sciences. 
On the other hand, those affiliated to qualitative methods 
have persistently discarded the quantitative methods, accusing 
them of being unable to explain social phenomena. As Marsh 
(1979) says, 
"the opprobium attaching to surveys has come from the fact 
that their form is similar to that utilised by the public 
opinion pollster and the market researcher, both of whom are 
more concerned with predictive ability than with explanation 
and understanding of the phenomena they study" (p. 293). 
Although survey methodology does eventually fail to explain 
the observed reality, it can provide general and reliable 
account of this reality and factors associated with it that 
cannot be obtained by other methods. It would certainly be 
more fruitful if extremist points of view had not persisted 
for, as Coser (1984) reminds us, extremism jeopardizes 
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scientific advancement. 
To drive the debate in such a direction seems otherwise 
misleading, as these methods may have more to complete than 
contradict each other (Glasser and Strauss, 1968; McClintock 
et al. 1979; Bulmer, 1984). As put by Ziman (1968), 
"a theory is more than a succession of formal mathematical 
deductions that can be rigorously proved; it is an argument 
that has to make contact with the observablq, and that 
contains postulates and models that cannot be deduced from 
elsewhere" (P. 37). 
The scientific method in social sciences is that which is in 
accord with the epistemological principles which underline 
the concepts., the researcher made of social reality (Bulmer, 
1984). 
The question one may ask is why the -researchers do not use the 
two methods side by side, using reliable measures where it 
seems more appropriate and qualitative methods where quantification 
would be nothing but an empty artifice, thus complementing 
instead of fighting each other. As Bulmer (1984) suggests, 
"different styles of research complement each other, and can 
fruitfully be used in conjunction with one another" (p. 29). 
Fortunately, more moderate views are gaining ground to propose 
integrated methods which will offset the weakness of one 
against the strength of another (Sieber, 1973; Jick, 1979). 
Inevitably all methods have weak and strong points, and this 
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research attempts to benefit of the marriage of quantitative 
and qualitative methods. The quantitative method provides 
the most adequate instruments for the analysis of data 
generated by questionnaire or interview, as is the case here. 
It is the reliable method to infer patterns of behaviour but, 
if the resercher wishes to understand the dynamic of the 
observed reality, he/she has to go through a heuristic 
process of analysis. 
The remainder of this chapter deals with the research 
procedures and techniques. The next section comments upon the 
research design and the two following sections describe the 
sample and data collection. 
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5.2 The Rcscarch Dcsign 
As was said above, this research was designed to appropriate 
the advantages of both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
In many respects it is akin to Crozier's (1964) analysis of 
bureaucratic organization in France. This means to carry on 
the analysis at two distinct stages as he did. At the first 
stage, Cro-zier (1964) analysed the data of his two case studies 
in the sphere of organizational theories. This analysis 
allowed him to identify patterned behaviour within the 
organization's internal logic of rules. At the second stage, 
data were analysed in terms of its relation to the French 
social and cultural system, furthering explanation and 
understanding of the bureaucratic dysfunction within the 
system. 
In this study, the analysis carried out at the first stage 
relates the data, collected through interview schedules, to 
the underlying theoretical assumptions. At the second stage, 
the patterns of influence in management decision which 
emerged out of the first stage, are analysed in terms of 
Brazilian social and political institutions. This approach 
specially differs from Crozier's (1964) approach in that it 
does not analyse again the same data in terms of the social 
and cultural system, but relates the results of the first 
stage to cultural traits of Brazilian society. 
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In the first stage, the analysis is based on quantitative 
methods., though it also enters into some narrative interpretation 
of the observed reality. In the second stage, the analysis 
is essentially qualitative, to show how the patterns of 
influence in management decisions are related to cultural 
traits. 
5.2.1 The First Stage of Analysis 
At this first stage, the central focus of the analysis is 
upon the relationships of the institutional frameworks (both 
at the organization and the task-environment level) and of 
the properties of decisions with the distribution of influence 
in the decision processes. Figure 5.1 shows the hypothetical 
relationships between factors related to institutional 
frameworks,. properties of decisions and the defined dimensions 
of the distribution of influence in decision processes. The 
institutional frameworks are assumed to bemutually dependent 
and consistent associations are supposed to appear between 
properties of decisions and the institutional frameworks. To 
identify patterns of influence inmanagement decision making, 
the analysis searches for understanding and explanation of 
the distribution of influence in decision processes, examining 
the relationships between the overall sets of factors. It 
examines the way in which these factors vary in relation to 
each other, the strength and direction of associations 
- 78 - 
between the variables. 
But first, to draw a picture of the context of the 
organizati. ons, the analysis starts with a brief description 
of the nine organizations in which decisions were sampled. 
Although the r. eseýLrch has not investigated, deeply, on the 
culture of the organizations, this description takes a 
longitudinal perspective to show how the organizations were 
born and whether they have changed over the years (Pettigrew, 
1979). But it also focuses on the implications of the 
institutional norms and rules for the legal constitution and 
structure of the organizations. This seems of paramount 
importance to understand the context where decisions are made, 
consequently, to the interpretation of the following analysis. 
The culture of an organization is reflected in its institutionalized 
norms and patterns of interrelationships, which also serve 
to enforce and perpetuate the existing power structure (Pfeffer, 
1981). The analysis of the distribution of influence out of 
this context would certainly be unrealistic. 
The analysis of association between the variables starts 
examining the correlation of standardization of procedures 
and of external constraint with the involvement of external 
and internal actors and the centre of influence in decision 
processes. Pearson's correlation coefficient was chosen to 
estimate the associations between the variables. As this research 
is concerned with explanation and understanting and not with 
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Hypothetical relationships between institutional frameworks, 
properties of decisions and the distribution of influence 
in decision processes 
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prediction and causality, it seems an adequate analytical 
tool. Nevertheless, some caution is needed in the interpretation 
of correlation coefficients. As Minium (1978) reminds us: 
"I) The degree of association is not ordinarily interpretable 
in direct proportion to the magnitude of the 
coefficient ... In general, a change of . 10 point in the coefficient has greater consequence when applied to 
coefficients having high values than when applied to 
those having low values ... ; 
2) It is tempting to th 
* 
ink that if two variables are 
substantially correlated, that one must be, at least in 
part, the cause of the other. This is not so. Mere 
association is insufficient to claim a causal relation 
between the two variables. 
3) Tbestrength of the association between two variables 
depends, among other things, on the nature of the 
measurement of the two variables as well as on the kind 
of subjects studied. It is not possible, then, to speak 
of the correlation between two variables without taking 
these factors into consideration. 
4) ... Pearsonian correlation is based on the straight line 
of best fit to the bivariate distribution. Although a 
straight line is reasonably considered tobe the line of 
best fit in many situations, sometimes it is not. When 
it is not the strength of association is likely to be 
underestimated by Pearson r, 
5) The correlation coefficient is affected by the range of 
talent (variability) characterizing the measurements of 
the two variables. In general, the smaller the range of 
talent in X and/or Y, the lower the correlation 
coefficient, other things being equal ... 
6) Finally the correlation coefficient, like other 
statistics, is subject to sampling variation. Depending 
on the characteristics of a particular sample, the 
obtained coefficient may be higher or lower than it 
would be in a different sample" (pp. 154-155). 
To enhance understanding of the implications of the 
institutional task-environment for the distribution of 
influence in organizational decisions, the analysis proceeds 
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comparing decisions between the different types of 
organizations. One way analysis of variance is used to 
estimate differences, in the distribution of influence in 
decision processes, among the. groups of organizations. 
Variation in the means of the three dependent variables and 
of standardization and external constraint are also examined, 
to explain the variation in the distribution of influence 
among the types of organizations, as related to variation in 
standardization and external constraint. 
The examination of the_possible effects of external dependence 
on the distribution of influence in organizational decisions 
required a more detailed descriptive analysis. As external 
dependence is a nominal variable, neither the correlation 
coefficient nor the comparison of means would give areliable 
estimation of its relationship with the distribution of 
influence in organizational decisions. 
Again, the Pearson, correlation coefficient is used to examine 
associations between properties of decision and the 
distribution of influence in decision processes. The 
correlation between the overall independent variables are also 
estimated, and where they are shown to be relevant to the 
analysis they are referred to. Furthermore, the correlation 
between the overall variables and other additional factors, 
related to organizational decisions, are. calculated and brought into 
the analysis to improve interpretation and understanding of the results. 
MISSING 
PRINT 
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S. 2.2 The Second Stage of Analysis 
In the second stage of the analysis, disti-pctive features of 
the patterns of influence in management degision making are 
juxtaposed with distinctive features Pf interpersonal 
relationships in Brazilian society. To UnAerstand how these 
dominant patterns of interpersonal relationships pervade 
diverse spheres of life in Brazilian socieýYo it is necessary 
to understand how they emerged and came to be institutionalized. 
Thus the analysis has to be primarily based on historical, 
political and anthropological studies, froiA which the cultural 
traits, relevant to it, are taken out. 
The construction of Brazilian society is eVoked to show: 
a) How the power structure of the political-administrative 
system was built and transferred to the productive 
system; 
b) How the socio-political organization stimulated some 
sort of behaviour and interpersonal relationships; and 
C) How these patterns of relationships aye manifested to 
dominate social life (Faoro, 1984; Buarque de Holanda, 
1979; Da Matta, 1983). 
The advantage of such an approach is that it gives meaning 
to both the existing social norms and rule,, and the process 
by which they were institutionalized, that 
is, it seeks for 
explanation and understanding of social reality 
by examining 
- 83 - 
its origin (Burns, 1967). 
This analysis is carried out through three steps. It starts 
by painting a picture of the Brazilian social order, tracing 
its roots in the colonial system and, at the same time, 
stressing the prevalent patterns of influence in the 
political-administrative and in the productive system. Then 
it goes on to identify some cultural traits, relevant to the 
analysis, and finally, the observed patterns of influence in 
management decisions are analysed in terms of these cultural 
traits. 
0 
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5.3 The Sample 
To select a sample of organizational decisions isnot an easy 
task. The universe is diverse, large and uncountable. Decisions 
are made at every moment. 
This sample was selected according to the theory underlying 
this research. It called for a diversified sample of decisions 
in different types of organizations. Table 5.1 portrays the 
sample design which follows the McClintock et al(1979)cluster 
sample method. According to these autliors, their 
'! methods essentially involve three features: 
1) The definition., enumeration and sampling of units of 
analysis within the case study that are theoretically 
meaningful and represent the phenomenology of informant; 
2) Stratified sampling of data sources based on theoretical 
grounds and on features of the case, crossed with 
stratified sampling of units of analysis; and 
3) The optiomal creation of a quantitative data set 
consisting of standardized codes for variables pertaining 
to each unit of analysis" (McClintock et al, 1979; p. 613). 
The McClintock et al (1979) proposal is to use "the logic 
and method of survey research to improve qualitative case 
studies" (p. 612), while this research proposal is to use 
the logic of qualitative studies to improve interpretation 
and understanding of survey research. The unit of analysis 
is the decision, but decisions were sampled to yield comparable 
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TABLE 5.1 
SAMPLE DESIGN 
Number of Decisions 
Organizations 
Simple Complex Total 
Collective CI 3 2 5 
Collective C2 2 2 4 
Bureaucracy BI 2 4 6 
Bureaucracy B2 3 2 5 
Market M1 1 3 4 
Market M2 2 3 5 
Professional PI 1 2 3 
P. -ofessional P2 3 2 5 
Professional P3 2 1 3 
TOTAL 19 21 40 
- 86 - 
clusters of decisions. Each cluster represents decisions in 
ne type of organization which, according to the underlying 
heory, is related to the institutional task-enviroment (Butler, 
984). 
. 3.1 The Sample of Organizations 
irst, the sample of organizations was selected. The types 
f organizations were chosen according to Butler's (1984) 
ypology which is based on institutional frameworks formed at 
ask-environment. The advantage of this typology is that it 
llows the comparison of decisions between organizations, 
ontrolling the institutional framework at taks-environment. 
s the sample design in Table 5.1 shows, it resulted in a 
ample of nine organizations. The number of organizations 
ampled was very much determined by the number of decisions 
eeded to get a sample which permits use of statistics. It 
as estimated that a minimum of two organizations of each 
ype would be needed. If five decisions could be selected 
rom each organization, this would give a total of forty 
ecisions. But, in practice, samples are constrained by the 
vailability of data and the informants' willingness to co- 
perate. Due to the small number of decisions that could be 
btained in one organization, this sample had to beincreased 
o nine organizations, including a third professional 
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organization. 
It was also attempted to keep the size of organizations as 
constant as possible. The number of employees was used to 
estimate size. [Annual budget was also thought to be used to 
estimate the size of organizations. However, with an inflation 
of approximately 200% a year, the figures seemed rather 
ambiguous, so it was abandoned. ] As can be seen in Table 6.1 
(Chapter 6), the number of employees in these organizations 
varies from 72 to 450. The range does not seem so wide as to 
preclude comparison, though it has to be noted that the 
collective organizations are somewhat smaller than the others. 
But these numbers need to be looked at more carefully. The 
number of employees consists of only those having anemployment 
contract with the organization. This procedure tends to 
underestimate the size of collectives, because it disregards 
the contribution of volunteer members. Therefore the difference 
in size between the collectives and the other organizations 
may not be as large as it seems when looking at the crude 
numbers. 
5.3.2 The Sample of Decisions 
Decisions were sampled to cover a large variety of topics. 
Studies of decisions in organizations have usually selected 
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specific topics of decision, or included diverse topics limiting 
the type of decision, for instance, to strategic decisions 
(Patchen, 1974; Mumford and Pettigrew, 1975; Mintzberget al, 
1976; Hickson et al, 1986). This choice has very much to do 
with the researcher's interests and with the theoretical 
concepts underlying the research. As one central aim of this 
research is to supersede the lack of knowledge about decisions 
in Brazilian organizations, it seems quite reasonable tostart 
by trying to get a general picture of them. 
Furthermore, this research is concerned with patterns o-f 
influence in management decision making, so itshould include 
any type of decision that managers ordinarily make. Thus the 
criterion to select decisions was to include the most diverse 
topics of s'imple and complex decisions. 
The concept of simple and complex decisions refers to the 
degree of difficulty that the organization met, to arrive at 
a decision. The top manager, usually the president or a 
director, in every organization was asked to indicate the 
decisions, classifying them as simple or complex according 
to the difficulty they had in arriving at each decision. 
This, of course, resulted in a rather subjective definition, 
as it relies on the manager's perceptionofdifficulties. But, 
on the other hand, it may represent better the reality than 
any prior definition. What is complex or simple to some people 
is not necessarily the same to everyone, though the perception 
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of complexity may be related to the uncertainty about the 
issue (Astley et al, 1982). 
Yet efforts were made to get an equal number ofdecisions per 
type of organizations. Unfortunately, this target was not 
entirely reached, but, as can be seen in Table 5.1, the 
discrepancies are small. 
The time available to the researcher prevented investigation 
of decisions in real time, therefore only decisions that 
happened in the past were investigated. Duration of decision 
process is not always predictable and it may suprise the 
decision makers themselves (Wilson, 1980). Thus, if a deadline 
exists and one wishes a consistent group of decisions, in 
the sense of cases about which there are available and 
complete information, this sort of restriction needs to be 
done. 
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5.4 Data Collection 
It has been said that "in recent years, analysis of 
questionnaires have dominated our literature for both the 
development and testing of hypothesis" (Jauch et al, 1980, 
p. 517), or that "interview has become the favoured digging 
tool of a large army of sociologists" (Benney and Hughes, 
1984, p. 24). Yet this research appeals to these instruments. 
The overall empirical data were collected through interviews. 
There are problems with interviews and questionnaires, but 
they also present some advantages. First, they are probably 
the easier and quicker way to collect data. Second, asking, 
in the questionnaire, just what is important to the researcht 
facilitates the analysis because the researcher does not need 
to take his/her time with information that will be set aside 
later on and with coding unstructured data. Nevertheless, a 
prior definition of what is or is not important is problematic, 
discovery from the analysis may point to other relevant 
factors, and it may be too late to get the necessary 
information, A way to overcome this limitation is to add 
questions which may not specifically refer to what is postulated 
in the underlying theory, but which is related to the 
investigated phenomenon. Another way to s ecure substantial 
information, which can be lost in a very structured questionnaire, 
is to combine structured and open-ended questions. 
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Moreover, other sources of data may not be available, so that, 
the researcher has to go to the field to ask questions. This 
can often happen when one is investigating decision processes. 
Secondary data, when they exist, are seldom complete(Wilson, 
1980), and participant observation, certainly anothervaluable 
tool, would be required to follow up the process and is not 
of service to investigate decisions made in the past. 
This research used two interview schedules to collect the 
data, both comprising structured and open-ended questions (see 
Appendix 1). But interviewing has the additional problem of 
language and communication, which is not only a problem of 
people speaking different languages. Phonetic, syntactic and 
semantic differences are also liable to cause misunderstanding 
between people speaking the same language (Deutscher, 1984). 
Usually pilot interviews are carried out to test the fitness 
of questionnaires and interview schedules and overcome language 
misunderstandings. In this case, a first English version of 
the interview schedules was tested inBritain and other pilot 
interviews were held in Brazil, using aPortuguese translated 
version. 
Interview schedule I aimed to select the decisions to be 
investigated, as well as to collect some data about the 
organizations. It was answered by the top manager at each C2 
organization, usually with the researcher, during the interview. 
Only two managers preferred not to answer the interview 
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schedule during the interview. Theý did it later and the 
researcher collected them the next day. Some additional data 
about the organization, such as written statutes and pamphlets 
about their history and activities, were obtained. 
Interview schedule 2 aimed to collect data about the decisions. 
It contains questions which are supported by the research 
theoretical concepts, and questions about factors not 
theoretically related to the investigated phenomenon, though 
related to decision processes. It was assumed that this 
information would be helpful to elucidate the findings. 
One interview schedule was answered for each decision. This 
meant that the research for each decision relied on the 
information of one single individual. It has to be recognized 
that this is a limitation of this study, at least for two 
reasons. First, the research was inquiring about events that 
took place in the past and thus has to rely on people's 
memories. The tendency is for details to fade when time goes 
by, but two persons are likely to remember more than one, as 
each of them may revive different details. So, two or more 
informants would be desirable. Second, there is the problem 
of bias which can be introduced by relying on a single view 
of the phenomenon. Unfortunately, these problems could not 
be avoided. Interviews are very time-consuming and to increase 
the number of informants per decision would require a reduction 
in the sample size. To try to overcome this limitation, 
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endeavours were made to create a relaxed atmosphere during 
the interviews and to concentrate on the more objective, 
general and demonstrable informations (Benney and Hughes, 
1984). 
Informants were indicated by the top manager in every 
organization. At the time of the first interview, the top 
managers were asked to indicate the decisions as well as 
informant to answer the interviews about the decisions 
(interview schedule 2). In all the organizations, except in 
Bl and Pl, the top managers themselves were the informants 
of at least one decision, and the informants in Cl and in M2 
were members of the administrative board and of the board of 
directors, respectively. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE ORGANIZATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the organizations included in the 
sample. This description aims to highlight the surrounding 
and connected circumstances where decisions were made. It 
stresses the institutional norms and rules which apply to 
different types of organizations on the one hand, and the 
basic structural features of organizations on the other. 
Table 6.1 gives a brief outline of these organizations, and 
the references attributed to each of them from now on. The 
age of organizations varies from I to 83 years, but it does 
not seem that age af f ects organizational behaviour in any way. 
Concerning the number of employees, the collectives introduce 
a bias in the size of organization in that they are much 
smaller. Nevertheless, as was argued in Chapter 5, it seems 
to portray characteristics of collectives rendering it difficult Cý 
to compare the size of these organizations, as estimated 
by the number of employees, because these organizations also 
have membership. Furthermore, as will be seen, this analysis 
does not suggest that differences amongst these organizations 
should be attributed to differences in size. 
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Another feature worth mentioning is that none of these 
organizations have experienced impressive changes in their 
goals. The changes have aimed at improving quality, launching 
new products or services and the growing of current production, 
to keep in speed with increasing demands. 
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6.2 Collective Organizations 
In principle any organization *is a collective, since its very 
existence requires a group of persons formally organized to 
achieve. some definite objective. The notion of collectives, 
as a specific type of organization, is suggested by Ouchi 
(1980), who calls it "clan" type, extending Williamson's (1975) 
idea of market and bureaucratic types. Also drawing upon 
Williamson's (1975) theory of markets and hierarchies as 
alternative modes for mediating transaction, Butler (1981, 
1984) suggests the collective type. The concept of collectives 
adopted in this research is based on Butler's (1984) idea of 
organizations created by voluntary donations "to a cause as 
a result of solidarity with other persons separated in space 
and time or through commitment to an ideology or a faith" 
(p. 8). According to Butler (1984) 
IIqhen this giving begins to be organized around charities, 
trusts, religious sects or policital parties this organizing 
takes place within the institutional rules of collectives" 
(P. 8). 
It is surprising that this definition does not contemplate 
self-aiding organizations, which certainly are under the some 
co-ordination norms and institutional rules. There is no 
reason to think that they would be different when they have 
the same basic foundation of voluntary donations to a cause 
as aresult of solidarity. They only differ from charities 
in that doners and beneficiaries are not necessarily separated 
is space and time. But is that an essential requirement to 
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be a collective? This research did not find evidence to 
believe this is the case. As can be seen in Table 6.1, the 
two collectives chosen for this study are a charity and an 
employee association. The second is obviously excluded from 
Butler's definition. As will be seen, Cl and C2 have different 
objectives and. activities, but they are very similar in their 
legal constitutions and structural forms. 
In a very broad sense, the objective of C1 is to provide 
relief to poverty. The bulk of the organization's services 
is provided through other small registered charities in Belo 
Horizonte and small towns in the State of Minas Gerais. Once 
these small organizations apply and are elected for funds 
from Cl, they start getting a monthly allowance to assist 
local poor communities. Since 1911, Cl had maintained ahouse 
for homeless and orphaned girls. This home is administered 
by nuns of a Catholic order, and it is operated as aboarding 
school. They run first and second grade course for the girls 
and other children of the surrounding community. For many years 
Cl was almost entirely dependent on the goodwill of members 
and citizens, in general, for funds. But during the last 
three decades the organization took on a rather different 
strategy to finance its activities. When its premises, located 
in the city centre, became highly valued, they saw the 
opportunity to manage it as a business, hence mitigating their 
dependence and uncertainty for funds. This decision required 
the organization to take on a totally new stance to manage 
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the commercial activities apart from their core activities. 
They succeeded, and it has given them a great deal of 
independence for planning and administering their core 
activities. The organization structure, set in by statutes, 
is very simple indeed. As shown in Figure-6.1, it is managed 
by an administrative board, supervised by a controlling 
council, a superior council and a general assembly. Subordinated 
to the administrative board are three divisions - administrative, 
commercial and benefits divisions - and also the house and 
the school. 
C2 is an association of employees of a large State-owned firm. 
It can be characterized as a self-aiding organization, created 
in 1956 by some employees, supported by the firm's management. 
The association is financed by membership contribution aswell 
as by the company in the form of extended facilities it 
provides to C2. At. the outset,, the -objective of the organization 
was to provide recreation opportunities - especially sports 
recreation - to its members. Over these nineteen years, it 
extended its activities to cultural and tourist facilities. 
The last three years have been marked by great expansion in 
the association activities, followed by aremarkable increase 
in membership, from 1800 members in 1981 to 9700 in 1985. In 
March 1985 the association also took over a parallel activity, 
to administer the f irm Is restaurant at headquarters of f ice in 
Belo Horizonte. Although the restaurant is not run for profit 
and meals are sold at a low price, the association isgetting 
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additional funds from it. As'can be seen in Figure 6.2, C2 
organizational structure is also very simple, and it is also 
set in by statutes. The association is managed by a president 
and five directors, elected by the assembly. Above this 
executive b6dy there are two councils - controlling and 
deliberative councils - and above them the assembly. All the 
association activities are co-ordinated from a central office 
which reports to the directors about the subject concerned. 
Associations like C2 are quite commom in Brazil. To a large 
extent they are encouraged, and sometimes even initiated, by 
the firms themselves. The arrangement is looked upon as 
beneficial to both sides, employers and employees. To the 
former, it is seen as a means to improve good relationships 
in the work place as well as decrease turnover in the firm. 
To the latter, it is perceived as a fringe benefit, to the 
extent that the association affords entertainment-and other 
services, otherwise too expensive to most of them. It still 
seems to fulfil a basic longing of Brazilian people, of 
breaking the impersonal world of modern organizations'and of 
creating, through the association, room for personal 
relationships. As Da Matta (1983) puts it, Brazilians aspire 
to find fellow-feelings and friendship in the work place to 
restore the family atmosphere. 
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6.3 Bureaucracies 
Butler (1984) defined bureaucracies as agencies created by 
the State "which are a direct result of an act or bill of 
the legislature" (p. 8). It is obvious that this definition 
has nothing to do with the bureaucratic organization in the 
Weberian sense. It does not mean that the organizations he 
named bureaucracies are somew-hat more standardized and 
formalized, or have a more clearly defined hierarchical chain 
or task specialization, as can be implied from current 
literature (Weber, 1968; Pugh and Hickons, 1976). As amatter 
of fact, the term bureaucracy, in the sense used by Butler 
(1984) . has a more specific meaning, It just intends to define 
agencies settled by the State for a specific purpose, that 
is. to run some particular service. As he says, "the agency 
is given a budget in the expectation that certain future 
performances are achieved" (Butler, 1984, p. 8). In this 
sense, bureaucracies and public agencies are synonymous, 
thus both terms are used here, indistinctively. 
The two bureaucracies chosen for this study fall neatly into 
the definition of a public agency, which "is given a budget" 
to provide some specific service to a particular clientele. 
Both are linked to the national education system and were 
created aiming decentralization for more effective provision 
of specific services. They also have rather sindiar organizational 
structures , as can be seen in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. They differ 
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in their legal constitutions as far as B1 is an autarchy and 
B2 is a foundation. 
An autarchy is an organization juridically defined as an 
autonomous auxiliary entity, decentralized from public 
administration, monitored and guarded by the State. It must 
have secured sources of funds and has the objective of providing 
services of real interest to the communtiy, which otherwise 
would be done by the State. In the Brazilian legislature, the 
decreto-lei (law by decree) n. 200/67 gives the following 
definition of autarchies: 
'tan autonomous service created by law, having juridical 
personality, it must have some property and an income to be 
able to undertake activities intheT)ublic sector" (translated 
from the decreto-lei n. 200/67). 
Bi is an autarchy created in 1968 to undertake the 
responsability of physical supplies to first and second grade 
State-owned schools, in the State of Minas Gerais. It is 
linked to the Secretaria de Estado de Educaggo do Estado de 
Minas Gerais (the State of Minas Gerais Department for 
Education). For its current expenditures it has grants from 
the State of Minas Gerais, while the bulk of its budget, for 
physical supplies to schools, are provided by the federal 
government. The organization is structured in a functional 
basis. The president, at the top of the hierarchy, is 
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assisted by two assessOrias (advisory staff 
1 ), one for puclic 
j relations and the other for technical matters. Three directors 
- administrative, financial and technical directors - and a 
manufacturing unit are subordinated to the president. 
Subordinated to the directors and factory ý manager are functional 
departments. An administrative council, nominated by the 
Secretary of State for Education in the State of Minas Gerais, 
is in charge of monitoring and approving the autarchy actions. 
The second public agency, B2, is a foundation created by a 
federal autarchy. Brazilian legislature distinguishes two C> 
types of foundation, according to their -origin. If the 
foundation is created by a private entity it is of private 
right and if it is created by a public entity it is of public 
right. This difference refers only to their juridicial status, 
since a single law regulates the creation and functioning of 
foundations. B2 has its origin in the 1930s when it was 
created as an Association to grant financial helptostudents 
suffering from lack of resources. In 1936 it was restructured 
and received a new name, and in 1973 the Association disappeared 
to give place to this foundation. The foundation received the 
association premises and for its current expenditure and 
The term assessorias has, literally, the meaning of 
advisory staffs. Nevertheles s the functions of the 
assessores(advisers) seem to vary, not only from one 
organization to another but also within a single 
organization. In some cases they seem to have a proper 
advisory function, while in others they seem to have 
an executive function. 
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services it receives funds from the autarchy. But. as a 
foundation, B2 has some autonomy to generate fundsbyselling 
services to the public. This is one of the advantages that a 
foundation has over an autarchy, that is, it has greater 
legal scope for generating and spending funds. In time, B2 
developed some expertise and was able to take advantage from 
its autonomy, to contract services which are today a 
complementary source of funds. Over the years it has 
considerably expanded the benefits and assistance it offers 
to students. In the beginning it only granted financial 
support, such as scholarships, to very few. Today, benefits 
are diversified and can be extended to a much greater number 
of students. B2 organizational structure has more of a 
divisional form. It has five divisions, related to B2 benefits 
and services, and three assessorias (advisory staffs) - 
administrative, planning and financial - which are subordinated 
to the president. At the top of all is the director council 
whose members are representatives of the federal autarchy 
and of the students. 
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6.4 Market Organizations 
Organizations of the market type are trading firms for goods 
and services in the market place. According to Butler(1984) 
"incorporation of trading firm in a nation state follows 
general laws, such as contract law, and specific laws relating 
to a particular industry or firm" (p. 6). 
In this definition, the emphasis in trading and market rules 
makes the distinctive character of these organizations. 
Nevertheless, it cannot be ignored that the huge number of 
organizations operating in the market can bedistinguished in 
many other bases. For instance, companies selling goods may 
be distinguished from those selling services, or the former 
from manufacturing firms and so forth. It could be argued 
that dif f erent industries, within the manufacturing sector, are 
linked to different task-environments which place bounds on 
them (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Hirsch, 1975). But this 
level of particularism is beyond the scope of this research, 
which is concerned with the general institution of market 
and the standards of performance it sets to those operating 
in it. As Butler (1984) says, "the tenor of marked rules, 
however, is that of universalism and performance measures" 
(p. 6). Yet this research did not dare to include organizations 
from different sectors, for instance one from the service 
sector and another from the manufacturing sector. It was 
preferred not to increase variation very much, since itcould 
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mean the introduction of unknown disturbing factors. The two 
market organizations here sampled were taken from the 
manufacturing sector. Nevertheless, they belong to different 
industries, and can be discriminated in terms of technology. 
Ml belongs to the modern electric/electronic industry, while 
M2 is a firm from the very traditional textile industry. 
Besides the existing differences, which may be grouped as 
particularistic features, there is also extensive commom 
ground between the two, as can be seen from the following 
description. 
The electric/electronic Ml was founded in 1967 by three 
partners who share ownership and management. They started 
producing electrical components and lighting. Later in the 
seventies they tried to expand, manufacturing screws and 
entering the electronic retail industry, but soon realized 
this was not worthwhile and sold the business. In 1980 they 
started investing in research to. develop electronic components. 
Production of electronics began at a low scale in January 
1985. Their long-term expansion plan has been to keep inwith 
market increase. The firm has sustained a substantial growth 
rate, which can be seen from employment growth. Insix years, 
from 1978 to 1984, the number of employees increased three 
times. 
As can be seen in Figure 6.5,141 organizational structure 0 
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presents a functional division amongst the three partners. 
They hold the positions of finance, administrative director, 
marketing director and technical, industrial director. At the 
second level the functions are horizontally differentiated. 
This level represents the middle rank situated between the 
directors and the third level, which includes supervisors of 
the rank and file. 
The textile firm M2 is a family-owned company, founded in 
1926. For many years the company sold its products to wholesalers. 
In the early seventies they started to move towards new 
markets. The change of market had substantial implications 
in the company's production and sales strategy. Today the 
bulk of their sales is channelled to other manufacturer§, 
retail shops and export. M2 does not show a rate of growth 
as high as Ml. Instead, it can be characterized by a slow 
but steady rate of growth over its 59 years of existence. 
The organization structure of M2, presented in Figure 6.6, is 
very flat indeed. Two brothers and a contracted manager are 
in charge of each of the three functional divisions. They are 
the sales director, the production director and the finance, 
administrative director. There is no intermediate level 
between the directors and supervisors of office and shop 
floor. 
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6.5 Profcssional Organizations 
According to Butler (1984) professional and market organizations 
have many similarities. What distinguishes them he says "is 
the nature of the contract" (p. 7), agreed between buyer and 
seller beforehand in a market, whereas in a profession price 
is determined after the job is completed. Ifthis distinction 
between professional and market organizations can be made in 
Britain, it certainly does not apply very well to Brazil, 
where the common practice is to agree prices before the 
service is contracted. But, what is relevant for the purpose 
of this research, and what distinguishes professional 
organizations, are the referent norms by which they have to 
abide, and which "lay rules for entry, training and code of 
ethics" (Butler, 1984, p. 7). 
Three professional organizations were chosen to enter this 
study.. Two private universities and a hospital. The. only 
reason to include a third professional organization was 
because in two of them the top manager was only able to 
mention three decisions. 
With respect to the universities, it seems worthwhile to 
mention that public and private universities co -exist in 
Brazil. In the city of Belo Horizonte there is a federal 
university and nine private, universities or independent 
faculties. According to Brazilian laws public and private 
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universities are first distinguished by their legal form 
(Lei n. 5.540,21/11/68), art. 4). Public universities are 
legally established as autarchies or foundations of public 
rights, and private universities are foundations of private 
rights or civil associations. At the same time, the Conselho 
Federal de Educag5o (CFE)2 (Federal Council of Education)has 
consistently been f avourable to foundations. Hence, the usual 
practice has been that private universities are either 
constituted as a foundation or as a civil association 
supported by a foundation. 
Pl is a university constituted as a foundation. It was started 
in 1965 at the initiative of a group of sixty professionals 
anxious to innovate teaching and training in their own 
profession. They started offering a single undergraduate 
course, but soon three other undergraduate courses were added. 
These courses are given in three separate schools, integrated 
in a commom campus. The schools have thorough academic 
financial and administrative discretion. Each of them has 
its own director, congregation, department council and 
academic and administrative staff. Each school charges fees 
independently and they also have complete discretion on how 
to spend their money. The board of directors of the foundation 
1ý 
2 The Conselho Federal de Educaggo - CFE is a permanent 
council, under the Ministry of Education, to regulate 
and monitor the functioning of the overall educational 
system in the country. 
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is composed of representatives of the schools and one 
representative of the government of the State of Minas Ge 
rais. The funct. ions of the board are to co-ordinate, monitor 
and integrate the units. Figure 6.7 portrays PI organizational 
structures. 
P2 is the second university, legally constituted as a civil 
association supported by a foundation. It was createdin 1966 
by a group of professionals who owned a consulting firm. At 
that time the group made the decision to create a faculty to 
offer a course on their own profession. At present, P3 offers 
three undergraduate courses and one postgraduate course. 
While this research was being made, the organization was 
getting ready to apply to the CFE to start a new undergraduate 
course. The consulting firm did not disappear but was 
integrated into the university structure, and later two other 
specialized services - editorial and research - 'were added 
to the organization activities. The diversity of services 
resulted in a rather complex structure, as presented in Figure 
6.8. At the summit is a director council. The hierarchical 
chain flows from the executive director to two functional 
assessorias (advisory staffs) and four divisions. Though 
substantial discretion exists to organize the activities, 
academic affairs are subject to normative constraint. At the 
top of the faculty are the congregation and the department 
council. Subordinated to the faculty director are three vice- 
directors, the librarian and an administrative staff. 
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P3 is a private hospital, legally organized as a company, 
that is within the legal norms of a trade company. The hospital 
is managed by a board of directors whose members are its 
owners and they are all physicians as well. The president is 
an older man who has an honorary position. The executive 
functions are divided amongst three directors, the medical 
director, the finance director and the administrative director. 
Apart from the functional division, which is very much the 
same as a manufacturing firm - just like the above-described 
market organizations - the hospital organizational structure 
is clearly professionally bound. First, there is no emphasis 
on sales or marketing. Success here has to be assessed on 
grounds of professional competence, not of a market mechanism. 
Second, the organization structure needs to be in tune with 
professional practices. P3 is not a large hospital, but it 
grew tremendously during its very first year of existence., 
It is a general hospital, and its organizational structure, 
shown in Figure 6.9, conforms with -two basic principles'. ý 
attendance and specialization. Attendance is divided into 
out-patients, wards and emergency. Services are organized 
into clinics as follows! general, surgical, gynaecology, 
orthopaedics, neurology, cardiology, children and ETN 
specialized clinics. The administrative staff issubordinated 
to a general manager who reports to the administrative 
director and the accountancy staff is subordinated to the 
chief accountant who reports to the finance director. 
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6.6 Concluding Remarks 
The following comments aim at elucidating some fundamental 
points to the ongoing analysis. 
First, concerning the constitutional forms of the organizations, 
which Butler (1984) refers to as "formal institutional rules". 
the data seem to validate his taxonomy. Though rules do not 
apply invariably to categories of organizations, -but very 
much to industries, a limited range of constitutional forms 
are warranted to each category. - 
Second, there is some evidence that organizations do have to 
abide within co-ordination norms (Butler, 1984). For instance, 
comparing M2 with P2, although they portray the same legal 
form, sharp differences in their structural arrangements are 
observed. 
Third, these data also indicate that organizations may adopt 
structural format as mere apparatus. For instance, behind 
the complex divisional structure of P2 lies a real pyramidal 
centralized hierarchy, converging to the ubiquitous personality 
of the executive director. As can be seen in Appendix 2, 
this is clearly manifested in P2 high scores of centre of 
influence. Yet another pressure of normative practice for 
collegiate decisions, as is the case of educational institutions, 
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congregations and department councils become nothing more 
than a ceremonial apparatus. 
Finally, comparing structures, technologies and markets of 
Ml and M2. it becomes transparent that the greater vertical 
and horizontal differentiation in Ml is associated to its 
production technology and market (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Woodward, 1965; Chandler, 1966). Though it - has - to be 
remembered that comparison between two organizations is 'too 
poor to allow any conclusion, differences in the means of 
centre of influence and internal inv-elvement of Ml and M2 
(Appendix 2), leave room to speculate that structural 
differentiation has some implication in the distribution of 
influence in decision processes. 
CHAPTER 7 
DECISION PROCESSES IN ORGANIZATIONS 
7.1 Int-roduction 
The sample of 40 decisions was selected to give as wide a 
variety of topics as possible and this target was reasonably 
achieved. When the executives were asked to indicate decisions, 
they did it labelling them as the factory reactivation 
decisions, i. e. re-opening a factory, the new product decision, 
the safety equipment decision and so on. These labels were 
then condensed into eight categories of topics for classifying 
decisions. Table 7.1 shows the distribution of decisions per 
type of organization in these eight categories. The distribution 
of decisions across the eight topic categories, except 
expansion and production decisions, is quite regular: the 
bulk of these two topic categories in the sample are 
concentrated in collective organizations. The bureaucracies 
present as great a number of production decisions (4) as 
collectives, but decisions in bureaucracies are more dispersed 
across the other topics than in collectives. it seems 
reasonable to speculate that the activities of collective 
organizations have little concern with markets, purchasing 
and finance, and instead have a heavy commitment with 
production and expansion decisions. As was seen inChapter 6, 
both organizations have substantial stable sources of financial 
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resources, which they allocate to the benefit and -services 
they provide, and this is what the decisions were about, 
apart from one reorganization decision. 
A fair balance of simple and complex decisions was also obtained 
in the sample. As shown in Table 5.2, the sample comprises 
21 complex and 19 simple decisions. Since the definitions of 
simple and complex decisions were not grounded ontheoretical 
concepts but emerged out of the managers' perception of 
difficulties to arrive at a decision, it seems sensible to 
start this analysis by examining the relation of these two 
categories of decisions, with the three dependent variables 
of distribution of influence. The mean values of these 
variables of simple and complex decisions are presented in 
Table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 
AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE IN SIMPLE 
- AND COMPLEX DECISIONS 
Dependent Variables Simple Complex Total Decisions Decisions Sample 
Centre of influence 3.58 3.52 3.55 
Internal involvement 4.16 4.52 4.35 
External involvement 0.42 0.95 0.70 
Only external involvement varies in any meaningful way with 
simple and complex decisions (t = 2.41 at 95% level of 
confidence). This suggests that external actors are more 
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likely to be involved in complex than in simple decisions. 
Yet a close examination of the participation and influence 
of external actors revealed: first., that external actors 
participate in only 17 out of the 40 decisions studied; second, 
that the list of outside participants includes parent 
organizations, competitors, suppliers, unions, clients, 
government and specialists; third, that despite the low 
number of decisions to which external actors had access and 
their low participation in each decision - as themeanvalues 
of external involvement show - they exerted some influence 
upon the decision in which they participated. The mean value 
of external actors' influence in the 17 decisions is 3.06. 
An ordinal five-point scale (see interview schedule 2v 
question 46) was used to score the influence of external 
actors in the decision process. The mean value of external 
influence was obtained from the mean of external actors' 
influence in each decision. Figure 7.1 portrays the scores 
assigned to external actors in the influential scale. Though 
only two external participants obtained the highest score, 
nine persons obtained 4, five obtained 3, eight obtained 2 
and four obtained 1. It shows that the influence of external 
participants in these decisions is slightly above tlýe moderate 
point of the scale. It has to be noted that when the 
interviewees named the internal participants they did it 
individually, i. e naming persons, but when they named external 
participants they did it institutionally, i. e. naming 
organizations. Thus external actors are representatives of 
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other organizations. 
Number of 
external 
actors 
Figure 7.1 
Scores of external actors in the influential scale 
The means of centre of influence and of internal involvementp 
in simple and complex - decisons, are not significantly 
different. If complexity is associated with uncertainty due 
to difficulty to evaluate alternatives to a decision, as has 
been suggested (Astley et al, 1982), it seems surprising 
that the means of internal involvement as well as of centre 
of influence in simple and complex decisions are not significantly 
different. These figures do not really support the current 
theoretical assumption that when the need for information 
and dependencies on expertise or on other contingent factors 
increase, the number of participants in decision processes 
are likely to increase and decisions are likely to be less 
centralized (Mumford and Pettigrew, 1975; Thompson, 1967). 
Influence 
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On the contrary, a recurrent centre of influence, in simple 
and complex decisions, appears and this is consistent with 
Rodrigues' and Sals (1982) findings which suggest that 
Brazilian organizations tend to concentrate strategic and 
administrative as well as functional decisions at high 
echelons. 
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7.2 Institutional Frameworks and the Distribution of 
Influence in Decision Processess 
To start, it may be opportune to remember that this research 
departed from the assumption that organizational decisions 
are made within institutional frameworks which are likely to 
tailor the distribution of influence in decision processes. 
Three institutional frameworks were distinguished according 
to their locus of formation, ' i. e. at the -level of the 
organizations, the task-environment and the larger social 
context. At this stage, the implications of the institutional 
frameworks, formed at task-environment and organizations' 
level, to the distribution of influence in decision processes 
are analysed. 
The correlation of standardization of procedures and of 
external constraint with the dependent variables are shown 
in Table 7.3. 
TABLE 7.3 
PEARSON'S CORRELATION COEFFICIENT OF THE DEPENDENTNARIABLES 
WITH STANDARDIZATION AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT 
Dependent Variables Independent Variables 
Standardization External Constraint 
Centre of influence . 09 . 10 
Internal involvement . 16 . 06 
External involvement -. 44* . 15 
<. 002 
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The correlation coefficients of standardization with centre 
of influence and internal involvement are positive but not 
significant. The strength of the correlation between these 
variables does not suggest a relationship between them. But 
the correlation coefficient is not always interpretable in 
direct relation to its magnitude. Among other things, a low 
variability of the variables may result in a low coefficient 
(Minium, 1978). Supposing the coefficient has just. been 
underestimated, the direction of a correlation coefficient 
may still indicate how the variables are likely to vary in 
relation to each other. It is interesting to observe that a 
positive correlation of standardization with centre of 
influence means that the greater the standardization, the 
higher the centre of influence, that is, the more the 
decisions are centralized. On the other hand, a positive 
correlation between standardization and internal involvement 
means that the greater the standardization, the greater the 
number of people involved in the decision process, that is, 
the greater the participation in the decision process. 
Either because there is no relationship between standardization 
and centre of influence, as the correlation coefficient attests$ 
or, if it exists, standardization is related to centralization 
of decisions - though, too, to more participative processes 
this result suggests that, as applied to decisions., 
standardization of procedures is not used as a rational 
bureaucratic alternative form of control in the way suggested 
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by Child (1970), that is, to delegate authority of decisions 
to lower echelons. Instead., it seems that standardization is 
used to legitimate the distribution of influence in decision 
processes and consequently the decisions themselves. if 
procedures on how to arrive at a decision are well established, 
to enhance participation may strengthen support for the 
decision without jeopardizing control. This seems an acceptable 
rational strategy. 
A higher and negative correlation appears between standardization 
and external involvement. As the means of external 
involvement, in simple. and complex decisions(see Table 7.2), 
indicate that complex decisions tend to have more outside people 
involved, this negative correlation between standardization 
and external involvement suggests that less standardized 
procedures are likely to exist to deal with complex matters. 
These relationships still suggest that manager's perception 
of complexity coincides with the uncertainty they felt in 
relation to the decision. As*expected, the results show 
standardization is positively associated with predictability 
(r = 0.36). 
But external involvement is negatively correlated with 
internal involvement (r = -0.33). This means that when the 
decision is vulnerable to external influences, there will 
be fewer opportunities of internal participation. Moreover, 
if external involvement tends to be greater in decisions 
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which are complex, less standardized and-'less predictable, 
it is likely that more strategic issues are still less open 
to influences of internal actors., except those in the dominant 
elite. 
There is no hint of association between external constraint 
and the distribution of influence in decision processes, as 
measured either by the number of internal orexternal persons 
involved or the centre of influence. If regulatory agencies 
or the organization's total coalition in any way set limits 
to decisions, it might be an exclusive concern of the dominant 
elite to cope with them. 
Yet some caution is needed in the 
coefficient between external 
interpretation 
constraint and 
of the 
external 
involvement. The scale of external constraint presuposes that 
regulation is a more forceful form of constraint than 
expectation, and it may well not be so. Although this research 
has not found clear evidence of this, it seems that regulations 
are not very much perceived as constraint, but as taken-for- 
granted rules, while expectation may be seen as something to 
be negotiated at any time. As one respondent says: 
"there are laws that regulate this issue, but they already 
existed when we started thinking to make this decision, we 
knew them, and I do not think they constrained the decision". 
It may be worth noting that, although very low indeed, the 
correlation coefficient between these variables is positive. 
A positive correlation between external constraint and 
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external involvement means that decisions are more likely to 
be under external influence when they are externally 
constrained. 
As the analysis of variance of each dependent variable (Tables 
7.49 7.5 and 7.6) reveals, rules and norms which are set up 
in the task-environment may account for variation in the 
distribution of influence in decision processes across the 
different types of organizations. The variation between groups 
of organizations is significant at 97.5% level of confidence 
across all variables. It indicates that some variability 
across the types of organizations can be attributed to the 
institutional framework, formed at task environment level. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of these data still indicates that 
the environment's institutional framework alone does not 
explain the distribution of influence in organizational 
decisions. These variations have to be seen very carefully 
indeed. The use of analysis of variance in non -experimental 
research, where the control of intervening factors is 
difficult, if not impossible, may lead to spurious results 
and a close examination of the data is required. Indeed, deeper 
investigation of decision processes in these organizations 
points to other factors probably accounted for in the observed 
distribution of influence. Examination of the mean scores of 
the three dependent variables and of standardization and 
external constraint across the four types of organizations 
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TABLE 7.4 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF CENTRE OF INFLUENCE 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS 
CoUective bureaucracy Market Professional 
Number 9 11 9 11 
Mean 4.33 2.33 3.56 3.91 
Standard deviation 1.00 1.37 0.73 1.30 
Source d. f. S. S. M. S. F. 
Between groups 3 18.04 6.01 4.02 
Within groups 36 33.86 1.50 
Total 39 71.90 
< . 025 
TABLE 7.5 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF INTERNAL INVOLVEMENT 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS 
CoDective Bureaucracy Market Professional 
Number 9 11 9 11 
Mean 3.56 3.91 3.33 4.64 
Standard deviation 1.39 1.22 1.41 1.69 
Source d. f. S. S. M. S. F. 
Between groups 3 25.42 8.47 3.83 
Within groups 36 79.68 2.21 
Total 105.10 
. 025 
TABLE 7.6 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT 
IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS 
Collective Bureaucracy Market 
Number 9 11 9 
Mean 0.22 1.00 1.33 
Standard deviation 0.44 1.09 1.00 
Source d. f. S. S. M. S. 
Between groups 3 8.66 2.89 
Within groups 36 25.74 0.71 
Total 39 34.40 
ProfessionaJ 
11 
0.27 
0.63 
4.04 
< . 023 
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brings up some other evidences. 
Table 7.7 portrays the means of the dependent variables and 
external constraint in the sample and in each type of organization. 
(The overall means, standard deviation and estimate confidence 
interval can be seen in Appendix 3. ). 
TABLE 7.7 
MEAN SCORES ACROSS THE TYPES OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Variables Sample Organizations Means Means C B M P 
Centre of influence 3.55 4.33* 2.55** 3.56 3.91 
Internal involvement 4.35 5.56* 3.91 3.33** 4.64 
External involvement 0.70 0.22** 1.00 1.33* 0.27** 
Standardization 2.83 3.33* 2.64 2.33** 3.00 
External constraint 1.97 1.56** 1.73 2.22 2.36 
C= Collective; B= Bureaucracy; M= Market; P= Professional. 
above the confidence interval 
below the confidence interval 
These figures specially show how far the mean scoresofthese 
variables, in each type of organization, are from the sample 
mean. They highlight the variation in the distribution of 
influence across the types of organizations, and how this 
variation is related to standardization and external constraint. 
Variation in the centre of influence across the types of 
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organizations does not seem to be associated with any of the 
other variables. Though it can be related to the institutionalized 
task-environment., there are still some clues to speculate 
that the centre of influence is very much determined within 
the organization's institutional framework. 
The greater number of people from within, involved in decision 
processes in collectives, can be explained by its legal 
constitution, which enforces collegiate decisions, but the 
high centre of influence in these organizations indicates 
that participation does not result in more decentralized 
decisions. These organizations also present the highest mean 
scores of centre of influence. An examination of the 
distribution of the centre of influence in these collectives 
shows that the president or a director was the most influential 
actor in 88.9% of the decisions. As the institutional norms 
require the referendum of a superior council and/or assembly 
for a great number of decisions, internal involvement tends 
to be higher but centre of influence remains untouched. 
It seems to be the case where participants stand for nothing 
more than endorsing his colleague's decisions. This is what 
really happens in many decisions, where some actors had the 
symbolic role of attending meetings and voting. One may 
reasonably speculate that when participation is seen as a 
personal contribution, the prevalent norm is that the members 
can delegate the power to make decisions while a trust 
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relationship is maintained. Loss of trust may result in 
change of directors but to the extent that beliefs and norms 
concerning attitudes and behaviours are institutionalized in 
the organization's culture, the influential positions are 
likely to remain (Pfeffer, 1981). 
The lower mean of centre of influence in the bureaucracies 
can be attributed to- the task-environment institutional 
framework but also to two 'other sources of variation, namely 
specialization and the organization institutional framework. 
Although the research has not made proper inquiries about 
specialization, the fact that these public agencies employ a 
substantial number of specialists gives ground to deem that 
specialization leads to decentralization of decisions in these 
organizations. 
Certainly it could-be argued that professional organizations 
are likely to have a much more specialized staff, and that 
is true. But it has to be noted that -these professional 
organizations are rather peculiar in this respect, as far 
as the great majority of their staff work in apart-time base 
contract. For this reason, their careers are not at stake 
in that single organization and they have neither too much 
time nor interest to actively participate in the administration 
of the organization. Yet a hint that specialization might 
affect the distribution of influence in organizational decisions 
stems from the comparison of the two market organizations. As 
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. 
can be seen from Appendix 2, Ml, which operates an advanced 
technology thus employs a grea'ter number of specialists, scores 
lower in centre of influence and higher in internal involvement 
than M2, an old traditional industry. 
The analysis of decision processes in these bureaucracies 
indicates that they have a greater commitment with participative 
schemes than any other organization in this sample. Though 
in some decisions participation is the result of pr. essureput 
on the organization, as in B2 price decision, in others it 
is encouraged or evoked by the organization itself. One 
example of the latter was the decision to create room for 
community participation in Bl. Yet a clue that the centre of 
influence is vory much determined within the institutional 
framework existent in the organizations comes from the 
comparison of the means of centre of influence in Pl and P2 
(see Appendix 2). They are both professional organizations 
(universities) operating under the same norms and rules set 
up inthe institutionalized task-environment. Nevertheless, 
decisions in P2 are greatly more centralized than in Pl and, 
as the description of these organizations shows (Chapter 6), 
PI seems internally committed to decentralization while P2 
portrays a very centralized style. It can also be speculated 
that decision processes in public organizations are less 
centralized. Comparing public and private-owned firms, inthe 
steel industry in the State of Minas Gerais, this researcher 
found evidence which indicates that decisions are slightly 
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less centralized in the state-owned firms (Rodrigues, 1983). 
Standardization of procedures is higher in collectives and 
lower in market organizations, and the same' pattern of 
variation is observed for internal involvement. The variation 
of standardization and internal involvement in the same 
direction is consistent with the positive correlation coefficient 
between these variables. It appears that standardization of 
procedures really serves as ceremony to legitimize decision 
internally as well as externally (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). To 
increase participation in decision processes may be a way to 
gain legitimacy for decisions. As it is reasonableto presume 
that collective organizations are engaged in activities which 
involve extensive trust relationships, it'is not surprising 
that co-ordination by moral norms, which applyto collectives 
(Butler, 1984), would lead to greater standardization of 
procedures and more extensive participation. On the other 
hand, market organizations, as co-ordinated by economic norms, 
will tend to have less standardized procedures and lower 
number of participants in decision processes. To the extent 
that standardization engenders rigidity (Merton, 1968), it 
may not grant the necessary flexibility these organizations 
need to keep in tune with the dynamics of the market. Thus 
it is not surprising that they tend to uphold standardization 
and participation at low levels. 
The mean scores of external involvement exhibita substantial 
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variation across organizations. They are extremely low in 
professional and collective organizations as compared with 
the other two types, and specially with market organizations, 
in which it is above the confidence interval. The means of 
external constraint and of external involvement do not always 
vary in the. same direction. Albeit in collectives, the mean 
scores of both external constraint and external involvement 
are low. in professional organizations, the mean of external 
constraint is above the confidence interval, while the mean 
of external involvement is below that interval. This result 
points up an imperfect association between external constraint 
and external involvement which is consistent with the low 
correlation coefficient found in the whole sample. This 
finding, obviously, does not support the hypothesis that 
greater external constraint is associated with external 
involvement in organizational decisions. At least as it was 
conceptualized and measured here, external constraint does 
not seem to make decisions more vulnerable to external 
influence. 
But, as has been argued, dependence on external resources may 
also result in decisions more vulnerable to external influence. 
Yet, as was stressed in Chapter 3, dependence on external 
resources does not represent an institutional factor, but 
may be associated with the institutionalized task -envirornent. 
To investigate how much the different types of organizations 
are dependent on external resources and how this external 
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dependence is related to external involvement in decision 
processes may help to explain the participation of outside 
people in organizational decisions. 
Table 7.8 gives, for each type of organization, the number 
and percentage of decisions in which external actors were 
involved and which depended on external resources(Table 7.8, 
columns I and 5). It also shows the number and percentage of 
decisions which were externally constrained. Columns 2 and 
3 give the number and percentage of decisions which were 
constrained respectively by regulation and by expectation, 
and column 4 shows the total external constraint, that is 
the number and percentage of decisions which were constrained 
by regulations and/or expectation. 
These data uncover other revealing features. Onthe one hand, 
it can be noticed that -neither external constraint nor 
dependence necessarily account for greater external involvement 
in organizational decisions. While 26 and 23 decisions, 
respectively, were externally constrained or dependent, only 
17 decisions had some external person involved. On the other 
hand, comparing the figures across the types of organizations, 
there is no clear indication that dependence on external 
resources is associated with the institutionalized task- 
environment. Except for market organizations, in which all 
the decisions depended on external resources, the external 
dependence across the other three types of organization does 
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not seem to vary significantly. Nevertheless, it still looks 
as though dependence and not constraint would have a hold on 
greater external involvement in organizational decisions. The 
rank order of the types of organization is equal for external 
dependence and external involvement. Meanwhile, in professional 
organizations, which present the lowest ratio of external 
involvement, 82% of the decisions were externally constrained, 
and only 36% of the decisions were externally dependent. Yet 
ýecisions in market and in professional organizations were 
just as highly constrained by regulations. In collectives and 
bureaucracies decisions were not externally regulated at all 
- in bureaucracies, one out of eleven decisions was constrained 
by regulation. Although the expectation ratio in bureaucracies 
is as high as the dependence ratio, it is difficult to say 
that expectation has affected external involvement. Variation 
in theexpectation ratio and external involvement across the 
types of organizations seems totally dissociated from each 
other. 
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7.3 Properties of Decisions and the Distribution of 
Influence in Decision Processes 
As has been argued, the distribution of influence in 
organizational decisions may be related to. properties of 
decisions. This section examines the magnitude and direction 
of associations between properties of decisions and the 
distribution of influence, as measured by the three dependent 
variables. 
. 
From Table 7.9 it can be seen that, except for cleavage and 
interdependence, none of the other selected properties of 
decisions are significantly correlated with any of the three 
dependent variables. 
TABLE 7.9 
PEARSON'S CORRELATION COEFFICIENT BETWEENPROPERTIES OF 
DECISIONS AND THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Independent 
Variables 
Predictability 
Frequency 
Non-reversibility 
Cleavage 
Interdependence 
Centre of control 
Dependent Variables 
Internal External Centre of 
Involvement Involvement Influence 
-0.10 -0.15 -0.15 
0.00 -0.19 -0.05 
0.10 -0.09 0.19 
0.26* 0.02 -0.08 
-0.29* 0.25* -0.17 
0.17 0.00 0.20 
40 
p<0.06 
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The correlation between cleavage and internal involvement 
suggests that disagreement upon possible outcomes of a decision 
puts pressure to increase internal. participation, but not on 
the centre of influence, as was expected. It may be that, 
when cleavage occurs, authority comes into play to avoid 
undesired influence. As Astley et al suggest, centralization 
is likely to occur when "both complexity and cleavage are 
high" (1982, p. 372). But, comparing the means of cleavage 
across the four types of organizations, it is interesting to 
note that cleavage is high in bureaucracies, which also 
present less centralized decisions (see Appendix 2). Is it 
decentralization that makes room for cleavage to arise? If 
so, how do the organizations succeed in centralizing decisions 
when cleavage threatens the power structure? Unfortunately 
this research cannot answer these questions, but they certainly 
deserve to be registered to be investigated in future 
researches. 
The negative correlation between interdependence and internal 
involvement does not confirm the hypothesis that greater 
interdependence would result in greater involvement. It seems 
that if interdependence means loose control and, consequently, 
an openfield for undesired influence, to refrain from 
participation may appear as a form of control, to guarantee 
the established order. But refrain from participation when 
interdependence is great can also be interpreted as an 
essentially rational procedure. It has to be remembered that 
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great interdependence, here, represents. processes in which 
activities are worked simultaneously, and certainly encreases 
the need for communication amongst parties in the process. 
Extensive participation, in this case, may result in a too 
convulsive process which the organizations may rationally try 
to avoid. 
The positive correlation between interdependence and external 
involvement has to be considered very carefully. Why should 
greater interdependence be associated with lower internal 
and higher external involvement? One explanation is that 
decisions which score high in interdependence are more conplex 
and more dependent on external resources. As has been shown, 
greater external involvement is associated with both external 
dependence and complexity. 
None of the other properties of decision are related to 
either internal or external involvement in any meaningful 
way. The direction of the correlation coefficient between 
predictability and internal involvement seems even 
contradictory. As standardization is positively correlated 
with both predictability and internal involvement, apositive 
correlation between external involvement and predictability 
was expected. The fact that standardization does not seem to 
be used as a rational bureaucratic form of control, but 
instead serves to rationally legitimize decisions, may 
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explain the opposite direction of these correlations. It 
seems that standardization may go beyond issues that are 
predictable, to define procedures not only related to the 
issues themselves, but also to regulate behaviours in the 
decision arena. 
The direction of the correlation coefficient of centre of 
influence with these six properties of decisions can indicate 
how it is likely to vary in relation to them. They indicate 
that the decisions are likely to be less centralize when 
they are more predictable and more frequent, when cleavage 
and interdependence are higher, and when the centre of 
control is at lower echelons and the reversability of the 
decision is high. All these associations are consistent with 
current theoretical assumptions (Simon, 1957; Thompson, 1967; 
Hickson et al, 1971), but surprisingly the centre of influence 
is not related to any of these properties of decisions. As 
has been evidenced throughout this analysis, agenerally high 
centre of influence seems to be the more impressive pattern 
in management decision-making in Brazilian organizations. 
Only in the public agencies do decisions seem to be slightly 
less centralized. 
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7.4 Some Additional Features of Decision Making in Brazilian 
Organizations 
Other factors: related to the origin, the process and the 
outcomes of the decisions revealed interesting characteristics 
of decision making in Brazilian organizations. 
Origin of decision was classified according to Mintzberg et 
al (1976) categories of stimulus to initiate a decision. 
Ranging from opportunity to crisis decisions with. problem 
decisions in between the extremes., these categories seem to 
reflect the "disturbance" which may arkse in the decision 
process. In this sense "disturbance" denotes the extent to 
which decision processes are disturbed as decisions run from 
opportunity to crisis. An opportunity decision means that it 
was initiated to grasp foreseen chances, and it can be 
expected that it characterizes a smooth or less disturbed 
process. Problem decisions are those initiated to answer 
still unresolved questions and may characterize increasing 
disturbed process. Crisis decisions are denoted by intense 
pressure to find solutions to emergent questions and may 
characterize intensive disturbed process. The 40 decisions, 
then, were categorized as follows: 16 opportunity decisions; 
18 problem decisions; and 6 crisis decisions. A score of 3 
was assigned to crisis decisions; a score of 2 was assigned 
to problem decisions; and a score of I was assigned to 
opportunity decisions. 
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The correlation coefficient between origin of decision and 
predictability (r = -0.2795 with p 0.014) and frequency 
(r = -0.3479 with p=0.04) bears out the idea that as 
disturbance grows, or in other words, along the continuum 
from opportunity to crisis, decisions become less frequent 
a nd less predictable. Moreover the negative correlation 
between origin of decision and external involvement (r = -0.4247 
with p=0.003) suggests that external involvement would be 
lower in crisis and problem situations. As for the overall 
sample, it was shown that external involvement tends to be 
greater in less predictable, less standardized and more 
complex decisions - these findings seem indeed contradictory. 
Nevertheless a close examination of the data shows that the 
associations of external involvement with more complex, less 
predictable and less frequent decisions just do not have the 
same pattern in problem situations. Table 7.10 presents the 
number of complex and simple decisions evoked by an opportunity, 
problem or crisis situation and, in each case, the number of 
decisions which had external actors involved. 
All crisis decisions were considered complex and had external 
actors involved. More or less half of the opportunity and 
problem decisions were perceived either as complex or simple - 
But, while external involvement is greater in complex than 
in simple opportunity decisions, it is greater in simple than 
in complex problem decisions. These figures suggest that the 
relationship between origin of decision and external 
- iso - 
involvement in complex decisions is not a linear one. It may 
be that a moderate growth in disturbance does not result in 
greater external involvement but when disturbance grows to 
configurate a crisis situation, organizations become unable 
to avoid external involvement in decision-process. 
TABLE 7.10 
EXTERNAL INVOLVEMENT IN COMPLEX AND SIMPLE OPPORTUNITY, 
PROBLEM OR CRISIS SITUATIONS 
GIN[plex External -Simple External Decisions hivolvement Decisions Involvement 
Ppportunity 7 4 9 1 
Problem 8 2 10 4 
Crisis 6 6 - - 
As origin and complexity of decisions are marginal factors 
to this analysis, the data available do not permit conclusions. 
Nevertheless. as far as the origin of decisions seems to have 
some implications in the involvement of external actors in 
organizational decisions, it would be rewarding to be attentive 
to it in future researches. 
As for decisions outcomes, an inquiry was made regarding who 
was affected by the decision, how it was communicated tothem 
and if there was any grievance against the decision. People 
from within and from without may be affected by organizational 
decisions, and this research did not make any distinction 
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between them. But, as all the decisions studied usually implied 
changes to the former., to both, but seldom only to. outsiders, 
forms of communication and grievances refer to the internal 
process of implementation of decisions. 
Form of communication means the way decisions were transmitted 
to those who would implement them or those to whom the 
implementation of the decision would imply some change. For 
instance, the decision to introduce a new technology in the 
payment process resulted in a tremendous change to those who 
did the job. Some of them became redundant and were transferred 
to other sectors, others had to be trained to use the new 
technology. An expansion decision had substantial implications 
to a whole sector of the factory where working conditions had 
deteriorated during the period of construction of the new 
plant. These people needed to be told that a decision was 
made and how things are going to be different as a result. 
Form of communication denotes the extent to which decisions 
are formally transmitted to those who would implement them 
or those to whom the implementation would imply some change, 
and was defined as: formal written, formal oral, informal or 
unnecessary. The most formal form of communication being 
formal written scoring 4, and unnecessary scoring An 
example of a decision which did not need an immediate 
communication was the decision to move into new markets in 
the textile industry. This was a typical incremental decision 
which was implemented, step by step, by-the market -director, who 
contacted the new customers and received the orders. Albeit 
- 152 - 
the decision had meant great changes in the long term, these 
were absorbed gradually following minor informal instructions. 
Grievances against a decision denote dissatisfaction with 
the decision outcome and may result in resistance to its 
implementation. The research did not investigate the nature 
of grievances, it just asked if there were any grievances 
against that decision or not, scoring 2 yes and I no. 
The correlation between form of communication and grievance 
(r = 0.4276 with p=0.003) suggests that the use of formal 
communication is likely to generate resistance to implementation 
of decisions. The heedfulness given to the way decisions are 
transmitted stresses the importance of the form of communications 
to successful implementation of decisions in Brazil. Negative 
answers to the question whether there were grievances against 
the decision were usually followed by the explanation that 
grievances were avoided because special meetings or personal 
contacts were arranged to communicate the decision and discuss 
its implementation. This result supports Rodrigues' and Sa's 
(1982) argument that Brazilian people dislike formal 
communication. As they suggest, 
"preference for less use of written material for 
comunication. reasons in Brazilian organizations reflect a 
persistent national feature for personal contact as opposed 
to formal written modes of com=ication" (p. 19). 
The length of time of these decisions, referred toas process 
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duration, was defined as the temporal extent starting when 
the issue was first raised within the organizations, till the 
moment the decision was finally authorized. This definition 
includes what Hickson et al (1986) named the two components 
of decision time: gestation time and process time. Measured 
in months, the means of process duration of these decisions 
is 8.97 months. -As compared with the mean of gestation time 
and process time, respectively 19.2 months and 12.7 months 
found by Wilson et al (1982) in 121 decisions in Britain, 
this figure looks very low indeed. This result suggests that 
once the matter is evokedBrazilian managers tend to move 
very fast toward a final answer to it. It is difficult to 
say if speed of decision process is culturally bound, as 
suggested by Mallory (1982), but it seems fair to deem that 
low participation in decision processes may indeed contribute 
to arriving at a decision more easily. Yet the positive 
correlation between process duration and interdependence(r = 
0.3745 with p=0.009) also indicates that the decision 
process lasts longer when interdependence amongst participants 
is greater. Another factor positively correlated with process 
duration is target of. decision (r = 0.4042 with p 0.005). 
Target of decision identifies who is affected by the decision. 
The meaning of this association is that decisions which affect 
the organization as a whole or the upper levels tend to last 
longer than those whose targets are lower ranks or employees 
as a whole. 
- 154 - 
As these factors are not central but complementary to this 
analysis, the above observed interactions cannot be conclusive. 
But they certainly lend some lights to understand the results 
of this research. 
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7.5 Concluding Remarks 
The results of this research seem to support the argument 
that the distribution of influence in. decision process is 
tailored within institutional frameworks existent in the 
task-environment and in the organizations. It was evidenced 
that the participation of members of the organizations and 
the centre of influence in decision processes are bound to 
norms, rules and behaviours institutionalized in the task- 
environment and/or in the organizations. The involvement of 
outside people in organizational decisions seems to be more 
associated with dependence on external resources. 
Patterns of influence in management decision making can be 
described in regard to the variation in the three dimensions 
of the distribution of influence, across the four types of 
organization-. Summarizing, it can be said that: 
a) Decisions in collective organizations are characterized 
by extensive internal participation together with 
extremely high centralization and very low external 
participation; 
b) Decisions in bureaucracies are characterized by 
relatively low centralization and moderate internal 
and external participation; 
C) Decisions in market organizations are characterized 
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by great external participation together with low 
internal participation and high centralization, and 
d) Decisions in professional organizations are characterized 
by low external participation together with moderate 
internal participation and high centralization. 
These patterns are represented in Figures 7.2,7.3p 7.4,7. $ 
and-7.6. Figure 7.2 portrays the pattern of influence in 
management decision-making as related to the centre of 
influence, across the four types of organizations. Though the 
analysis has accused a mean of centTe of influence in 
collective organizations significantly higher thanthesample 
mean, the graphic evidences that differences between 
collective, professional and market organizations are not 
very large. But it also evidences the substantial difference 
between bureaucracies and the other types of organizations. 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 show the pattern of influence in 
management decision-making as related, respectively, to 
internal and external participation in decision processes, 
across the four types of organization. Comparing the graphics 
it is evident that the position of the different types of 
organizations are just reversed in the two graphics. This 
means that the greater the external participation the lower 
the internal participation or vice-versa. It seems reasonable 
to interpret these variations as the result of strategies of 
the organizations to keep participation in the decision 
process at some desired level. As Figure 7.5 shows, the total 
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participation (i. e. internal plus external) tend to equalize 
across the organizations, though it is still considerably 
higher in collectives. The variation in these three dimensions 
across the four types of organizations is shown in Figure 
7.6. 
It can be noticed that most of the variation is in the level 
of participation in decision process, and that the centre of 
influence appears independent from the level of participation. 
Furthermore., there is no evidence that the centre of influence 
is associated with any of the six properties of decisions or 
with more simpl-e or complex decisions. These findings do not 
support Blau's (1970) argument that: 
"managerial decisions in organizations are either significant 
in which case they are not delegated or delegated in which 
case they are not significant" (p. 172). 
More or less centralized decisions, in Brazilian organizations, 
seem to reflect managerial styles associated with the type of 
organizations - decisions are generally less centralized in 
bureaucracies - or with the organizations themselves -decisions 
in Pl are generally less centralized than in P2. 
Some other peculiar features emerged out of this analysis. First, .4 
it is worth noting that the level of participation in decision 
processes in generally low. The means of internal and external 
involvement are respectively 4.35 persons and 0.70 persons. 
These figures indicate that. on average. decisions are made 
within a group of 5 persons. This really seems a very low 
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number as compared, for instance, with an average of 15 
persons involved in decision processes, as found by Patchen 
(197 4) in his research of 33 purchase decisions in business 
firms in the United States. It is true that he had interviewed 
more than one person about the same decision and, had this 
procedure been used here, certainly these figures could be 
higher. But even if they doubled in number, which would 
hardly ever happen, they were still lower than the mean 
reported by Patchen (1974). 
Second, decisions still seem very centralized and the most 
influential actor is often the legitimate authority. In 17 
decisions, the legitimate authority concides with the most 
influential actor and in 25 decisions the most influential 
person was locate on the board of directors. JIt may be 
opportune to note that the board of directors seems to have 
a much more executive function in Brazilian organizations 
than, for instance, their counterparts in Britain). Nobody 
below the third rank had voice to influence any decision, and 
only 2 out of the 40 decisions were resolved at this level. 
Of course it may be argued that these figures are influenced 
by the size of organizations. These are not large organizations. 
But Rodrigues and Sa (1982) observed the same pattern of 
centralized decisions in Brazil, studying a sample ranging 
from 200 to 18,000 employees. 
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Third, Brazilian managers seem to arrive 
-quickly. The means of process duration ( 
very low as compared, for instance, with 
time and process time (respectively 12.1 
months) found by Wilson et al (1982) in 
Britain. 
at decisions very 
8.97 months) seems 
the mean of gestation 
months and 12.7 
121 decisions in 
Finally, it is interesting to observe t. hat grievances against 
decisions in Brazilian organizations do not seem to be 
associated with disagreement on the substance of decisions 
but with the form used to communicate the decisions. 
The whole picture suggests that, despite the differences 
across the organizations, the most persistent pattern of 
influence in management decision-making in Brazilian organizations 
is characterized by a low level of participation together 
with high centralization. To get a better.. understanding on 
how these small inner groups dominate decision processes in 
organizations, this pattern of influence in. management 
decision-making is analysed in relation to some Brazilian 
basic institutions. But this is treated in Chapter 9. Before 
that, some findings of the Bradford studies on decision- 
making (Hickson et al, 1986) are compared with the findings 
of this research. 
CHAPTER 8 
COMPARING MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING 
IN BRAZIL AND BRITAIN 
8.1 Introduction 
The comparison of decision-making in Brazilian organizations 
with decision-making in British organiz-ations. can, be used 
to illustrate how national features may be understood in 
terms of cultural characteristics. As has been said already, 
this is not cross-cultural research, but it may contribute 
to cross-cultural analysis, in so far as it shows how 
organizational processes can be related to macro social 
variables, or cultural traits, prevalent in basic social 
institutions. In this chapter features of decision processes 
in Brazil and Britain are compared, and in the next two 
chapters characteristics of decision-making in each country 
are related to national cultural traits, identified in some 
of their basic institutions. 
The major problem, here, was to find out comparable data. 
Even though power. -and-influence in organization have been 
subjects of concern to many scholars, distinct theoretical 
assumptions, research strategies, techniques and measurements 
rule out reliable comparative analysis. For instance, Heller 
et al (1977) propose a scale to measure "influence power 
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continuum" UPC). But these authors are concerned with "the 
circumstances under which Influence and power sharing" result 
in skill utilization, job satisfaction and effectiveness 
(p. 572). The influence power continuum (IPC) is thus an 
independent variable in their contingency model. 
Abell (1975) model is centred on "influence and bargaining 
power in bargaining zones". By bargaining zones he means. 
"a group of individuals, normatively constrained, but with 
differing objectives, attempting to arrive at collective 
decisions through a complex process of influence and 
bargaining" (p. 17). 
Although he is also concerned with the study of the distribution 
of power and influence in organizational decision-making, his 
model is drawn to investigate the "subjective salience" of 
each issue to each participant in the decision. It focuses 
in the "initial preferred outcomes" (IPO) and the "modified 
preferred outcomes" (MPO) for each participant, examining the 
"in depth interaction in the bargaining zones". This approach 
and the one taken in this research are quite different and 
renders pretentious any comparison with studies using his 
conceptual framework. 
Rodrigues (1980) research of 35 decisions in British business 
and non-business organizations aims atinvestigating decision 
process pace, and decision-making outcomes. Her conceptual 
model presupposes mutual association between resources, 
information constraints, and forms of process activation, 
- 167 - 
given by conflictfulness, centralization and influence, as 
independent variables. Then she analyses the relationships 
among those variables and process pace, given by duration 
and tardiness of decision process, and decision-making 
outcomes, given by closure, proactivity, propitiousness and 
disturbance. Though her approach bears some affinity with 
the one taken in this research, differences in the operational 
definition and measurement of the variables make comparabil ity difficult. 
Amongst the studies that this author knows, the Bradford 
studies appear as those which allow reliable comparison with 
this study. Hickson et al. (1986) analysis of 150 strategic 
decisions focuses on features of decision process and suggests 
three types of decision-making "which varies discernably in 
process, in complexity, and in politicality" (p. 239). These 
extensive studies depart from a general description of 
decision-making, grounded on process variables - to identify 
variation in processes according to basic characteristics of 
decisions or process variables. Then explanation ofvariation 
in decision process are found in concomitant variation in 
complexity and in politicality. The nain concern of the 
Bradford studies is still rather different from the one 
carried out here. While the Hickson et al. (1986) studies are 
an attempt to explain decision-making processes in relation 
to the complexity and politicality of decision, the analysis 
carried out here is centred on the distribution ofinfluence 
in organizational decisions. Involvement of social actors and 
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the influence they exert in decision processes are dependent 
variables in this study. The departing question is to what 
extent involvement and influence are institutionally bound 
and/or associated to properties ofdecisions. In the Bradford 
studies involvement is a source of complexity and influence 
is a source of politicality, thus independent variables. 
Therefore, there is no room for a direct comparison of the 
results of the Bradford studies with this study. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the two researches bear 
similarities in measurements and methods, adjustment of data 
analysis may render the two studies comparable. 
Furthermore, the length and richness in detail of the 
Bradford studies may offset the differences so to allow 
reasonable comparison of patterns of influence in Brazilian 
and British organizational decisions. 
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8.2 The Brazilian and the British Samples ofOrganizations 
and Decisions 
The range of organizations covered by the British sample, as 
well as the size of these organizations - estimated by the 
number of employees - are shown in Table 8.1. First of all, 
it has to be said that the British sample of organizations 
encompasses a large number of industries, in the private and 
in the public sectors, scattered across England. As can be 
seen in Table 8.1, the 11 organizations at the top of the 
list are manufacturing firms, 2 in the public sector- and 9 
in the private sector. The other 19 are service organizations, 
3 are public commercial, 8 are public non-commercial and 8 
are private. 
The Brazilian sample (see Table 6.1, p. 96) is considerably 
smaller but still variegated. Though the majority are private 
organizations, there are 2 organizations in the public sector, 
the 2 bureaucracies. Yet it includes 2 collectives., a type 
of organization which does not appear in the British sample. 
One textile firm and two universities appear in both samples, 
but these organizations, on their own, are quite different 
in size. The two universities are still different in ownership. 
The two British universities are public while the Brazilian 
are private universities. 
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TABLE 8.1 
THE BRITISH SAMPLE OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Manufacturing (11) 
Public (2) Consctruction equipment 
Chemicals B 
Private (9) Metal components 
Textiles 
Chemicals H 
Paints 
Tool components 
Friction products 
Glass 
Brewery J 
Brewery T 
Services (19) 
Public Commercial (3) 
Public non-commercial (8) 
Private (8) 
Air transport 
Eletricity 
Water 
Health service B 
Health service L 
Municipality 
Police 
Polytechnic H 
Polytechnic L 
University L 
University S 
Insurance B 
Insurance R 
Bank 
Credit company 
Housing loans 
Road transport 
Industrial research 
Entertainment 
Size 
(Employees) 
22000 
1.4800 
6)000 
1.300 
1)200 
300 
750 
2j500 
34,000 
49500 
100 
57 , 000 9,000 9 6jOOO 
49500 
8,000 
149000 
69500 
19900 
1,000 
1,200 
2,800 
500 
22 000 
2'700 
45000 
7$600 
200 
250 
100 
Extracted from Hickson et. al., 1986, p. 22. 
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As a matter of fact, size seems to be the most striking 
difference between the two samples of organizations. Only six 
organizations in the British sample would be comparable, in 
size, with the Brazilian organizations. To the extent that size 
of organizations has consistently been found correlated with 
structural variables (Hickson et al. . 1969; Hickson and Macmillan, 
1981 among others)it seems important to pay attention to 
difference in the size of organizations in the Brazilian and 
in the British samples. Furthermore, Hickson et al. (1986) 
observe a "tendency in the the very smallest organizations ... 
to reach decisions rather sooner" (p. 243). 
In Britain, decisions were chosen jointly by the researchers 
and the executives, to cover as great a diversity of subject 
matter as possible (Hickson et al., 1986). The same criterion 
was used to select the decisions in Brazil, except that the 
researcher did not have the chance to choose among many 
decisions indicated by the executives. She had to be content to 
investigate those decisions that the executive indicated. 
But, as can be seem from Table 8.2, the objevtice of getting 
a wide range of topics was satisfied in both samples. 
As the decisions in the Bradford studies are strategic 
decisions, defined as: "one in which those who are involved 
believe will play a bigger rather than a smaller part in 
shaping what happens for a long while afterwards" (p. 27). 
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Some characteristics that Hickson et al. (1986) point out as 
being intrinsic to a strategic decision, are that it is 
relatively unusual, commits substantial resources and is 
comparatively organization wide in its consequences" (p. 28). 
The decisions in the Brazilian research do not always bear 
these characteristics. to the point of being considered a 
strategic decision. As has been said before, simple and 
complex decisions were selected. Thus, some rather routine 
decisions, such as the purchase of raw-material and the 
concession of benefits, in collective organizations. together 
with other complex subject matters, like the construction of 
a parking place and the creation of a new product, were 
included in the Brazilian sample. 
A very . similar"classification of topic labels was used in 
both studies to classify dec-is-ions. (See classification used in 
the Bradford studies in Table 8.2, and the classification 
used in this study in Table 7.1. p. 124). Nevertheless,, it 
is still difficult to compare the two samples as they stand. 
So. the Brazilian sample appears regrouped, according to 
Hickson et al. (1986) classification, in Table 8.2. Yet 
services and product decisions which were classified 
separately in the Bradford studies are put together in Table 
8.2. As can be seen, together the services /products decisions 
are the most frequent in both samples. In the Brazilian 
sample they represent more than a quarter of the total sample. 
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But this number may have been very much influenced by the 
presence of collective organizations in the Brazilian sample. 
As noted in Chapter 7, apart from one reorganization decision, 
decisions in collective organizations were about new services, 
new premisses and improvement of the existing services, the 
first topics classified as expansion and the later as 
production, in Table 7.1. Yet some topics classified as 
production decisions in the Brazilian original classification 
were classified either as control or domain according to the 
Hickson et al (1986) definitions. 
The second most frequent topic in both samples is technologies, 
that is, decisions to invest in new equipments or premises. 
But, topics of control, domain and personnel are as frequent 
as decisions on technologies in the Brazilian sample, while 
the third most frequent topic in the British sample - 
reorganization - appears after control, domain and personnel 
in the Brazilian sample. Personnel seems the most salient 
difference ýn terms of frequency of topics of decisions in 
the two samples. They represent 15% of all the decisions 
studied in Brazil and only 8% of the decisions covered by 
the British sample. Does this mean that the Brazilian care 
more about personnel than do the British? Or, did the greater 
number of decisions, concerned with personnel, happen by 
chance? It would be hazardous to advance any interpretarion 
from these crude numbers but, as will be seen later, 
personnel does seem to play a special role in Brazilian 
-: 175 - 
organizations. 
Decisions on inputs have approximately the same weight in the 
two samples. Decisions on locations, i. e., site and sites 
dispersal and decisions on boundaries, i. e., purchase of, 
and merging with other organizations do not appear in the 
Brazilian sample. To the extent that decisions on locations 
are the less frequent in the British sample, representing 
only 5.3% of the total sample, one may expect that decisions 
on location were likely to come out in the Brazilian sample, 
if the sample size was increased. Decisions on boundaries 
represent 7.3% of the total sample of decisions in Britain. 
This means that one cannot so easily say that decisions on 
boundaries were likely to appear in the Brazilian sample if 
the sample size was increased. The questions that arise are: 
why do Brazilian organizations seem to have little concern 
with purchase of and merging with other organizations? Or, 
are decisions on boundaries of little concern to smaller 
organizations? As have been noted the Brazilian organizations 
are substantially smaller than the British organizations. 
Although, the Bradford studies do not explicitly suggest that 
decisions on boundaries are likely to be more frequent in 
larger organizations this question may be important to future 
researches. 
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8.3 Involvement and Influence in Organizational Decisions 
This study has been concerned with the number of social 
actors involved in the decision processes, either internal 
or external actors., and the influence each of them had upon 
decision outcomes. The Bradford studies are concerned with 
internal and external interest units involved in decision 
processes, and their influence upon the decision outcomes. 
These are different approaches which obviously would hinder 
comparison between the two studies. One cannot equalize the 
involvement of persons with the involvement of interest 
units. As Hickson et al (1986) say: 
"Clearly, the involvement of asingle department, for example, 
can mean the involvement of numerous individuals. There are 
many more individuals, in and out, than the number of internal 
sub-units or external organizations counted here (p. 46). 
Accordingly, what is propounded to be compared here are not 
the results of these two studies, but the comparable data of 
two researches. of course., it still requires to give a new 
treatment to the Brazilian data. As this research identified 
the individuals involved in decision, by their position in 
relation to the focal organization and the role they played 
in the decision process, it makes possible to know which 
interests they represent, hence the interest units involved 
in the decision-making. 
Internal interest units are manifested in the organization's 
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division of labour (Crozier, 1964; Hickson et al., 1971; 
Hinings et al, 1974). Heterogeneity of functions, necessary 
to keep the organization going, also generate a diversity of 
interest which is ready to'ýop out"in the decision arena. 
These internal units, together with other organizations which 
interact with the focal organization, came to form what Cyert 
and March (1963) called "the organization's total coalition". 
The external interest units in a de*cision were called by 
Hickson et al. (1978) "organizations-in-contact". The whole 
set of these organizations-in-contact comprises the many 
groups which may be involved in the decision process because 
they control some important resource to that decision (Thompson, 
1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). 
Table 8.3 gives the classification of interest units used by 
Hickson et al. (1986) in the Bradford Studies. As they say, 
they derived the classification'from Katz and Kahn (1966) 
which "rests on the assumption that both insiders and outsiders 
have interests of varying magnitudes in what is going on" 
(Hickson et al, 1986, p. 47). 
Table 8.3 shows the primary internal and 
in the organizations and giv6s examples 
which might be identified with these pr 
list of the 40 cases of decision-making, 
Brazilian sample, and the interest units 
decision are presented in appendix 5. It 
external interest 
of interest units 
imary interests. A 
which make up the 
involved in each 
also shows the 
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TABLE 8.3 
CLASSIFICATION OF INTEREST7UNITS USED IN THE BRADFORD STUDIES 
Primary Interest in the Examples of Interest Units Organization 
Internal Interests 
Transformation Production and equivalent functions in 
service organizations 
Stability Engineering and personnel sections 
Conformity Accounting, inspection and the like 
Adjudication Complaints and equivalents 
innovation Research departments 
Acquisition Purchase departments 
Domain Marketing 
Autonomy/Devolution Self sufficient divisions 
Extemal InteTests 
Inputs Suppliers of materials and or finance 
outputs Custumers and clients 
Employment Trade unions 
Public Standards Factory inspectorates, goverment 
Private Standards Auditors,, trade associations, 
shareholders 
Comparative Performance Competitors 
Adapted from Hickson et. al., 1986. Table 2.6, p. 48. 
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involvement of "other general management", that includes: the 
chief executive and collegiate bodies. It has to be noted 
that except in P2, that the chief executive is the executive 
director (see organization chart in Chapter 6), in all other 
organizations he is the president. In P3, it is the president 
and not the chief executive that was classified under "other 
general management". As has been commented earlier, the 
president of P3 has an honourable position in the organization, 
so, he is not deeply involved in day to day business. In 
P3 like in Ml and M2 the partners share the executive functions. 
8.3.1 Involvements in Brazilian and British Decision-Making 
The various interest units involved in the 40 cases of 
decision-making in Brazil were classified according to the 
concept of primary interests in the organization. The 
identification of the interest units, listed in appendix 5, 
with the defined primary interests, may not be so obvious to 
the reader as it is to this author. To make it clear this 
classification is portrayed in Table 8.4. Only 12 primary 
interests were identified in the 40 cases of decision-making 
studied in Brazil. There was no interest unit involved in 
decisions which had adjudication or innovation as their 
primary interests. Nevertheless., this does not necessarily 
mean the absence of these interests in these organizations. 
0 
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TABLE 8.4 
CLASSIFICATION OF THE INTEREST UNITS INVOLVED 
IN THE BRAZILIAN DECISIONS 
InteTest Units Involved in the Primary InteTests 40 BTazilian Decisions 
Production Transformation 
Administrative, Personnel Stability 
Accounting, Quality Control Conformity 
Purchase Acquisition 
Marketing Domain 
Advisory Staff, Juridical Staff, 
University Departments Autonomy/Devolution 
Suppliers Inputs 
Customers, Clients outputs 
Unions ETloyment 
Government, Factory Inspectorates Public Standards 
Master organizations, Trade Private Standards 
Associations 
Competitors Conparative Performance 
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For instance, the decision to adopt a new system of payment 
of contractors in B1 originated Irom the complaints about 
the existing formula, the decision to launch a new product 
in Ml required a lot of iesearch and deve lopement of the 
product. As a matter of fact, it may be that those activities 
(adjudication and innovation) are not utterly formalized in 
these Brazilian organizations and it seems reasonable to 
conjecture that the size of the organizatigns . can account 
for this. 
The number of interest units involved in the 150 British 
cases of decision-making, and in the 40 Brazilian cases of 
decision-making are given in Table 8.5. In both researches 
involvement was counted in the same way. Anyone who had been 
consulted or given minimal information, at any point in 
the process, was counted as involved in the decision. 
The first column in Table 8.5 gives the 14 categories of 
primary interests. The second and fourth columns give the 
number of interest units,, of each category, involved in the 
150 cases of decision-making in Britain and in the 40 cases 
of decision-making in Brazil. The percentage ofeach category 
in the total involvement is given in the third and fifth 
columns, respectively for Britain and Brazil. 
The presence of internal primary interests in both sets of 
decisions follow more or less the same order. Conformity and 
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transformation are far the most represented interests in 
both countries, though in a reverse order. While conformity 
comes first in the British decisions, transformation is the 
most steady presence in Brazilian decisions. Autonomy/devolution 
and domain represent 'respectively 10% and 7% of total 
involvement in Britain and in Brazil, and acquisition is the 
-least represented interest in - Britain and in Brazil. 
The impressive difference is registered in the involvement 
of interests representing stability. According to Hicksqn et 
al (1986), this category has interests in "stable operation 
to occupy equipment and employees" (p. 47). and they give as 
examples: engineering departments, maintenance section and 
personnel departments. Among the 20 interest units classified 
under the category of stability, in the 40 cases ofdecision- 
making in Brazil, there are 8 personnel and l2administrative 
divisions. Although some ambiguities in the definition of 
the personnel function may still persist (Legge, 1978), for 
the purpose of this research it is understood as all 
activities concerned with jobs, wages, training security 
etc., of employees. The administrative function may not be 
so obvious., since such a label did not appear in the 
Bradford studies. In Brazil it refers to functions concerned 
with the maintenance of general services in the organizations, 
which might includethe establishnment of bureaucratic routine, 
the maintenance of equipment in the factory, structural 
reorganizations and so forth. This definition seems very 
close to the Hickson et al. (1986) definition of engineering 
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functions which have interest in stable operations to occupy 
equipments (p. 47), .. 'though their definition sounds more 
limited. At the same time, there is -too big a-difference' in 
the number of interest units, whose primary interest is 
stability, involved in the Brazilian and in the British cases 
of decision-making. The involvement of stability interests 
in the British decisions did not go beyond 5% of the total 
involvement, and it reaches 17% of all involvements in the 
Brazilian decisions. Moreover, only the personnel interest 
units have been more involved in the Brazilian decisions (7% 
of total involvement) than overall stability interests in 
the British decisions (5% of total involvement). As noted 
above, the number of cases of personnel decision -making 
represents 15% of overall cases studied in Brazil and 8% of 
the British 150 decisions. Hence, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the involvement of personnel divisions in Brazilian 
decision-making explains at least part of the difference of 
the involvement of stability interests in the two countries. 
The involvement of external interests in decision -making 
presents some similarities and also some striking differences, 
and, it is evidently lower in Brazil. Public and private 
standards are the external interests more consistently 
represented in decision-making, but they too, appear in a 
reverse order in Britain and Brazil. In Britain there were 
112 and 108 units representing respectively private and 
public standards which make up 11% of the total 
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involvement., for each category in the British decisions. In 
Brazil public standards seems rather more represented in 
organizational decisions than private standards. Yet as can be 
seen in Table 8.5, the relative weight of these interests in 
decision-making is substantially lower in Brazil as compared 
to Britain, -though the involvement of public interests in 
the Brazilian decisions seems significantly higher (7% of 
total involvement) as compared with the involvement of private 
interests (3% of total involvement). The presenc e of subsidiary 
organizations in the British sample of organizations may 
account for the strentgh of private standards in Britain. 
The involvement of external units whose primary interests are 
in inputs and outputs also show an inverse pattern. Inputs 
appears as the third external interest more involved in the 
British decisions, followed by competitors, outputs and 
employment. In the Brazilian decisions outputs interests were 
as much involved as private standards (4 interest units of 
each category or 3% of overall involvement), followed by 
inputs,, competitors and employment. As a matter of fact it 
can be said that the level of involvement ofpublic standards, 
competitors,, outputs and employment interests, in decision- 
making, though slightly higher in Britain, does not seem 
significantly different in the two countries, except by the 
reverse position they show. Private standards and inputs 
account for the greater difference, as the involvement of 
these interests in the British decisions seem significantly 
higher than their involvement in the Brazilian decisions. 
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To summarize there are few interest units, internal and 
external, involved in the Brazilian decisions as compared 
with the number of interest units involved in the British 
decisions. An average of 6.81 interest units were involved 
0 
in the 150 cases of decision-making studied by Hickson et ai 
(1986). As they say: 
"There were 1,020 internal and external units named as 
involved in the 150 processes of decisions, or in other 
words about seven main units per decision, ranging from a 
handful in some instances to as many as 20 in the case of 
one manufacturer's new product" (p. 46). 
In the 40 cases studied in Brazil an average of 3 interest 
units., internal and external, were involved in the decision 
processes, ranging from none in the case decided between the 
chief executive and the superior council in C1 to 6 in a 
decision to assure the-right to work, to those who wished to 
do so, in a strike situation. A sharp difference in terms of 
level of participation in decision processes, in Britain and 
Brazil, seems evident from these figures. However the comparison 
of the average involvement of each interest unit in decision 
processes, in the two countries, can further understanding 
of this general low level of participation in Brazil. As can 
be seen in Table 8.6. units having transformation and acquisition 
as their primary interests seem to have the same level of 
participation in decision processes in Britain and Brazil. 
It is interesting to notice that these two interests are 
among the most represented (transformation) and the least 
represented (acquisition). The involvement of units 
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TABLE 8.6 
AVERAGE INVOLVEMENT OF INTEREST UNITS IN OVERALL 
BRITISH AND BRAZILIAN DECISIONS 
Priinary Interests 
Conformity 
Transformation 
Private Standards (E) 
Public Standards (E) 
Autonomy Devolution 
Inputs (E) 
Domain 
Stability 
Comparative Performance (E) 
Outputs (E) 
Fhployment (E) 
Innovation 
Adjudication 
Acquisition 
Total 
Average Involvement 
Britain Brazil 
1.24 
0.87 
0.75 
0.72 
0.67 
O. S3 
0.47 
0.34 
0.30 
0.29 
0.. 23 
0.14 
0.14 
0.09 
6.81 
0.. 53 
0. -80 
0'. 10 
0,. 20 
0.30 
0'. 08 
0.23 
0.50 
0.05 
0.10 
0.05 
0.08 
3.00 
(E) External interest. 
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representing stability is exceptionally higher in Brazil. As 
mentioned. before greater concern with personnel matters seems 
to account for this difference. The level of participation 
of all the other internal interests seems considerably lower 
in Brazil. As for the involvement of external interests., 
differences in terms of their lower participation seem still 
greater (as is evidenced in Table 8.6 above) except for outputs 
which is one of the least represented interests in the British 
decisions. 
8.3.2 The Exercise of Influence in British and Brazilian 
Decision-making 
To Hickson et al (1986) "the exercice of influence is power 
in action" (p. 60), and their study is especially concerned 
with the influence exerted by the various interest units 
upon the decision outcome. As they put it: 
"the influence of the interest units in a decision set is 
the measure of the effectiveness of those sources in the 
decision-making, for influence is effective power (Hickson 
et al, 1986, p. 61). 
The basic assumption underpinning this definition is that 
the various interests in a focal organization control 
different resources which become a source of power in a 
decision set, and it includes authority as well as any other 
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material base of power (French and Raven, 1959). 
In this study influence was defined as the capacity of a 
social actor to obtain his desired outcomes in a decision 
situation., which also implies the effective use of power 
(p. 19). However, this study is centred on the influence 
exerted by social actors upon the outcomes of organizational 
decisions. Although these definitions of influence could be 
commensurate, the approach taken in each study would hinder 
any reliable comparison. Thus the Brazilian data had to be 
reckoned to estimate the influence of the interest units. 
Fortunately a nearly equal scale was used to measure influence 
in both studies. (In the Bradford study influence was measured 
in a five point scale rating; 1. little; 2. some; 3. quite a 
lot; 4. a great deal; S. a very great deal) - Umparing the two 
scales(see questions 15 and 16 in the interview schedule 2 
Appendix I)one can see that the difference is more of a semantic 
character. Nevertheless it resulted in that the higher rates 
are stressed in the British scale, while the lower rates are 
stressed in the Brazilian scale. As the Brazilian research 
had actually used a translated (Portuguese) version of the 
questionnaire, this sort of restriction wouldbeunavoidable. 
It is difficult to say whether such a restriction might have 
accounted for differences in the measurement of influence 
(under or over estimated the influence in one country as 
compared with theother), in any way, it may be wise to keep 
it in mind. 
Once the participants in the Brazilian decision-making were 
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identified with the organizational functional division they 
were linked to, and with the -external organization they worked 
for, the rating score attributed to them was computed according 
to the interest unit they. represented, and subsequently, 
classified into the corresponding category of primary interest. 
Where more than one individual, from a single internal 
division or external organization, was involved in the 
decision, the highest score was considered. 
Table 8.7 summarizes the mean, standard deviation and range 
of influence, in the Brazilian decisions. The chief executives 
are the most influential interest in Brazilian decision-making. 
Yet it has to be warned that the mean of the influence of 
the chief executive is likely to be underestimated, due to 
the structural organization and functional division', amongst 
the partners, in the two market organizations and in P3. (At 
least one of them was involved in all the decisions in'their 
respective organizations). The omnipresence of production - 
represented by the technical industrial director in 111; by 
the production director in M2; and by the medical director 
in P3 - makes one believe that they might be the chief 
executive in their respective organizations. However, as it 
was stressed that the partners shared the executive functions, 
it seemed preferable to reckon their influence in the 
transformation category, as one representing production 
interests. It may be worthwhile to note that the directors 
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TABLE 8.7 
INFLUENCE IN THE BRAZILIAN DECISION-MAKING 
Primary Interests 
Standard 
Means Deviation Range 
Domain 4.11 1.27 3 
Transformation 4.09 0.86 2 
Inputs (E) 4.00 1.00 2 
Autonomy/Devolution 3.75 1.42 4 
Conformity 3.62 1.28 4 
Public Standards(E) 3.13 0,99 2 
Stability 3.05 1.43 4 
Outputs (E) 3.00 1.15 2 
Private Standards (E) 3.00 1.83 4 
Comparative Performance (E) 3.00 1,41 2 
Acquisition 2.67 1.15 2 
Employment (E) 2.00 1.41 2 
Total (excluding general management) 3.60 1.25 4 
Internal*interest units 3.73 1.23 4 
External interest units 3.09 1.20 4 
General Management 
Chief Executive 
Other general management C2 
4.36 1.09 3 
3.05 1.56 4 
(E) External 
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received the_highest score for all the decisions in which they 
were involved. Judging by the mean values of influence, the 
internal interest units do not seem to heavely outweigh the 
external interest units, when they, jointly, participate in 
the decision process. These figures seem to support the 
argument advanced in Chapter 7 that despite the low number 
of decisions to which external actors had access they did 
exert some influence upon the decision in which they 
participated (p. 126). 
Table 8.8 portrays the means of influence of all interest 
units, including the chief executive and other general 
management, the rank order of the involvement and of the 
influence of overall primary interests in British and in 
Brazilian decision-making. The means of influence of the 
interests units, excluding the chief executive and general 
management, in decision-ipaking are generally higher in Brazil. 
This resulted in an overall mean of influence (i. e. the mean 
of internal and external interest units combined), of 3.6 in 
Brazil against 2.9 in Britain. Yet, as Table 8.8 shows the 
same trend appears for internal and external interest units. 
It has to be noted, however, that a lot of difficulties come 
to light in comparing these means. First, there is the problem 
of the scale alluded above. Second, what should exactly be 
the meaning of high rating of influence for an interest unit 
in one country as compared with another? For instance, the 
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means of influence of interests units identified with the 
organization's domain is 4.1 in Brazil and 3.4 in Britain. 
Of course one cannot say, just by comparing these figures, 
that the influence of domain interests in Brazil is greater 
than in Britain. On the other hand, if one observes that the 
category domain is at the top of the list in both countries, 
it seems fair to argue that the level of influence of 
domain interests, upon organizational decisions is likely to 
be equal in the two countries. It seems obvious that it is 
the rank order of influence, of the primary interests in 
Britain and in Brazil, that should be compared. Yet, it is 
worth noting that adjudication is the number one in the 
British list, and that interests in adjudication and in 
innovation were not involved in the Brazilian decisions. But, 
as Hickson et al. (1986) say, 
110ccacionally sales or production can' be outweighed by 
'adjudication' interests, in the few decisions inwhich these 
do become involved" (p. 64), 
a point which is supported by the low score on involvement 
of this interest. 
As for the amount of influence exerted by the chief 
executive, these figures seem to suggest that the British 
executives are more influential than their Brazilian counterparts. 
In Britain, the mean of influence of the chief executive is 
somewhat higher than the mean of influence of any other 
interest unit, and in Brazil, the chief executive does not 
seem much more influential than the most influential interest 
units: domain, transformation, and inputs. Even though the 
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means of influence of domain and transformation, in the 
Brazilian decisions, may have been overestimated, as indicated 
above, the difference between the means of influence of the 
chief executive and of all interest units combined seems 
considerably largerin Britain (1.4) as compared with the 
difference between these two means in Brazil (0.8). 
By grouping the 12 primary interests - adjudication and 
innovation were excluded - according to the influence they 
exerted upon decision outcomes, it becomes evident that the 
influence of interest units in the two countries follow very 
similar patterns. The division of these categories of primary 
interests in three groups has a sheer analYtical aim-It only 
makes it easier to identify and compare the patterns of 
influence of interest units in Brazilian and in British 
decision-making. As can be seen from Table 8.9 the classification 
of the internal units in terms of the amount of influence 
they exerted in decision processes shows very similar patterns 
in the two countries. 
Domain, transformation and autonomy/devolution appear in the 
first group which comprises the interest units which exerted 
high influence upon decisions. Conformity and stability came 
in the second group, as having a medium influence upon 
decisions in both countries, and acquisition appear in the group of low 
influence. As these categories of interests were listed in 
Table 8.9 in the rank order of influence they received in each 
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TABLE 8.9 
HIGH, MEDIUM AND LOW INFLUENCE OF 
PRIMARY INTERESTS IN BRITAIN AND IN BRAZIL 
Britain 
Domain 
High outputs 
Influence Transformation 
Autonomy/Devolution 
Conformity 
Medium Private Standards 
Influence Stability 
Inputs 
Public Standards 
LOW Acquisition 
Influence Comparative Performance 
Employment 
B=il 
Domain 
Transformation 
Inputs 
Autonomy/Devolution 
Confomity 
Public Standars 
Stability 
Outputs 
Private Standards 
Comparative Performance 
Acquisition 
Employment 
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country, it can be noted that domain, autonomy /devolution, 
conformity and stability hold the same positions in Britain 
and in Brazil. Though in the same groups, transformation is 
3rd. in Britain, and 2nd. in Brazil, and acquisition is 10th. 
in Britain, and llth. in Brazil, what does not really evoke 
any meaningful difference. 
The influence. of external interests, upon organizational 
decisions, present some substantial differences. Except for 
employment, the least influential, and comparative performance, 
also in the group of low influence, in Britain and inBrazil, 
all the others appear in quite different positions. It is 
interesting that private and public standards on the one 
hand, and inputs and outputs on the other, appear just in 
opposite positions. In the first group, of high influence, 
outputs is the 2nd. in Britain and inputs is the 3rd. in 
Brazil. In the second group, of medium influence, private 
standards is the 2nd. in Britain, public standards is the 
2nd. in Brazil, and inputs is the 4th in Britain, outputs 
is the 4th. in Brazil. In the third group, of low influence, 
public standards is the lst. in Britain and private standards 
is the lst. in Brazil. 
Using the same criterion to group the involvement of primary 
interests in decision processes, some new features are revealed. 
Table 8.10 portrays the three groups of primary interests of 
high, medium and low involvement in Britain and in Brazil. 
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TABLE 8.10 
HIGH, MEDIUM AND LOW INVOLVEMENT OF 
PRIMARY INTERESTS IN BRITAIN AND IN BRAZIL 
Britain 
Conformity 
High Transformation 
Involvement Private Standards 
Public Standards 
Autonomy/Devolution 
Medium Inputs 
Involvement Domain 
Stability 
Comparative Performance 
LOW outputs 
Involvement Employment 
Acquisition 
Brazil 
Transformation 
Conformity 
Stability 
Autonomy/Devolution 
Domain 
Public Standards 
Private Standards 
outputs 
Inputs 
Acquisition 
Comparative Performance 
Employment 
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As had already been evidenced, in the last section, the 
involvement of interest units in British and Brazilian 
decision-making present some fact-finding similarities and 
differences. By examining the rank order of involvement and 
influence of primary interests in decision-making these 
findings-can be better understood. First, it can be 
observed that the involvement of primary interests in decision- 
making does not show such a uniform pattern in the two 
countries, as does the influence they exert upon decision 
. outdomes. While nearly 
half the primary interests have exactly 
the same rank order for influence in Brazil and in Britain, 
the same does not happen for involvement. Yet considering 
the groups: conformity and transformation appear inthe group 
of high involvement; domain in the group of medium involvement; 
and acquisition, employment and comparative performance in 
the group of low involvement in Britain and in Brazil. 
Second, all'internal primaTy interests, except acquisition, 
come first on involvement in Brazilian decision-making, while 
in Britain, though one cannot say that external and internal 
interests are equally represented in organizational decisions, 
they are much more mixed. Third, it seems evident that neither 
in Britain nor in Brazil, to be involved in a great number 
of decisions necessarily means to have great influence upon 
decisions outcomes, although this seems tobe more true to 
Britain, than to Brazil. Yet, five primary interests have 
corresponding group positions for involvement and influence 
in Britain and Brazil. These are the cases oftransformation, 
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employment, acquisition, comparative performance and autonomy/ 
devolution, though the later is the first in the group of 
medium involvement and. the. fourth in the group of high 
influence, in Britain. Conformity is classified inthe groups 
of high involvement and medium influence; and domain is 
classified in the group of medium involvement and high 
influence in the two countries. All the other five primary 
interests show quite different positions in Britain and 
Brazil, either for involvement' or influence, or both. 
Stability is in the group of high involvement in Brazilian 
decis. ions but holds the same position in the group of medium 
influence it has in Britain. Outputs and inputs appear in 
the groups of low involvement and high influence, respectively 
in Britain and in Brazil. In Britain, private and public 
standards are in the group of high involvement, but while 
private standards come in the group of medium influence, 
public standards fall in the 'group of low influence. In 
Brazil, public and private standards are in the group of 
medium involvement, and while public standards keep its 
position in the group of medium influence, private standards 
fall in the group of low influence. 
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8.4 The Level in Hierarchy Where-Decisions are Authorized 
The analysis carried out in the last. chapter, was centred 
on the involvement of internal and external actors in decision 
process, and the hierarchical position of the most influential 
internal. actors, from which the centralization of decisions 
was inferred. Since there are no data available on the 
hierarchical position of the British influencing persons in 
the Bradford studies, and as far as this author knows there is no 
other comparable data on influential actors on. British decisions,, 
any attempt to compare the distribution of influence in 
organizational decisions on this dimension is ruled out. But 
some speculation can be made on the level at which 
decisions were authorized in the two countries. Hickson et 
al (1986) defined the "authority - level in hierarchy" as: 
"How high in the hierarchy did the process culminate, 
indicated by a score for the level at -which inp. lementation 
was authorized and could then comence (1 -*below divisional 
level or equivalent; 2- divisional level or equivalent; 
3- chief executive; 4- chief executive ratified by board; 
5- board or equivalent top governing body; 6- board and 
ratified at higher external level; 7- outside and above the 
organization). "'(p. 270). - 
The mean level in hierarchy at which decisions were authorized 
in Britain is 4.7 and using the Bradford scale to score the 
formal authority to make decisions in 38 cases in Brazil 
- data were missing on two cases -a mean of 5ý1 was 
obtained. The standard deviation is 1.3 for Britain and 1.4 
for Brazil and the lowest level at which decisions were 
authorized, in both countries, was the divisional level. 
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This can signify that in both countries decisions are authorized 
more or less at the same level in the hierarchy, on average 
at the board level. Nevertheless, some care is required in 
the interpretation of these figures. The scale of authority 
r hierarchical levels'. - -seems to have been constructed empirically, 
i. e., from the results of the Bradford research, and in-this 
sense it typifies the hierarchical structure oflarge British 
organizations. Hence it did not fit very well with the structure 
of the Brazilian organizations, and -it is necessary to explain 
the scores attributed to the hierarchical level's on these 
organizations. First, the upper boundary of the organization 
was demarcated at the board level, whereas counci Is, assemblies 
and the like appear above the board in the Brazilian 
organizations. The score 6 was assigned to decisions authorized 
at this level, but it is not just what the scale pressuposes. 
Second, the scale still pressuposes one level, for the chief 
executive., in betweei! the board and -the divisi6nal level. 
This level did not really appear in the Brazilian organizations, 
where, as already stated the president of the board of 
cfirectors or equivalent tQD governing. body is usually 
the chief executive. The procedure was to assign score 
3 when the decision had been authorized by the president 
or by one director alone, and 5 when the decision had been 
authorized by more than one member of the board together, 
usually the president and one director, or by the board as a 
collegiate body. And third, score attributed to divisional 
level or equivalent in the Bradford scale, was assigned to 
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the level immediately below the board in the Brazilian 
organizations. 
Although it could be thought that the difficultiesby. forcing 
the use of a British empirically developed escale. to measure 
the Brazilian reality are due to the smaller size of the 
Brazilian organizations, this does not seem to be true. At 
this high level there is not much room to differentiate, and 
the small Brazilian organi, zbLtions do seem to portray a more 
complex and differentiated structure at the top. To some 
extent the types of organizations can be accounted for this 
complexity of strucýure at higher levels in Brazilian 
orga nizations. Councils especially appear in collective 
organizations, which do not exist in the British sample of 
organizations. Even though public agencies, and eventually, 
professional organizations do have these superior bodies, 
they do not appear in the two market organizations. 
The question whether a comparison can be made between the 
means of level in hierarchy where decisions were authorized, 
in Britain and Brazil, still remains. It may be fair to 
assume that there is no meaningful difference between these 
means. Yet, it can be argued with Maurice (1976) and child 
(1981) that measures which focus on formalistic and broad 
features of structure "tend to remove cultural dimensions 
from organizations and their structure" (Child, 1981, p. 319). 
Furthermorep as only strategic decisions entered the British 
sample of decisions, while the Brazilian sample comprised 
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strategic as well as routine decisions, it would*be expected 
that some decisions would be authorized at a level below the 
divisional level in Brazil. Nevertheless it did not happen, 
and only 2 decisions out of 40 were authorized at the 
divisional level, or in other words, at the level immediately 
below the board. As a matter of fact., what seems peculiar to 
centralization of decision-making in Brazilian organizations 
is that, even routine decisions tend to be centralized. As 
seen in Chapter 7, standardization of procedures on how to 
arrive at a decision is positively correlated with 
predictability and frequency but none of these variables are 
significantly correlated with centre-of influence (see also 
Appendix 4). This same pattern was found in organizations in 
the State of Sao Paulo by Bertero (1968), who suggests that 
even subsidiaries of multinationals located in Sao Paulo tend 
to assimilate the Brazilian pattern of concentration of 
authority. Moreover as mentioned earlier, Rodrigues and S9 
(1982). who used the Aston scales in a sample of 24 large 
and small organizations in the State of Minas Gerais, 
interpreted "resistance in Brazilian society to delegate 
decisions to those at the bottom", as a cultural explanation 
for centralization of organizational decisions in Brazil. 
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8.5 Concluding Remarks 
This section-attempts to condense the observed similaritie, ý 
and differences on involvement and -influence in 
Brazilian and British decision-making. Plagearizing Hickson 
et al (1986) Table 3.4 of heavyweight and lightweight 
interests units (P. 80) -is a good way to stress these 
similarities and differences. This can be done by thinkIng- of 
the distribution of influence in organizational decisions as a 
dichotomy of high and low involvement and influence. Figures 
8.1 and 8.2 show the positions of the 
_primary 
interests, 
respectively for Britain and Brazil, in the four cells 
resulting from the combination of involvement and influence. 
Hickson et al (1986) have called "internal heavyweight" the 
interests grouped in the upper right cell which scored high 
in both involvement and influence, and "external lightweight", 
those in the bottom right cell which are frequently involved in 
decision processes but have little influence upon decision 
outcomes. The same denomination cannot be used for the 
interests grouped in the upper and bottom right cells in 
Brazil. Though the same internal interests seem to dominate 
decisions in both countries, in Brazil . "the 
balance of power" 
does not seem so "safely tipped internally", as Hickson et 
al (1986, p. 81) say. Actually, it seems to be broken by 
public standards. Yet more contrasting is the bottom right 
cell of the British "external lightweight".. Not a single 
external interest falls into this cell in Brazil. The two 
- 206 
Involvement 
LOW High 
Higb 
Influence 
IDW 
lnputs (E) Transformation 
Domain 
Autonomy/Devolution 
Conformity 
Public standards (E) 
Acquisition Stability 
Outputs (E) 
Private Standards (E) 
Comparative performance(E) 
Employment(L) 
FIGURE 8.1 
COMBINED INVOLVINENT AND INFLUENCE OF PRIMARY 
INTEREST IN BRAZILIAN DECISION-MAKING 
Involvement 
IA)W 
High 
Influence 
Low 
Hi 
Outputs (E) Transformation 
Domain 
Conformity 
Autonomy/Devolution 
Employment (E) Private Standards (E) 
Comparative performance(E) Public Standards (E) 
Acquisition Inputs (E) 
Stabil#y 
FIGURE 8.2 
COMBINED INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE OF PRIMARY 
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external interests appearing in the upper left cell in each 
country is at least curious, as these two interests stand at 
the opposite extreme of the production system. In Britain 
customers and clients are not involved in many decisions but 
are influential in the decisions they. participate in; in Brazil 
suppliers-are the ones which are able to show influence, 
over the few decisions in which they are involved. In the 
cell of low involvement, and low influence, in both countries 
are: employment, comparative performance and acquisition. 
To summarize, these findings seem to indicate that: 
_ 
1. The internal division of labOUT ' seems to produce a 
certain uniformity to the internal distribution of 
influence in organizational decisions, conferring power 
to those functions more critical to the organization's 
survival, such as production and sales. The rank order 
of influence of internal interests in Britain and in 
Brazil are exactly the same. 
2. In the Brazilian organizations, the internal interests 
do not'seem to retain the degree of hegemony enjoyed by 
the British internal interests. Government departments 
and agencies stand among the powerful Brazilian internal 
interests. 
The concentration of primary interests in the upper right 
cell and in the bottom left cell of figure 8.1 - combined 
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involvement and influence of primary interests in Brazilian 
decision-making - suggests a strong correlation between 
involvement and influence of interests units in Brazilian 
decision-making. This means that involvement in decision- 
making in Brazilian organizations is a good chance to 
influence decision outcomes. In other words, it seems 
that the distribution of influence among the participants 
of decisions, in Brazil, is more dispersed than it is in 
Britain. Yet the influence of the chief executive in 
Brazilian decision-making does not stand so much above 
the most influential interest units, as the influence 
of the British chief executive does. Of course this is 
further evidence of more dispersed influence within the 
decision arena in Brazilian organizations, though, it 
cannot be forgotten how different in size, are the groups 
of decisions makers in the two countries, the Brazilian 
portraying a strong oligarchic character. 
4. British organizations seems much more concerned with 
customers and clients than Brazilian orpnizations. They 
are the only external interests that seem likely to 
threaten the internal hegemony in British organizations. 
In Brazil, customers and clients are neither frequently 
involved nor havq much influence on organizational decisions. 
On the other hand, suppliers are not involved in many 
decisions in Brazil. but do influence the decisions they 
participate in, while in Britain, they get involved in 
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many decisions but do not exert a great deal of influence 
on these decisions. 
5. The number of interest units involved in British decision- 
making is more than twice the number of interest units 
involved in Brazilian decision -making. The average 
involvement of interest units in decision-making in 
Britain Es. 6.8 against an avera e of 3.0 interest units 9 
involved in decision-making in Brazil. Nevertheless, 
personnel, maintenance and administrative departments 
are more present in Brazilian than in British decisions. 
As already noted, this may be due to the greater number 
of personnel decisions in the Brazilian sample. 
Apart from the parallel consistent influence exerted by 
internal primary interests, and to some extent by external 
primary interests as well, the general pictures, that can 
be painted, of patterns of influence in Brazilian and British 
organizational decisions may be as follow': 
Decision-making in Brazilian 
Organizations is: 
Decision-making in British 
organizations is: 
Centralized (even simple and less Decentralized(less important and 
important matters are not delegated). programmed decisions are 
delegatea)l. 
e. g. as evidenced by Pugh et al. 1976; Child and Kieser, 
1979. 
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Decision-making in Brazilian Decision-making in British 
organizations is: organizations is: 
Made by an united oligarchy (small Made out of an extensive 
number of people and of interest competitive process (great 
units involved in the decision number of interest units and 
process). individuals involved in the 
decision process). 
Balanced power within the dominant Unbalanced power within the 
oligarchy (dispersed distribution extended ruling elite 
of influence within the decision (distribution of influence 
arena). concentrated specially on the 
chief executive). 
To understand these patterns, which on their own, may appear 
rather contradictory to the reader . they have to 
be examined 
within the social context where they occur. They reflect 4 
social practices which are produced in the very interaction 
of social actors in a given social system (Giddens, 1976), 
and as such may be identified in the basic institutions of 
that same society. 
CHAPTER 9 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
DECISIONS AS RELATED TO THE MACRO SOCIAL CONTEXT 
- THE BRAZILIAN CASE - 
9.1 Introduction 
The analysis carried out in Chapter 7 suggests that institutional 
frameworks existent both at the organizational level and at 
the task- environment level, can really mould the distribution 
of influence in organizational decisions. 
Pattern of influence in management decision- making exhibit 
the hallmark of the organization to the extent that itreveals 
the genuine ordinayy practices in the focal ortanization. 
Differences between the two universities are specially 
revealing of the way. in which internal cultures give rise to the 
institutional framework whereby those who participate as well 
as their social practices are selected. Identification with 
the organization ideology, which values autonomy and 
decentralization, together with a feeling of belonging to a 
team whose objective is well known, are the most outstanding 
traits of PI management. As they say: "everybody here wears 
the shirt of the organization". Management emphasis is on 
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the financial, academic and administrative autonomy of the 
parts (schools or faculties) , and general matters are resolved 
in the board of the foundation, where they can be agreed on 
among the parts (schools) represented there. As can be seen 
in Appendix 2, Pl shows the lowest centre of influence, just 
above B2. On the other hand, the values and beliefs enforced 
in P2 stress compromise with efficiency and allegiance to 
the boss authority, thus dependence and centralization. As 
an intervieweetold this researcher: "there is no need to ask 
who is the most influential actor here, we carry his orders 
and provide the necessary informations but he decides 
everything, even what must be cultivated in the garden". A 
complex organizational structure grants the desired ascending 
comifiunication from every unit to the boss (see Chapter 6). 
Direct personal surveillance, control from the top, and 
little horizontal communication are the prevailing traits of 
P2. As can be seen in Appendix 2, P2 presents the highest 
centre of influence. 
Yet, the four types of organizations exhibit patterns of 
influence in decision-making which can be associated with the 
institutional framework existent at their task-environment. 
In terms of number of people involved in decision-making and 
centralization of decisions, variation among the four types 
of organizations suggest patterns of influence characteristic 
of each type. To be remembered, they can be summarized as 
follow: 
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Centralization 
Total 
Ijn, olvemmt 
LOW Medium High 
High Collective 
Medium Bureaucracy Professional 
LOW Market 
Figure 9.1 
Relative Position of the Four Types of Organizations 
Along the two Dimensions of Centralization 
and Involvement 
The positions of the four types of organizations along the 
continuum of total involvement (internal and external 
involvement) and centralization (hierarchical position of 
the most influential actor) , reveal the characteristic pattern 
of influence of each type of organization. Collective 
organizations present the most distinctive pattern of influence 
being higher in both involvement and centralization. 
Bureaucracies are lower in centralization but overlap with 
professional organizations in the medium position of involvement. 
Market organizations are lower in involvement but overlap 
with professional organizations in the medium position of 
centralization. 
But as said before, besides these distinct traits which may 
allow to discern different patterns of influence when 
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different organizations are compared, some general traits 
suggest a prevalent national pattern of influence in management 
decision-making. One of the first peculiar trait ofdecision- 
making in Brazilian organizations is centralization of all 
sort of decisions, or in other words, it is evident that 
Brazilian managers tend not to delegate decisions. Authority 
to make decisions seems very well defined. On the one hand 
it is concentrated at higher echelons, and on the other awell 
defined division of labour, at this high level, suggests a 
rather dispersed distribution of influence among participants 
in the decision process (see Chapter 8, pp. 193-194). Another 
outstanding characteristic of decision making in Brazilian 
organizations is the small number of participants involved 
in the decision process, either in terms ofindividual actors 
or of interest units (see Chapter 7, p. 162 and Chapter 8, 
p. 187). In comparing Brazilian and British decision-making 
the evidence suggests that: in Brazil, a small upper consenting 
group forms the main locus of influence in decision- 
making, in Britain, a few individuals(especially the. chief 
executive)hold the balance of influence and hold a custodial 
patronage over a large bickering group. These different 
patterns of influence evoke two rather distinct forms of 
control which seem to reprint their native "cultural context 
of organizing" (Czarniawska, 1986). 
As has been suggested (Chapter 5) this national pattern may 
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reflect the patterns of relationships which pervades the 
diverse spheres of social life in any given cultural setting. 
According to Giddens' (1979) theory of structuration 
"social activity is always constituted in three intersecting 
moments of difference: temporarilly, paradigmatically 
(involving structure which is present only in its instantiation) 
and spatially" (p. 54). 
This is a view of institutions as enduHng practices prevalent 
amongst the constituent actors of a society. It involves an 
understanding of social systems as "reproduced relations 
between actors or collectivities, organised asregular social 
practices" 7Giddens, 1979, p. 66), which rejects the axioms 
of systems theory (Archer, 1982). To Giddens(1976/1979)social 
systems are produced and reproduced in day-to-day encounter 
of participants of a society, so structures are thought as 
"medium and outcomes" of social reproduction. In this sense 
structure means "rules and resources, organised asproperties 
of social system" (p. 66) carrying innovative and recursive 
capacity. 
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9.2 Patterns of 1nfluencc and Social Order 
A deep investigation of the Brazilian social order would be 
too big a task to be done within the scope of this thesis. 
There is neither room nor time for such extensive analysis 
here. Fortunately a brief incursion into the origins and very 
existence of the prevalent social and political institutions 
proves to be adequate for understanding the uncovered patterns 
of influence in management decision-making in Brazilian 
organizations. Of course, this discussion needs tobe limited 
to those aspectsi_relevant to the analysis of patterns of 
influence in organizations. Thus the focus is on two large 
institutions represented by the political -administrative system 
and the productive system, as these seems to be the leading 
institutions in complex societies (Cherns, 1980, Giddens, 
1973, Connolly, 1984, among others). 
The inner form of Brazilian society was tailored under the 
auspices of Portugal. During three centuries, from 1500 to 
1822, the colony was administered as a big enterprise of the 
Portuguese crown. It is not surprising that, over the centuries, 
the transplanted social and political institutions set up 
strong roots in Brazilian life. Even though the melting pot 
of races which make up the population of the country has 
refashioned these institutions(Buarque de Holanda, 1979), a 
flash-back into their origins is important to understand 
what they represent. As put by Faoro (1984), the Portuguese 
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world echoes in Brazil, shaping the relations "entre povo e 
poder" (between the mass of ordinary people and the powerful 
ruling elite). 
The process of colonization of Brazil, bearing allegiance to 
the established order of the Portuguese patrimonial State, 
secured the transference of the patrimonial social structure 
to the new lands. In Weber's (1968) words, "we shall speak 
of a patrimonial state when the prince organizes his political 
power over extrapatrimonial areas and political subjects"(p. 
1013). The political subjects in a patrimonial state, as 
defined by Weber 
flare those who are legitimately ruled by a patrimonial prince 
... the patrirmnial ruler is linked with the ruled through a 
consensual community which also exist apart from his 
independent military force and which is rooted in the belief 
that the ruler's powers are legitimate in so far as they are 
traditional" (p. 1013). 
In this way, the state becomes an enterprise'of the prince 
who rules and controls all social, political and economic 
activities in his kingdom. On the other hand, the crown 
business together, with the State administration, impose their 
own administrative apparatus. According to Weber (1968): 
"the patrimonial ruler customarily draws the economically and 
socially privileged strata over to his side by exclusively 
reserving for them the leading position in the standing army, 
which is organized into a body disciplined and trained 
permanent units; these positions now offer also a specific 
'profession' with social and economic opportunities in the 
manner of bureaucratic officialdom" (P. 1019). 
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It has to be noted that the bureaucracy of the patrimonial 
regime is not the rational and impersonal bureaucracy of the 
modern State. On the contrary, it means the making of personalized 
and powerful offices adjunctive to the prince. The State is 
not a pyramidal hierarchical structure but a bunch ofoffices 
in accord with the subordinated aristocracy(Faoro, 1984). As 
Buarque de Holanda (1979) notes, what makes the distinction 
between the patrimonial bureaucrat and the bureaucrat of the 
modern bureaucratic State, as defined in Max Weber's ideal 
type, is that to the former, public office appears as something 
of his own personal interest, as opposed to the impersonal 
order which characterizes life in the office, to the later. 
As Faoro (1984) shows, the political- administrative organization 
of the Portuguese State, juridically thought, written and 
rationalized, constitutes a power corporation sustained by 
the political and bureaucratic estate. This estate, the 
government of a minority, is the dominant ruling elite., 
dissociated from ordinarypeople. The crown treasure is fed 
by the international trade, under thorough control of the 
prince whose power rests in the distribution of privileges 
and favours amongst his serfs, that is, the citizens of his 
kingdom. Private economic activities are encouraged if they 
benefit the prince's monopoly of commerce, and forbidden if 
they jeopardize the crown's profit. Assisted by the bureaucratic 
estate, the prince can exert extensive control over economic 
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and social activities within his Kingdom. Benefitting anyone 
group at the expense of others either amongst the elites 
or the different social strata and addressing himself 
directly to the populace, the prince can uphold his power in 
a precursory populist style. 
"the good king' not the hero was the ideal glorified by mass 
legend - the father of the people is the ideal of the 
patrimonial state" (Neber, 1968, p. 1107). 
Unlike feudalism which, in the process of resistance to 
liberal democracy and capitalism, had its structure broken 
and hence disappeared, the patrimonial regime has been able 
to survive, in a process of accommodation of new institutions 
into its old regenerated structures (Faoro, 1984). 
The occupation of Brazil by the Portuguese, practised more 
in a business-like manner than in a colonization model(Buarque 
de Holanda, 1979), made the transference of the patrimonial 
structure to the new world easy. Having the monopoly of 
commerce and of communication with the rest of the world, the 
bureaucratic estate kept all life in the colony under heavy 
regulation and tight control. Agriculture and manufactured 
goods which could compete with products from other parts of 
the kingdom were not allowed in the colony. By this means, 
the embryonic wheat farming in Rio Grande do Sulwas forbidden, 
and the court order on 5 January 1785 enacted the extinction 
of all existing manufacture of gold, silver, iron, silk, 
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cotton, linen and wool in the colony (Buarque de Holanda, 
1979). 
The distribution of lands in the form. of administrative 
grants aimed to supply the royal commerce with profitable 
tropical products. The settler with his financed engenho[the 
primitive sugar mill] and sugar cane plantation is an agent 
of a half public business and a representative of the crown 
in the colony. With this arrangement he is guaranteed economic 
and social rewards., that is profit and prestige. Onthe other 
han4, to the extent that the Portuguese State monopoly was 
the only buyer of the colony production, rewards stem not so 
much from economic transaction as from loyalty to the crown. 
The farm is at the same time his home and industry, organized 
according to the same social hierarchical principles. The 
four groups around the patriarch - his family, employees, 
aggregates and slaves - are thoroughly dependent on him, thus 
subordinated to his will and authority. In the organization 
of this system everyone has a place and a role, and is liable 
to be punished or rewarded according to his behaviour. The 
bulk of the work is performed by the slaves, but free 
workers are in charge of supervision and specialized tasks. 
Moreover, when the slaves have some skill and shown compliance 
and fidelity to the patriarch, they are selected to more 
prestigious jobs (Antonil, 1967). The manufacture of sugar in 
the engenhos of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
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required substantial skilled labour and organized collective 
work. Antonil (1967) gives an outstanding account of the 
complexity of the work organization in these primitive sugar 
mills, whose more distinctive features were., for sureJ their 
collective rather than individualist character, and task 
specialization for the production of a commercial good. In 
this respect it certainly anticipated the capitalist factory 
which gained form in the British XVIII century cotton mills, 
and that, from that time onward extended to every economic 
activity, always refined aiming at great pro duct ivity (Hobsbawn, 
1969). To give a brief idea of the complexity of the work 
organizations within the "engenhos" - as depicted inAntonil's 
text, first published in 1711 - the main jobs were: 
a) the I'mestre do ag6car" who oossesed the most valuable 
knowledge, and could be compared with a general manager 
or chief executive of modern enterprises; 
the "feitor-mor" in charge of the allocation and 
control of personnel; 
C) the many "feitores" controlling the different 
activities; 
d) the "purgador" who controlled the production process 
and could be compared with a modern production manager; 
e) the "caxeiro" in charge of packing and dispatching 
the product. 
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But this advanced pioneering organization was -impregnated 
with mercantilist values, beliefs and attitudes, which quite 
distinguish it from industrial capitalism, even the most 
primitive form of capitalism. 
Meanwhile., there are intense relationships amongst the groups, 
probably stimulated by life and work within the boundaries 
of the farm. This structure, which gains form in the extensive 
sugar cane plantations and engenhos in the sixteenth century, 
is found in the mines in the eighteenth century and in the 
coffee plantations in the nineteenth century. Even the 
abolition of slavery did not break its supporting pillars 
(Silva, 1976). 
The end of slavery may have signified a paramount change in 
business accounting as the bulk of the labour force till 
then was an investment item but from that moment had to be 
accounted as a current eXDenditure item - or to the nation 
economy signifying an increment of wages(Pinheiro, 1977), but 
certainly not a dramatic change in the labour relations. Not 
even theggrowing infflux of European immigrants, who entered 
the country by the end of the XIX century and the beginning 
of the XX century, contributed to a substantial change in 
these relations. In the realm of the coffee plantation (the 
leading product of the economy at that time), the patriarch 
still kept control by guaranteeing jobs as well as by 
being, as almost always as ever, the only source of material 
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provisions to the workers on the farm. Furthermore, slaves 
never formed the totality of the labour force in Brazil 
(Pinheiro, 1977), but on the contrary, a double meaning' labour 
force had existed since the XVI century. Hence the pattern 
of labour relations in perpetuation for centuries were well 
rooted. Of course, this does not mean the absence of any 
change in Brazilian social relations, but just that, coming 
out of the process of social encounter in day-to-day life - 
where innovative and resisting forces are confronted -social 
relations were gradually reshaped over the years, as they 
continue to be. 
At the time of independence, in 1822, the inherited social 
order was well entrenched in all levels of Brazilian society. 
The episode of independence itself is an example of that. As 
Coelho (1976) says, it was more an attempt to solve the 
"Brazilian problem" than the search for a political regime 
that characterized the process of independence. Reacting to 
the pressures of the established local political estate, the 
son of D. Joio VI heralded Brazil an independent monarchy and 
himself the Emperor D. Pedro I. To the people, his attitude 
is seen as a brave one, and the act, a lavish gift from the 
good father to his sons. In turn he gained legitimacy and 
popularity, which he used to close down the assembly and 
promulgate the Brazilian first constitution. 
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At that moment the Emperor appeared as "the good king", "the 
father of the people", that is, the "ideal glorified by mass 
legend in the patrimonial order", as Weber puts it. In the 
twentieth century, Getillio Vargas was ostensibly named "the 
father of the people", title which his supporters displayed 
to sustain his popularity and populist policies. Nevertheless 
as Flynn (1978) observes: 
"Me argument has been that the -revolution of 1930 marked a 
transition from the 'Old-Republic', dominated by the coffee 
oligarchy, to another system in which during the 1930s, 
particularly under the Estado Novo, the industrializing 
bourgeoisie, specially in Sgo Paulo, were predominant. It 
was these relatively new industrialists, working with Vargas, 
who shaped Brazil's modern state under the Estado Novo - 
controlling that new state apparatus, while also makinj 
skilful use of the ideologies of corporatism and nationalism, 
to exercise, the fullest control of Brazilian society yet 
achieved in the twentieth century (p. 519). 
Flynn's observation is very accurate in pointingout a relevant 
turn over within the dominant elite concomitant with the 
reproduction of institutional frameworks mediating power as 
suggested by Giddens (1976/1979). Santos (1985) named the 
social order created under Vargas "the regulated order", that 
is., an order in which citizenship is subordinated to state 
regulation. It can be described as a rle-ordination of the 
social system but not a change in the system operation. A 
more significant restructuring of Brazilian society may have 
ocurred in recent years, resulting from unexpected outcomes 
of the economic and social policies implemented after 1964 
(Santos, 1985). According dos Santos (1985), more prominent 
changes can be observed, 
-on 
the one hand in the emergence of 
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new associative forms and the restructuring of the old ones, 
and on the other in the redefinition of patternsofbehaviour 
of collective actors. These changes involve: 
a) The emergence of new forms of collective representation 
of old and new industries (Diniz and Boschi, 1978); 
the new face of trade union movement (Almeida, 1983); 
C) the insertion of peasant and rural workers into the 
political scene (Reis, 1982); 
d) the encreasing participation and reallocation of women 
in the labour market (Santos, 1985); 
e) the bureaucratization-rationalization, in the Weberian 
sense, of wide sectors of middle classes, specially 
expressed in: the relative growth of managerial jobs; 
the transformation of liberal professionals(Physicians, 
Lawyers, etc. )into wage-earners; the growth of technical 
and scientific personnel emerging as a new leading 
segment (Santos, 1985). 
These chanRes seems more odd in that they have run out of 
control of the dominant oligarchies, which have not been 
able to reinforce the stablished order, challenged by the 
new demands. But it is also rather striking that the political 
class has not shown the same transformative capacity. It may 
even be the case that this backwardness of the political 
system, in relation to the civil society, has spurred popular 
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organizations as a means of direct encounter with the public 
authority. A decline of mobilization at local level has been 
observed by Boschi (1983) when the formal political process 
appears as the mediator of popular demands. 
The sixty-seven years of monarchy certainly reinforced the 
patrimonial principles and structures. The liberal -democrat ic 
ideology, incorporated in the discourse of the intellectual 
elite since the eighteenth century, could not fully develop 
as political and social praxis. 1nstead, it developed into 
one of the most serious distortions ofthe national political 
system, the "coronelismo", which is the Brazilian variant of 
clientelism (Igl6sias, 1985). Clientelism or clientele system 
consists of patterns of cooperative social ar rang eme nt(Powell, 
1970). Yet according to Powell (1970), three basic factors 
underlie the patron-client relationship: 
"First, the patron-client tie develops between two parties 
unequal in status, wealth and influence; ... Second, the formation and maintenance of the relationship depends on 
reciprocity in the exchange of noncomparable goods and 
services; ... Third, the development and maintenance of a 
patron-client relationship rests heavily on face-to-face 
contact between the two parties (p. 412). 
In Brazil, the "co-ronel" makes the linkage between the central 
power and the people in the municipality. They are at the 
same time the oppressor and the friend, they exploit their 
dependents(dspecially by means of underpaid work) but offer 
protection and other benefits (many times in the form of 
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designation for jobs in the civil service). At the time of 
elections the 11coronel" uses his influence to exchange votes 
for the control of the local police, justice, education I 
health 
service, etc.!, thus enhancing his power (Faoro 1983; Igl6sias, 
1985). As opposed to "British voters, who choose a party 
rather than a single leader" (Sampson, 1983, p. 32) Brazilian 
voters, choose a single leader rather than a party. If it is 
true that Brazilian society is going through visible changes, 
it is no less true that the "coronelismoll has not been 
completely eradicated from Brazilian politics. 
Actually, the traditional system does not hinder the coming 
of democratic institutions, instead they coexist astwo faces 
of the same coin. On one side there is the institutionalized 
framework of structured personal relationships - family, 
friendship, kinship, co-parenthood - and on the other the 
impers-onal system of law grounded in bourgeois liberal ideology 
(Da Matta, 1983). As Faoro (1983) argues, the politico- 
bureaucratic estate., of the patrimonial State, when confronted 
with the rational bureaucratic organization of the modern 
liberal State, adopts its techniques as mere techniques 
without incorporating its principles. 
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9.3 Cultural Traits 
I 
Some cultural traits of Brazilian society can be easily 
perceived and understood in the light of the foregoing 
discussion. The society that emerged out of the Portuguese 
patrimonial order, in the American tropics, isa hierarchical 
society where each stratum has a defined place and role and, 
at the same time the social strata are not besieged into 
themselves but linked to each other through an extensive 
network of personalized communication. As Da Matta(198I)says 
in comparing the social relations in Brazil with that in the 
U. S. A. , while Americans are socially equal living separately, 
in Brazil we are socially different living together. 
According to Da Matta(1983), Brazilian society canbe seen as 
having two axes, representing two ideals, i. e. that of hierarchy 
and that of equality. On one axis are placed those better off 
because they have good relationships with very important people 
(VIPs). To them, sanctions of law are relative in the sense 
that there will always be a loophole to avoid or mitigate them 
(the well-known "jeitinholl, i. e., unlawful mean of getting through). 
On the other axis are those anonymous individuals to whom the 
rule of law does exist in its general and egalitarian principles. 
The picture depicts the process of accommodation of new 
institutions into old ones as suggested by Faoro (1984). A 
society formally structured according to the principles of 
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liberty, fraternity and equality are fair and honourable, 
but it would be unfair and unethical to deprive honourable 
citizens of their privileges. After all, these honourable 
citizens are very nice people indeed. They do not threaten 
either liberty or fraternity amongst their fellow citizens 
thus why should one worry about equality? At the end of the 
day, everybody is equal before God. Such logic of legitimation 
behind the social reality is rather rational, and so far has 
succeeded in the Brazilian context. In so far as the system 
is open to social mobility and somewhat lavish in distributing 
privileges, it fosters individual hope against hope. The 
ideal is to be different not equal or, in other words, to be 
somebody not anybody (Da Matta, 1983). 
Hierarchy in the stratified Brazilian society does not lead 
to strata isolation like the sort identified by Crozier(1964) 
in French society. On the contrary, there are many bridges 
amongst strata in Brazil - The society built up in the American 
tropics was agrarian in its structure, slavery inits technical 
economic exploitation as well as mixed first with the indians 
and later with negroes(Freyre, 1959). According to Freyre (1950), 
this society developed without race conciousness, as the 
Portuguese themselves are short of race counciousness, butat 
the same time possessing a religious exclusivity that unfolded 
in a system of social and political amendments. The extensive 
network of personal communication breeds friendly feelings 
among people from different strata, and at the same time 
hampers the development of group consciousness. Furthermore, 
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as promotion and social mobility are likely to be achieved 
more by means of personal relationships than merit, the 
system tends to be reinforced over and over again. In this 
world of personalities, there are few stimuli to spontaneous 
association (Buarque de Holanda, 1979; Da Matta, 1983), 
consequently an unfavourable climate for participative work. 
Competition and cooperation, which are behaviours orientated 
toward a common material objective, give place to rivalry 
and helpfulness which are behaviours orientated toward the 
benefit or damage that the parts can do to each other (Buar- 
que de Holanda, 1979). 
The sort of participation unusual in Brazil is that involving 
cooperation or orientated toward a common material objective, 
and not that involving helpfulness or orientated toward the 
benefit or damage that the parts can do to each other. As 
Buarque de Holanda (1979) points out, the distinction made 
by Mead (1937) between' cooperation and helpfulness gives 
meaning to the practice of I'mutirgo". The I'mutirgo" is a 
practice of mutual help, developed in the rural areas, which 
consists of voluntary grouping to help each other in the 
doing of all sorts of work, from preparing the land to 
harvesting, or even building a house or spinning cotton. This 
practice seems to have originated from native indians customs, 
and aimed at mutual help leading to final celebrations with 
meals, drinks and dances (Buarque de Holanda, 1979). 
Helpfulness, collaboration and loyalty, counterbalanced by 
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deference promotion and protection - especially in the 
relationships between socially differentiated actors - are 
the main values underpinning social relations in Brazil. As 
the functioning of the political-administrative system is 
grounded in trustful relationships, the alternation of 
political parties in power ensues complete reshuffle, not 
only of ministers, but of officials at the first, second and 
third echelons in the government administration, and in the 
public owned enterprises as well. Although bureaucratization, 
and especially the regulation of professional career advancement 
in the public service, has hindered the overwhelming displacement. 
that was usual in the past, reshuffle may eventually go 
beyond the third echelon. What really seems to matter is the 
enshrining of power to avoid competition. 
In the productive system, people living and working together 
on a farm had few opportunities of contact with the outside 
world. Means of communication were precarious and controlled 
by the patriarch, since everyone was dependent upon him. Lack 
of distinction between work and home, and well-defined places 
and Toles within this patriarchal family, where nobody had 
much say or will, also did not leave room for competition 
amongst strata. But a friendly atmosphere and affective links 
were in the interest of everyone. The origin ofthe Brazilian 
people's ideal of making the work place an extension oftheir 
home, as observed by Da Matta (1983), probably rests in this 
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patriarchal system. 
As for centuries the rural life predominated over the cities 
(Buarque de Holanda, 1979), the social order which was 
reproduced at the micro level of the colonial productive 
system surely lent a hand to root these patterns of relationships 
at the level of the organizations. These well -entrenched 
behaviours and patterns of interpersonal relations came to 
ensure the accommodation of the "managerial revolution" into 
the established order. Brazilian organizations have absorbed 
the techniques of modern management, preserving the basic 
pillars which sustain and orientate the functioning of the 
old organizational system. The dual system operating at the 
politico-administrative level is again reproduced in the 
organizations. The formal structure becomes an apparatus 
alleged to afford efficiency, but manipulated according to 
the circumstances. The system of personal relationships in 
fact sways the functioning of the system, creating, changing 
or extinguishing jobs, offices or whatever is necessary to 
sustain the status quo. 
An anecdotal case is usefull to illustrate how the system 
operates. Investigating structural changes in a large 
multinational, the researcher noticed that a unit labelled 
advisory board came into existence and disappeared within 
three years. Inquiring about its function, it was revealed 
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that members of that advisory board were the present directors 
of the company. They were chosen by their predecessors to be 
their substitutes showing that the advisory board was created 
to initiate the future directors in board affairs. When these 
new board members took office the advisory board was rubbed 
off the organizational chart. In fact, advisory board was 
only a "label" to justify the presence of the future board 
members working alongside the existing board and had nothing 
to do with what was going on inside that unit. Yet further 
inquiries laid bare the kinship and friendship links between 
the old and the new board of directors. 
It is evident that authoritarism mitigated by personalism, 
or in other words a network of personal relationships has 
served to mediate power relations in the Brazilian political 
administrative system, as much as in the productive system. 
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9.4 Cultural Boundaries and Management Decision-making 
A pattern of influence in management decisions in which the 
main features are centralization and low participation fits 
well into the Brazilian social mosaic. A society born and 
educated in a system dominated by one traditional ruler and 
a political, bureaucratic estate is not prepared for participative 
decisions. The ideal is prestige and social status, achieved 
through the framework of personal relationships and not equality 
and universal values, necessary to build up collective actions 
and wide-ranging participation. 
While encouraging collaboration but not association, such a 
society hinders the development of co- sharing work capabilities. 
lt is not surprising that collective organizations are not 
commom in Brazil, or that charity associations are predominantly 
small groups, spread all over the country. 
The traditional social hierarchy leaves room for individual 
mobility, whereas the stubborn definition of personal roles 
and positions avoids strata changeability and kills collective 
pressures. Positions, status, prestige and living standards 
are interlocked and are achieved individually. In such a way 
decision makers are socially and, at the same time, personally 
nominated and legitimated. Of course there will be little 
pressure for shared decisions, but a great demand for scarce 
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respectable positions and all the privileges they can bear, 
including the power to make desicions. Rivalry, not 
competition, is what the system engenders and concomitantly, 
displacement, not participation, is the target. 
Two main factors underpin Brazilian social institutions and 
are at the bottom of all social relations: 
1. a hierarchy based on deferential values such as birth 
and education; and 
2. a network of interpersonal relationships which embody and 
preserve the contradictions of the system. 
Preferably informal, interpersonal relationships operate, on 
the one side, to diminish hierarchical distances and relieve 
the burden of authority. As Buarque de Holanda (1979) says, 
hierarchy and authority are annoyances to Brazilian people. 
On the other side, they bestow identity to individual social 
actors and reinforce the hierarchical system. 
These cultural traits become transparent when the pattern of 
influence in management decisions is analysed in terms of 
the Brazilian social system. First, it becomes clear that 
decision makers are socially defined. The most powerful man, 
usually the president,, with the directors and a few advisors 
close to him, have all the say. It may be interestingto note 
that people within this inner group are generally bound by 
kinship and friendship links. Nominations can be rationally 
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legitimated in the name of efficiency, compliance, expertise, 
confidence or whatever suits the occasion or the nominee. 
Advisory bodies seem to be much used to place such men in 
positions to control strategic -resources and information. It 
seems understandable that in such personalized hierarchical 
systems, standardization does not appear associated with 
delegation of authority to make decisions. This inner group, 
the first and second echelons in the organization's structure, 
has the characteristics of a ruling elite. When management 
is shared amongst two or three partners, as in the two market 
organizations and in the hospital, they themselves form the 
ruling elite. Eventually someone outside this group has access 
into the decision arena, but, as these results show, they 
rarely have great influence in decision outcomes. It seems 
quite clear that this pattern of influence in management 
decisions revolves around the basic cultural traits of 
interpersonal relationships and hierarchy which shape 
authority relations. 
Second, lack of tradition in associative actions appears 
behind the difficulty in getting joint decisions. This 
difficultyis. especially noticed in collective organizations, 
but it is quite understandable that it is so. In so far as 
the cornerstone of collectives is commitment to a commom 
cause, it would be expected that these organizations would 
show a widespread distribution of influence in decision 
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process. Nevertheless this did not happen. Several times 
during the interviews, t he president of Cl complained about 
the apathy of his fellows to discuss any proposal and, what 
is worse, the great difficulty in arranging a meeting when 
the subject has to be approved by the administrative board. 
The greater internal involvement in decision processes found 
in collective organizations may only reflect the accommodation 
of universal institutional rules to traditional patterns of 
behaviour. In these circumstances, what is secured by statutory 
norms is monitoring, not effective participation. Furthermore, 
the stability in terms of number of participants in decision 
processes, when the number of external participants increases, 
the number of internal participants decreases (see figures 
7.3 2 7.4 and 7.5) , may sug est the need to saf eguard the group 09 
friendly collaborative atmosphere, which could be threatened 
if a large number of people were brought together. 
Thirdp it may not be surprising that managers do not perceive 
regulation asa realconstraint, and that external constraint 
is not associated with external involvement in decision 
processes. On the one hand, as social and economic life has 
been "traditionally" subjected to tight and extensive control, 
regulation may become more a necessity than a constraint to 
Brazilian people. On the other hand, to the extent that laws 
do not require absolute but relative adherence, things can 
always be accommodated and it is not necessary to betoomuch 
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concerned about them. Furthermore, in a hierarchical social 
context , dominated by 
interpersonal relations, the relationships 
of the organizations with regulatory agencies may be more 
characterized by a continuous process of compliance, 
accommodation or allegiance, than by a process of negotiation 
or compromise of the sort suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978). This does not mean that powerful organizations are 
not able to influence legislators, but that it does not 
happen in terms of negotiation but friendship. If you have a 
friend in power you can get things done. 
Fourth, acquiescence with authoritarian behaviour does not 
mean that decision outcomes are not questioned. People seem 
actually ready to resist and put pressure for changes when 
they do not agree with decision outcomes. Nevertheless, as 
the results of this research point out., grievances against 
decisions are more the aftermath of impersonal and -cold 
communication than disagreement with the substratum of 
decisions. It is understandable -that, in a personalized 
system, formal communication, impersonal as it usually is, 
bears a sense of disdain, disrespect or even affront. The 
decision to introduce safety equipment illustrates this point. 
A few years before, the organization had experienced great 
difficulties in introducing safety equipment. At that time, 
when the decision was made, they issued a note to inform 
that from that date onwards the use of the equipment was 
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compulsory. As they said, resistance was intense, with the 
majority of the employees refusing to use it. Consequently 
it took a long time and a great effort until the decision 
was implemented. This time, to introduce other safety 
equipment, they took on a rather different strategy. After 
the decision had been made, they contacted suppliers of the 
equipment and asked for samples to be tested. Then a meeting 
with the shop-floor supervisors was arranged. Atthis meeting 
they talked about the benefits that the equipment would 
bring to everybody and presented the three models available 
in the market to be tested. They could indicate the model to 
be adopted and the implementation of the decision was a 
complete success. There will be conformity and respect to 
authority since it is mitigat ed by personal deferences. 
Fifth, less centralized decisions in public agencies may 
indicate an evolution toward a pattern of influence in 
management decision-making processes. But this research cannot 
answer the question of whether this isa real tendency toward 
decentralization of decisions in Brazilian organizations or 
just a pattern of influence in public agencies. What these 
data seem to suggest is that if decisions are going to be 
decentralized, in Brazilian organizations, this will probably 
not mean that only routine and less important decisions are 
going to be delegated to lower echelons, but that itiS likely 
to happen by growing decentralization of any type of decision. 
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Sixth, as the power of the ruling elite rests onpersonalized 
(interpersonal relationships) mediation, unit and shared 
power within the dominant groups appear as the strategic 
resources to avoid displacement by rival groups. Thus the 
more dispersed distribution of influence among participants 
of decisions in Brazil as compared with Britain may just 
reflect different forms of institutional mediation of power, 
in this case Brazilian personalism as opposed to British 
individualism. The greater involvement of personnel departments 
in Brazilian decision processes, as compared with Britain, 
may be a derivative of the personalized mediation of power 
prevailing in Brazilian society. 
To be sure these patterns of influence in management decision- 
making seems rather consistent with the scores found by 
Hofstede (1980), for Brazil and Britain, specially on 
individualism and power distance dimensions, that are: IDV = 
38 and IDV = 89 (1) -respectively for Brazil and Britain, PDI= 
69 and PDI = 35 (2) respectively for Brazil and Britain. As 
Taino and Santalainen (1983) summarized these two dimensions: 
(1) IDV. Individualism Index. 
(2) PDI. Power Distance Index. 
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"power distance indicates the extent to which the members of 
a society collectively accept the fact that power is 
distributed unequally; and individualism implies a loosely 
knit social framework in which people are supposed to take 
care for themselves and their families in the first place, 
and its opposite pole - collectivism - ... implies a tight social network in which people expect their organizations 
to look after them in exchange for their loyalty to it". 
As shown above a collectivism characterized by atight social 
network in which people expect their organization to look 
after them in exchange for their loyalty, is the supporting 
pillar of social relations in Brazil. On the other hand,, *the 
mediation of power through this sort of collectivism has 
served to reinforce the hierarchical system, hence to maintain 
a large power distance. The term personalism has been preferred 
here to distinguish this sort of collectivism from the 
collectivism orientated toward a commom. material objective, 
according to the distinction made by Buarque de Holanda (1979), 
on forms of collectivism. 
As for Britain, the combination of high individualism with 
low power distance found by Hof stede (1980),, or the participative 
competitive decision process with unbalanced power within 
the decision arena found by Hickson et al (1986) , seems rather 
consistent with an individualist competitive society which 
values, at the same time, social stratification and civil 
rights. But how these patterns are related to British 
institutions is examined in the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 10 
THE DISTRIBUT10N OF INFLUENCE IN ORGANIZATIONAL DECISIONS 
AS RELATED TO THE MACRO SOCIAL CONTEXT - THE BRITISH CASE 
10.1 Introduction 
Individualism is, certainly, one of the most striking trait 
of British culture. As Halsey (1986) puts it: 
"British culture is deeply individualistic. It is no accident 
that Hume and Locke are its philosophers. rather than Hegel 
or Nhrx. The deeply embedded cultural -assumption is that 
ultimate values are individual, that society is no sense 
superior to the sum of the people who make it up; that 
collectivism can only be instrumental and that the state is 
best when minimal. Not that ordinary British men and women 
or their politicians have ever had much taste for such 
abstraction: it is just that individualism is built into 
'custom and practice', into. local work places and community 
organizations, into all commonsensual explanations of why 
people do what they do" (p. 2). 
The origin of British individualism may be traced back to the 
XIII century as suggested by Macfarlane (1978), but it does 
not seem that there is an actual decline of British individualism 
as some have argued (Wiener, 1981; Tayeb, 1984). 
The findings of Tayeb's (1984) survey on English culture led 
him to group characteristics attributable to the English 
people into four categories. Tayeb's first category encompasses 
those characteristics most salient in the culture, in the 
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sense that they were endorsed by 70% or more of his sample, 
they are: 1) strong sense of responsibility; 2) trustworthiness; 
3) capacity to cope well with set-backs; 4) ability to see 
things through; 5) honesty; 6) self control; -7) self- 
confidence; 8) independence of their parents; 9) respect for 
the law; 10) ability to cope with new and uncertain situations; 
11) discipline; and 12) friendliness. His second category is 
represented by deep-seated characteristics such as love for 
freedom, autonomy and privacy, which he suggests are cultural 
traits. In the third category, Tayeb grouped some characteristics 
such as individualism and spirit of capitalism, which following 
Wiener (1981), he suggests that in spite of bel-n'g deep- 
seated have lost their strength over the years and, 
achievement motivation, which following Bradbarn and Berlew 
(1961) he says has been through high and low points. Finally, 
Tayeb's fourth category refers to situation-based characteristics 
such as intolerance for immigrants and coloured people. 
If individualism simply means rational and market orientated. 
behaviour, one may argue that Britain is not exactlya wholly 
individualistic society. The array of values upholding British 
institutions is certainly greater than that (Halsey, 1986; 
Sampson, 1986; Marwick, 1986). Nevertheless, ifindividualism 
means an "ego-centred kinship system", where the man stand 
alone in the centre of his world(Macfarlene, 1978) British 
society seems to continue as individualistic as ever. 
Characteristics such as "to be independent of their parents" 
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and "love for autonomy and privacy" which 
attributes to English people are, in fact, 
of individualist behaviour. 
Tayeb (1984) 
characteristics 
It seems obvious that these two dimensions, rational market 
orientated behaviour and ego-centred kinship system, are not 
mutually exclusive. On the other hand, it may be reasonable 
to argue that they can appear in different degrees in every 
society. As Hofstede (1980) findings shov,, Britain holds the 
3rd place in individualism, amongst the 40 countries covered 
by his studies, just below Australia and the U. S. A., both ex- 
British colonies. Actually the individualism index for the 
U. S. A. (91); Australia (90); and Great Britain (89) does not 
vary significantly. What may be peculiar to British society 
is that individualism, in Britain, is counterbalanced by 
other values, and this seems especially true in relation to 
rational market orientated behaviour. Observing that there 
is not a sway of profit-maximizing objective in Britain., 
Wiener (1981) saw it as a "decline of the industrial spirit". 
As he puts it: 
"Ibe emerging culture of industrialism, which in the mid- 
Victorian years had appeared, for good or ill, to be the 
wave of the future, irresistibly washing over and sweeping 
away the features of an older Britain, was itself transformed. 
The thrust of new values borne along by the revolution in 
industry was contained in the later nineteenth century; the 
social and intellectual revolution implicit inindustrialism 
was muted, perhaps even aborted. Instead, a compromise was 
effected, accomodating new groups, new interests, and new 
needs within a social and cultural matrix that preserved 
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the forms and even many of the values of tradition Oliener, 
19810 p. 157-158). 
If there is no doubt that in pioneering industry the Britons 
restructured their society, they certainly did it their way, 
as they continue to do., and it does not seem it could be 
different (Giddens, 1979). The picture of British society in 
the 1970/1980s reveals, at the same time, change and endurance 
of traditional patterns (Halsey, 1986; Rose, 1985; Sampson, 
1986; Marwick, 1986). To a foreign observer the' picture 
leaves the impression that British people welcome modernization 
provided their basic values are left untouched., and more, 
that they are very much conscious in doing it. 
Not only individualism is a hallmark of the British society, but it 
is also marked by a strict hierarchy that seems to go beyond amere class 
division society (Stevenson, 19184), and that yet seems to 
be reinforced by an overwhelming assimilationofaristrocatic 
values (Wiener, 1981). In this case., it may appear quite 
contradictory that power distance, as Hofstedels(1981) data 
revealed, is not large in such a hierarchical society, and 
that decision processes in British organizations are long, 
argumentative and participative as Hickson et al. (1986)findings 
suggest. But of course, it cannot be forgotten that 
"general management or divisional colleagues ..... hold a 
constrained domination over a managerial pluralism of 
interests" (Hickson et al, 1986, p. 238). 
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This pattern certainly reflects a hierarchical predominance 
behind a democratic faCade. Hence, the short power distance 
and. the competitive decision process might just reflect the 
institutional mediation of hierarchical power in the liberal 
individualistic British society. 
The remainder of this chapter is an attempt to understand 
this pattern of influence in management decision making, in 
terms of the prevailing cultural traits in British institutions. 
As it was done for Brazil, the analysis is centred in the 
political-administrative system and in the productive system. 
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10.2 Patterns of Influence and Social Order 
For many centuries the British Isles were invaded by 
different people from the the south, the centre and the north 
of Europe, and each, in their turn, lent their influence on 
the language, arts, culture and customs of the isles. Over 
many centuries those successive antagonist invaders - the 
Celts, the Romans, the Angles, the Saxons, the Jutes, the 
Vikings and the Normas - were making the British nation. 
In fact the unif ication of Great Britain did not happen bef ore 
the XVIII century when Scotland was incorporated into the 
British nation thus forming the base of the United Kingdom. 
An offspring of the Middle Ages, Britain grew up under a 
feudal social order which came to be reshaped into the liberal 
capitalist order. The occidental feudalism (under which the 
British society was first shaped) "is a marginal case of 
patrimonialism that tends toward stereotyped and fixed 
relationships between lord and vassal" (Weber, 1968. -p. 1070). 
Yet according to Weber (1968), 
I Ir- Feudalism is oriented not only to characteristic patrimonial 
features such as tradition, privilege, customalandprecedent, 
but also to temporary alliances between the various power- 
holders, as it was typical of and, in fact the essence of the 
polity of Estates (Standestaat) in the Occident" (p. 1086). 
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To put it in a very pithynarrow way, the distinctive feature 
of feudalism, as opposed to pure patrimonialism, is 
"decentralized domination" based on contracted mutual obligations 
and a sense of honour betweenthe prince and his lords and 
between the lord and his vassals, as opposed to "centralized 
domination" based on wide control and a related f ickle balance 
of power positions which prevails under pure patrimonialism. 
But to the extent that social structures are defined by 
active social actors in their day-to-day encounter (Giddens, 
1976), the English feudal structure, which eventually came 
to dominate the British Isles (though only in the transitional 
period from feudalism to liberal capitalism did the unification 
of Britain under the English rule came to an end), shows its 
characteristic traits. As Weber (1968) points out: 
"For the centralistic development of England an arrangement 
taken over from Normandy by William the Conqueror became 
crucial:. All subvassals were directly oath-bound to the King 
and considered his men; furthermore, subvassals who did not 
obtain legal satisfaction from their lord were not 
i 
forced(as 
in France) to go through various stages of appeal of the 
feudal hierarchy but could go directly to the king's courts" 
(P. 1080). 
On the other hand, and possibly in order to cope with the 
central power of the King, the English aristocracy and gentry 
developed, very early, a sophisticated parliamentary system. 
In England the open struggle against the King's misuse of 
power started as early as in the XII century (Wells, 1966). 
According to Wells (1966) a popular assembly of prominent 
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delegates was a tradition in all monarchies settled by the 
invaders, either from the north or from the German empires, 
but in England this tradition became more prominent , than 
anywhere. Wells also points to two aspects vwhich strengthened the 
power of the English Parliament vis a vis the Crown: First, 
it was based on a formal statement of some primary universal 
rights, and second, because its members "the Knights of the 
Shire" and the "gentry from the cities" were both elected 
deputies. Since the inception., the custom was for this assembly 
- of representatives of the landed aristocracy andofgeneral 
proprietors - and the assembly of the lords and bishops, to 
hold separate meetings, and this custom gave rise to the 
two houses of parliament in Britain: the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords. Actually the two houses donot differ 
very much in their membership. Great many -: "knights of the 
shire" were wealthy landlords, as influential as the peers 
who sometimes were their brothers and sons, but as a whole 
the commons still were the plebian assembly. Yet the simple 
institution of parliament did not put an end to the conflict 
between the king and the nobility-Any attempt by the king to 
seize too much power for himself and conflict was inevitable. 
The British nobility never had much taste for absolute monarchy 
neither for a popular republic. After the Cromwell protectorate 
the English monarchy was restored with all the ceremonial 
dignity so dear to the English heart (Wells, 1968). Over the 
centuries the English parliament militated against absolutism, 
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commiting itself to a watchdog role, to prevent the rising of 
any exclusive power. 
It seems-quite clear that parliament is the bedrock of the 
British policital-administrative system. As Marwick (1968) 
says: 
"Britain's gift to the world is ... a highly sophisticated 
parliamentary system which worked perfectly in guaranteeing 
the liberties of all those whose liberties it was intended 
to guarentee" (p. 24). 
It is not difficult to wonder that this amenable political- 
administrative system paved the road to the XVIII century 
economic and social reforms (Weber, 1968b). The door of the 
House of Commons (the-plebian assembly), open to the 
bourgeoise, certainly meant the absorption of economic and 
social changes without any drastic strain or political 
upheaval. Inasmuch as the traditional political participation 
of prominent men of wealth and industry, spurred economic 
and social changes, it may be thought of as fateful to 
Britain pioneering industrialization. Furthermore the British 
aristocracy has never been entirely exclusive. On the contrary, 
it has shown an outstanding ability to take in outsiders, 
provided they were rich, a practice which according to Sampson 
(1962) has contributed to 'its keeping its place in modern times. 
The revolutionary character of the process of industrialization 
emphasizes the historical discontinuities which characterize 
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the second half of the XVIII century in Britain(Deane, 1969). 
However spectacular, this revolutionary process was predated 
by slow paced changes which gradually transformed the 
traditional feudal social relations. In Deane's (1969) terms, 
it also involved a demographic revolution, an agrarian 
revolution, a commercial revolution and a transport revolution, 
intertwined with the industrial revolution in a complex 
relation of cause and effect. In this sense these movements 
stimulated and, at the same time were stimulated by the 
transformation of the production process, whilst forging the 
social -relationships within the productive system. 
The final massive transformation of British society, associated 
with the industrial revolution, brought fundamental changes 
on the overall work relations and productive system. At the 
economic level it meant stupendous and steady growth of 
production, and at the social level it brought a new way of 
life and work to the majority of the British people. As 
Hobsbawn (1969) points out, "it transformed the lives of men 
beyond recognition" (p. 80). 
The pre-industrial Britain had its basis in an agrarian economy 
and a rural population. Insofar as the workshop used to be 
attached to the house, every family member could contribute 
to the family production, be it in manufacture as much as in 
agriculture. The ordinary production unit was the family. 
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Until the advent of the factories, even the main manufactures, 
such as textile and metallurgy were organized in a domestic 
base (Deane, 1969). 
From a Marxist point of view the main consequences of the 
mode of production inaugurated by the industrial revolution 
- or capitalism - are on the one side the separation of workers 
from the means of production, and the resulting social division 
between propertied and propertyless, and on the other side 
the routinization and subdivision of the work process in the 
factory, resulting-in workers' deskilling and alienation 
(Hobsbawn, 1969, Braverman, 1977). 
Yet when the pre-industrial family based labour, bearing 
multiple and variegated tasks, and individual freedom to 
dispose of its own work, was replaced by the collective 
factory based'labour, whereas privately appropriated, a 
primary contradiction was also introduced in the socio 
economic system (Giddens, 1979). Thereafter, contract relations 
within the productive system underwent profound changes, as 
the feudal based contract of mutual obligation was replaced 
by contracts of exchange of work for wa es. The extent to 09 
which exchanges are regulated by market rules, andworkcould 
be contracted individually, competition would ensure an 
individualist characterto the collective work. Although the 
organization of workers and the introduction of collective 
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employment contract have become a reality, it. did not lead 
to a more collective society. As Marshall et al. (1985)point 
out: 
"As long as workers were exposed to the precariousness of 
life 'governed wholly by market forces, local communities 
provided a measure of defense by acting as units of self- 
help, and in the process generated a sense of collective 
identity which helped sustain the emergence of workers' 
organizations. However the irony of citizenship, achieved by 
collective organization and struggle, is that it erodes the 
. basis of communal solidarity and results in individualism" (p. 276). 
At the same time the advanced political system was flexible 
enough to grant liberty -and citizenship rights, that together 
with meritocracy would grant legitimacy to eventual inequalities. 
Marked by "a pragmatism never divorced from a reverence for 
tradition" (Marwick, 1968, p. 23), the British parliament has 
been able to put up with reforms and, at the same time, has 
kept its fundamental characteristics. To the extent that the 
representative parliament serves the bourgeoisie interests, 
motion towards a more democratic representation has been slow- 
paced. In spite of the franchise extension of 1832,1867 and 
1884, which marked important progress, Britain entered the 
XX century far from having a genuine democratic representation. 
As Marwick (1968) remarks: 
"in 1911 only 59 per cent of the adult male population (just 
under 8 million out of a total population of 40.8 million) 
had the franchise, and it was ciear from the complicated 
registration procedure that the vote was still a privilege 
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which a man earned through his respectability and proven 
value to the comunity, rather than a democratic right"(p. 26). 
The organization of the working class in the Labour party, 
on the eve of the XX century, played an important role in 
pressuring for changes in British society and politics. It 
especially ensuered the appearance of a new actor in the political 
scene, which, at least, came to require negotiated concessions 
and accomodation to safeguard the elite status quo (Stevenson, 
1984; Marwick, 1968). In addition to this new pressure upon 
the system, the two wars have contributed to further social 
change in twentieth century Britain. At the outbreak of the 
First World 1,1, 'ar the picture of British society, as painted 
by Stevenson (1984) shows: an upper class transformed by the 
absorption of the new wealth of industry and commerce, sharing 
power and social prestige with the nobility; a prosperous 
upper-middle class of professionals and managerial groups 
enjoying high status and income, besides a well defined place 
in the social hierarchy; a lower-upper-middle class struggling 
to maintain its status and appearance of comfort; a lower 
middle class of non manual workers who might earn less than 
skilled workers, but, nevertheless had a higher social 
standing; a lower class which comprises the majority, about 
three quarters of the population, engaged in manual work, 
and yet divided according to corresponding ýcraft skill, 
income and living standards. 
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Apart from destruction and dissolution, wars serve to raise 
nationalism and national consciousness. If it is true that 
the great many changes observed in British society, in the 
years between the wars, and more markedly after the Second 
World War, were underway before these events, it is not less 
true that the wars served to speed these changes (Marwick, 
1968; Stevenson, 1984). The years after 1945 witnessed not 
only the huge effort for reconstruction but also steady 
growth in affluence. As Marwick (1986) stresses, 
"despite recurrent economic crises, the reality for the 
majority of British people was that at last the country 
seemed to have entered into a kind-of high-spending consumer 
society" (P. 114). 
Nevertheless, mutatis mutandi, things are as much as they C> 
have ever been. The old public schools and Oxbridge colleges 
may not be so much the exclusive avenue to power positions; 
a new element "race division" may have been added to the 
class divided society; or the Conservative party may have 
lost its aristocratic ethos under Margaret Thatcher's 
leadership, showing a new face, imprinted by her agressive 
individualist policies, and her assertive and centralized 
style. But amidst all these changes a status based hierarchy 
is still a real social division and the parliament continues 
to be the legitimate institution to sanction even the most 
authoritarian decision. To use some of Sampson's concluding 
words on the "changing anatomy of Britain", 
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Ine lasting historical achievement of the British 
institutions has been to hold people together in peace with 
a sense of identity and mutual respect, to accommodate social 
change and to provide the political stability. on which 
everything else rests" (p. 483). 
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10.3 Cultural Traits 
It may look as great rash to attempt to trace an 
evolutionary thread of the complex British society in a few 
pages. Yet, despite the whole deficiencies that such a brief 
historical profile may have, it cannot be discredited just 
because it is short. To its credit it can be argued that it 
fulfills the proposed objective of disclosing cultural traits 
relevant to understand the observed patterns of influence in 
British management decision-making. According to Halsey(1986), 
"huny have noted and praised Britain as a land of tolerance 
and liberty, while at the same time wondering at its capacity 
to resist the claims of egalitarian movements without resort 
to overt force" (P. 7). 
It seems that the major dilemma of British society has been 
to conciliate the democratic ideals of liberty and equality 
with a status divided society. 
The traditional, advanced, civilizing political system 
developed by the Britons, and the sense of fairness and 
stability that it can pass on to the people is a motive of 
national pride. The British people are very proud of all 
their traditions. Their countryside, their way of life, their 
monarchy, are all too alive in people's mind and very close 
to their hearts (Wienner, 1985; Halsey, 1986). It is easy to 
wonder that all this pride and love for tradition maRes it 
easier to endure the traditional status hierarchy of British 
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society and even to enforce and legitimate it. At the same 
time gradual concessions and especially extended citizenship 
have served to mitigate social inequalities, but yet to 
maintain the gulf between status -groups '*. (Marwick, 1986; 
Halsey, 1986; Marschall, et al, 1985). To quote Halsey(1986), 
Britain 
"is a country in which the unequal powers and advantages of 
a ruling minority have survived from agrarian through 
industrial towards post-industrial society with remarkable 
continuity" (p. 173). 
As in any other society, continuity in Britain means a 
process by which new and reformed institutions are accomodated 
into the forms of the old ones, so to preserve the stablished 
status quo and basic cultural traits. 
As the above picture of Britain suggests, an individualism 
grounded in the ideal of liberty is pervasive in British 
society and has certainly served to orientate the organization 
of its institutions and social relations in the different 
spheres of life. Its root can be found in Hobbes' "law of 
nature" as well as in Locke's "social contract", as yet, the 
point of departure of these two philosophers was the freedom 
enjoyed by men in nature. Nevertheless, while )iObbes advocates 
an absolute power to bring order into the disorder of the 
"war of every man against every man" that ensues when, inthe 
state of nature, every man fights in pursuing his own interests, 
Locke presupposes that men are born free and rational thus 
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endowed to accord a social contract to govern themselves. 
The principle of an agreed social contract among men - who 
are supposed to have been born free and equal - and that. 
rests, mainly, in sedimented customs and practices, underpins 
British institutions. The tradition of a common law, 
as the ultimate power to govern people's lives and relations, 
appears as the chief hindrance to the resurgence of any 
absolute power. At least at a formal level the exercise of 
power is circumscribed to the application of the law, though 
actual power may be very unbalanced indeed. As Rose . (1985) 
comments: 
'Within a Cabinet there is no equality of political influence 
While all ministers are formally equal, some are more equal 
than others" (P. 79). 
As far as the exercise of power, in general, has to be 
mediated through communal agreement or at least communal 
sanction, to be legitimate, power in British society has a 
hidden face. Even thouUh the idea of a powerful united 
Establishment, deciding Britain's destiny is generally accepted, 
and one may dare to say, it is dear to most people, this 
picture may not correspond very neatly to reality (Sampson, 
1962). As Sampson says, in the first place, the real rulers 
are rarely visible, and in the second place, "the rulers are 
not at all close-knited or united" (p. 624). But yet, to 
quote Sampson (1962), 
"however faceless the institutions my appear, real people 
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with real powers can run them, and behind the blank fagade, 
the right decisive men in the right jobs, ... can still break 
through deadlocks, committees and muddle" (p. 627-628). 
It seems rather evident that power relations in British 
political-administrative system and productive system are 
mediated by common sense rules of competition and bargaining, 
whose visilibity give legitimacy to the exercice of power, 
and at the same time conceal its face. The contradiction of 
status hierarchy, liberty and equality is counterbalanced with 
individualism and its corresponding ideologies of fair 
competition and meritocracy. 
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10.4 Cultural Boundaries and Management Decision-Making 
The comparative analysis of British and Brazilian decisions 
carried out in chapter 8 brought to light similarities as 
well as differences in the patterns of influence in management 
decision-making in the two countries. Noteworthy similarities 
are: the frequency at which some interests get involved in 
decision process in both countries, and the amount of influence 
(measured by the mean score of influence of the primary 
interests inv-olved in decision processes) exerted byinternal 
interests. These findings support the argument that the 
distribution of influence in organizations is bound to 
contingent factors (Hickson et al, 1971; Hinings et al, 1974). 
It seems quite obvious that the overwhelming presence of 
transformation and conformity, in decision processes, is 
associated with the centrality of their functions within the 
internal division of labour, as the higher influence of 
domain and transformation seem to reflect their control upon 
critical resources to the organization effectiVeness. 
Explanation of the observed differences and similarities in 
the involvement and influence of the external interests in 
Britain and in Brazil can be sought in tenis of the institutional 
frameworks existing at the task-environment level in each 
country. As it had been argued in Chapter 3, the institutional 
frameworks existent in each social setting shape the social 
- 262 - 
forms and processes in their own sphere and in the sphere of 
those social settings related to them. It seems reasonable 
to argue that the extent to which Britain and Brazil present 
sharp cultural differences, norms and rules regulating social 
relations at task-environment levels in the two countries 
might differ. 
The most noticeable differences, as pointed in Chapter S. 
appear in the delegation of less important decisions in 
Britain as opposed to the overwhelming centralization of 
decisions in Brazil; the greater number ofinterest units and 
individuals involved in British decisions as opposed to the 
small number of participants in Brazilian decisions; the 
unbalanced power within the decision arena in Britain as 
opposed to the more balanced power w ithin the decision arena 
in Brazil. A pattern of influence which combines delegation 
of unimportant matters, extensive participation and unbalanced 
power seems consistent with a social order which values 
individual liberty, civil rights and status hierarchy. 
As had been evidenced in the last section the mediation of 
power in British institutions revolves around a hierarchical 
domination on the one side, and individual competition on 
the other. As far as individual liberties and citizenship 
rights are ensured, and competition and bargaining appear as 
the civilized means of conflict resolution, the dominant 
ruling elite enters into the stage either as a benevolent 
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Leviathan, the guardian of individual civil rights, or the 
wise arbitrator to settle eventual conflict. In this way the 
hierarchical domination and the extentto which the stability 
of the system rests upon the. role played_ by the dominant 
eýite remains concealed, so that the status hierarchy is safeguarded 
and the system contradiction reinforced again and again. 
Brazil and Britain have the same status divided society, 
nevertheless the agency, which gave form and sustain the 
social structures in each country, shows sharp contrast. 
While in Brazil, the social hierarchy is rooted in and 
sustained by an extensive network of personal relationships, 
' fair competition individualism and its corresponding ideologies o'L 
and meritrocracy underpin and maintain the British divided 
status hierarchy society. By the same token, the different 
patterns of influence in management decision -making in 
Brazilian and British organizations, reflect their 
cultural singularities and the national charater impressed 
upon the institutional mediation of power in these two 
countries. 
One may speculate that it would be dif f icult for a British manager 
to legitimate a decision that had been made in the Brazilian 
style, that is, within the inner circle of the managerial 
elite. Swaying over a managerial pluralism of interest (Hickson 
et al, 1986) there is no need for the British managerial 
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elite to show its face. As Sampson (1962) wrote: 
"within the bureaucratic seats of power-whether the Treasury, 
the Prudential, the Midland Bank or Shell - the question in 
my mind 'who Runs Britain? I, soon seemed to be ground to dust 
in the machinery of committees, each one insisting that they 
are servants of the other ... If you ask a corporation man 'who runs this place? ' you will be met with mutterings about 
cybernetics, lines of co = nication or five hundred managers 
(p. 627). 
If the very power of the elite group depends on their capacity 
to warrant individual liberty and equal opportunities to the 
parts, the participation of all interests concerned, in the 
decision process, has to be granted. By behaving in accord 
with the institutionalized norms and rules the elite group 
may get their preferred outcomes either out of bargaining 
(Abell, 1975) or arbitrating conflicts (Astley et al, 1982). 
Thus, it is not surprising that the resulting declision-making 
in British organizations appears as one of unbalanced power 
within an extensive competitive decision process. 
By contrast, the Brazilian managerial elite, making use of a 
network of personal relationships to mediate their power, 
tend to restrain participation in decision process, but 
eventually, make room for personnel department involvement 
in decision process. As shown in Chapter 8 the involvement 
of personnel departments in decision processes in Brazilian 
organizations is somewhat higher than in British organizations, 
whereas the influence of personnel departments upon decision 
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outcomes, in the two countries, differ hardly at all. As 
opposed to Britain, a. balanced power within a dominant 
oligarchy appears as the distinguishable pattern ofinfluence 
in management decision-making in Brazilian organizations. 
CHAPTER 11 
SUMMING UP 
This -research had two main objectives. First it aimed at 
testing a more holistic model to analyse the distribution of 
influence in organizational decisions. Second it aimed at 
improving knowledge and understanding about administrative 
processes in Brazilian organizations. These objectives were 
reasonably achieved, even though many pitfalls have remained. 
The results seem especialýy--revealing in pointing out the 
usefulness of more comprehensive models Vnich would aloow us to 
capture the dynamics of power relations in organizations. If 
one wishes to observe a landscape in its totality, one has 
to view it from the many sides it eventually has. In an 
analogous way, if the researcher wishes to understand a 
phenomenon he must extend his search to all relevant factors 
related to it. 
The model proved itself applicable but it needed to be 
refined. Constrained by the time granted to submit a doctoral 
thesis, a great deal of simplification had to be done. The 
definition of influence was narrowed just to infer the amount 
of participation in decision processes and the centralization 
of decisions in the organizations. Concepts and measures have 
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to be redefined in the future to distinguish the basis and 
forms of participation, and whether or in what circumstances 
participation really entitles the actor toexercice influence. 
It is necessary to develop measures to estimate forms of 
participation and effective influence as related to the role 
played by the social actors in the decision processes. 
Influence needed to be defined so as to distinguish "ability 
to influence" and "capacity to influence". Is the former 
related to contingent factors and the lattertoinstitutional 
factors? Though the results of this research give hints to 
believe that the distribution of influence in decision 
processes in Brazilian organizations are more likely to be 
bound by institutional frameworks than bycontingent factors, 
they still support both theories. 
In fact the direction of association between some variables 
in this study seems to suggest that institutional frameworks 
set limits to individuals' ability to use the contingent 
factors they control to influence decisions. For instance, 
looking at the direction of the correlation coefficient of 
interdependence and of centre of control with the dependent 
variables, it can be seen that the centre of influence is 
positively correlated with the centre of control and negatively 
correlated with interdependence. This means that those who 
control the critical resources to a decision can exert 
influence upon its outcome. Nevertheless, the negative 
correlation between internal involvement and interdependence 
- 268 - 
seems to indicate that the institutional apparatus operates 
to secure the established order. it appears that, if 
interdependence implies a loose control, only those 
institutionally entitled to exert influence might have access 
to the decision arena. 
On the other hand, organizational decisions become more 
vulnerable to external influence when the decision depends 
on external resources. It seems that contingencies and not 
institutions may be the most forceful determinant ofexplicit 
and direct involvement of outside people in organizational 
decision processes. 
Despite the whole weakness of comparative analysis using 
independent data sources (as stressed in Chapter 8), the 
comparison of patterns of influence in Brazilian and British 
organizational decisions still shows up suggestive results. 
Although it has only scratched the surface of a hig,, hly complex 
subject matter, these findings indicate that a perspective 
on institutional mediation is a fruitful vein to explore, to 
improve understanding of organizational processes in general, 
and to provide explanation of observed differences in cross- 
cultural researches. Of course this means a long way aheadý the 
need to develop conceptual frameworks and research techniques which 
7' action and would steer investigations towards the interplay oIL 
structure in organizational processes, and in the social 
settings related to the focal organization. 
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As the patterns of influence in management decision-making 
in Britain and in Brazil present similarities and differences, 
it seems. that it would be quite arbitrary to say that 
differences are due to differences in the stage of economic 
development of the two countries. By focusing on the 
historical shaping of institutions the analysis denudes the 
process of redefinition of social forms as new technologies 
are assimilated, and in this way, may overcome the difficulties 
that have been alluded to in cross-cultural analysis among 
developed and developing countries. It seems reasonable to 
argue that a convergence tendency, when it exists, will appear 
in this sort of analysis. As a matter of fact the results 
suggest that contingent factors can operate asa homogenizing 
force, while cultural factors can enforce diversity and 
sustain national identities. 
It has been arFued that the control of contingent factors in itself 
does not guarantee the social actors' power to influence 
organizational decisions, but to exert influence, the social 
actors have to be able to cope with the uncertainties they 
control (Hickson et al., 1971). Furthering this argument it 
can be said that for the social actors to be able to manipulate 
contingent factors, to influence organizational decisions, 
their behaviour has to be socially accepted and this means 
to keep in step with institutionalized norms and rules. 
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The most important findings of this research may be summarized 
as follows: 
a) The distribution of influence in decision processes in 
a social organized system is fashioned according to 
institutionalized norms and rules which had been 
generated within that system or assimilated in the 
process of interaction with other social systems. That 
is to say that organizational processes and behaviours 
are patterned according to norms and rules socially 
defined at different spheres of social life. Thequestion 
is not one of causality, but of how the same patterns 
of behaviour and'personal relationships are met and 
iterated in different social settings. 
b) Although one has to admit that by incorporating norms 
and rules socially defined in the task-environment and 
in the larger social context, the patterns of influence 
in management decision making are intrinsically bound 
to external institutions, a direct involvement of external 
actors in organizational decisions does not seem to be 
institutionally determined. This may suggest that 
dependence on external resources may disrupt the 
institutionalized norms. Nevertheless the relative 
weight of public standards and inputs in Brazilian 
organizations and of private standards and output in 
British organizations may be indicative of compelling 
- 271 - 
cultural practices. Although more deep investigation 
would be needed before any conclusive utterance could 
be made, the presence o: E public standards, among the 
most influential interests in Brazilizan decisions (see 
figure 8.1), may reflect the longstanding tradition of 
State intervention, as shown in Chapter 9. At the same 
time, the relative importance of outputs and to some 
extent of private standards in British decisions (see 
table 8.9 and figure 8.2), may reflect the ideology of 
individual liberties that prevail in British culture, 
as shown in Chapter 10. 
C) The comparative analysis of patterns of influence in 
Brazil and Britain corroborates the argument that the 
distribution of influence in management decision-making 
is bound by contingent and institutional factors. Eventhough 
these results cannot be seen as conclusive, they give 
. 
strong 
evidence showing that the controlofstrategic resources 
- including strategic positions - may be necessary but 
is not sufficient to grant power to a social actor or 
group. As social relations(including interdependencies) 
are mediated through institutionalized norms and rules, 
to behave in accord with culturally accepted practices 
is fundamental to secure power to any social actor or 
group. 
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d) The institutional perspective can be a rich vein to 
explore in the search for understanding and the 
explanation of organizational processes and for comparative 
studies of organizations. While the institutional 
frameworks, which exist at the level of the organizations, 
can be claimed to explain differences between organizations, 
the institutional frameworks existing at the level of 
the task- environment can be claimed to explain differences 
between different types of organizations, and differences 
between organizations in different countries can be 
explained in terms of their relations to national 
institutions, that is, as pervasive cultural traits are 
manifested in different spheres of social life. 
The contribution of this research to improve knowledge and 
understanding of administrative Processes in Brazilian 
organizations can be assessed on two grounds. First, it 
resides in showing how the distribution of influence in 
Brazilian organizations is linked to prevailing national 
patterns of interpersonal and authority relationships. By 
analysing the patterns of influence in management decision- 
making in terms of dominant cultural traits underlying the 
national institutions, it was possible to understand that 
centralization of decisions in Brazilian organizations reflects 
a traditional pattern of authority - of overwhelming and 
tight control by a ruling elite - which has been reinforced 
by entrenched patterns of interpersonal relationships. Second, 
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it may contribute by evidencing how mode. rn managerial forms 
have been incorporated by Brazilian organizations without 
breaking down the traditional managerial practices. 
This is a very limited contribution indeed, but it may be a 
reasonable starting point for future researches to draw 
attention to the country particularities. Furthermore, Brazil 
is a huge country (8,511,965 KM2) and differences from one 
region to another are noticeable. This research was restricted 
to the metropolitan area of Belo Horizonte, the capital of 
the State of Minas Gerais, located in the south centre region 
f influence in of the country. Whether the same patterns oJ 
management decision-making appear invariably in the whole 
country, or how different they appear in different regions, 
can also be used as starting questions for future researches. 
This same restriction certainly applies to patterns of 
influence in management decision-making in Britain, as the 
Bradford studies was limited to investigating decision 
processes in England. Yet, there is no reason to conpletely 
desavow the generalization of these findings to the respective 
nations. insofar as the analysis focuses on broad and general 
national features. 
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APPENDIX I 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE I 
PROJECT: Organizational Decision Making 
RESEARCHER: Indiana P. F. Rodrigues 
SPONSOR: Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Cientifico e Tecnologico - CNPq 
Organizational Analysis Departamento de 
Research Unit Ciencias Administrativas 
University of Bradford Universidade Federal 
Bradford de Minas Gerais - B. H. 
Great Britain Brasil 
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You are being asked to provide some primary information as part of a survey of a 
large number of decisions. We are studying simple and complex decision 
processes and the way external factors influence these decisions. 
The question you are asked alms to identify a number of decisions across very 
diverse organizational activities, and to afford general information about the 
organization. 
A report on the results of the research may be sent to those organizations which 
contribute who express interest in receiving it. 
Confidentiality will, of course, be strictly maintained. No organization or 
individual will be identified in any report. 
Your co-operation in this research is appreciated. Thank you. 
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1. Person interviewed: 
Name of organization: 
if subsidiaryp parent name: 
if parent, subsidiaries: 
Year of f oundation: 
4. Were there any impressive changes on organization goals and politics over 
these years? Please explain: 
5. What are the products /ser vices of the company? 
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6. Have the company products/services changed very much f rom its 
inception? Please explain: 
7. How many employees did the organizaticyn have on: 
31 December 1984: 
31 December 1981: 
31 December 1978: 
S. How much were the company's total sales on: 
31 December 1984: 
31 December 1981: 
31 December 1978: 
9. How much was the budget value on: 
31 December 1984: 
31 December 1981: 
31 December 1978: 
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10. Would you please indicate some simple or complex decisions and nominate 
a qualified individual to answer a questionnaire about the decision? 
Decision issue Category Inf ormant 
(circle as 
appropriate) 
1. simple/complex 
2. simple/complex 
3. simple/complex 
4. simple/complex 
5. simple/complex 
6. simple/complex 
7. simple/complex 
S. simple/complex 
9. simple/complex 
10. simple/complex 
Ii. simple/complex 
12. simple/complex 
0. simple/complex 
14. simple/complex 
15. simple/complex 
- 293 - 
I!. Czn we havt an orEp-JAL, -. io: i chtri sboveing: 
the main hicrarchicr-I I-evels 
prociucT and/(. r aphlciRl divlýlon 
functiond division 
12. Would you like to receive a report on the results of this research? 
YES / 140 
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 2 
PROJECT: Organizational Decision Making 
RESEARCHER: Indiana P. F. Rodrigues 
SPONSOR: Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
Cientifico e Tecnologico - CNPq 
Organizational Analysis Departamento de 
Research Unit Ciencias Administrativas 
University of Bradford Universidade Federal 
Bradford de Minas Gerais - B. H. 
Great Britain Brasil 
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This questionnaire is designed to collect comparative data on organizational 
decisions. 
You will find that in many questions you are given a number of alternative 
answers and have to choose one of them. This simplifies the questionnaire for 
you so that it will take less time to fill in; indeed it is not as long as it looks. 
All your answers are completely confidential and all information given to us is 
used in such a way as to preserve complete anonymity. 
Finally we would like to thank you for completing the questionnaire. 
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1. Name of Organization 
Informant (name and position) 
Decision topic 
How did it start? 
5. Who started it? (name and position) 
When did it start? 
7. When did you reach the decision? 
S. Was the decision implemented within the time predicted? 
yes, completely 
yes, partially 
not at all 
Explain: 
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What was the objective of the decision? 
10. Was it reached? 
yes, completely 
yes, partially 
not at all 
Explain: 
Once the decision was made how difficult would it be to change it if 
necessary? 
no change would be possible 
we could stop implementation 
it would be possible to start it again 
it would be possible to make some adjustment 
it would be possible to take further steps 
Explain: 
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12. Did you have any prior experience to which you could refer to get some 
clue how to approach this decision? 
this sort of decision has been made frequently 
many similar decisions have been made in the past 
some similar decisions have been made in the past 
very little similarity to previous decisions 
no similarity to any previous decisions 
Explain: 
13. How much did you know about the alternative solutions to evaluatee this 
decision? 
all we need to know 
quite a lot 
a little 
very little 
not at all 
Explain: 
14. Were there any disagreements about preferences during the decision? 
many people disagreed with each other 
there were distinct factions 
few people disagreed with the majority 
one person only disagreed with the others 
no disagreement 
Explain: 
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17. To what extent was it necessary for the various parties involved to co- 
ordinate their activities? 
parties can work independently and present results 
parties have to do work in particular order 
parties all have to work simultaneously 
ExPlain: 
Is. Decision process came on: 
through regular established procedures 
within some regular procedures 
following rules settled at the beginning 
following some loose guidelines 
without any established pattern 
Explain: 
19. Was this decision constrained by any regulation or expectation? 
yes 
no 
Which? 
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20. Was any external resource required during decision process or for its 
successful implementation? 
yes 
no 
Explain: 
21. Who controlled these resources? 
customer 
supplier 
competitor 
owner 
union 
government 
22. How was the decision authorized? 
21a. What were they7 
0 ob**** 60.......... 
............. 
.................... 6*............. 
............ 0 6000 6 0.0. 
90.6000.00 6 060 
0 .............. 0* 00 
....................................... 
00............................... 
23. For whom did this decision change things? 
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24. How were they informed about the decision? 
25. After all, did someone question the decision? 
yes 
no 
Explain: 
APPENDIX 2 
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Mean Scores of Centre of Influence, Internal Involvement 
and External Involvement in Market Organization 
Organizations Centre of Internal External 
n=9 Influence Involvement Involvement 
M1 3.00 4.25 1.50 
M2 4.00 2.60 1.20 
TOTAL 3.56 3.33 1.33 
Mean Scores of Centre of Influence, Internal Involvement 
and External Involvement in Professional Organizations 
Organizations Centre of Internal External 
n=11 Inf luence Involvement Involvement 
Pi 2.33 3.00 1.00 
P2 5.00 5.40 0.00 
P3 3.66 5.00 0.00 
TOTAL 3.91 4.64 0.27 
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Mean Scores of Centre of Influence, Internal Involvement 
and External Involvement in Collective Organizations 
Organizations Centre of Internal External 
n=9 Influence Involvement Involvement 
Cl 4.80 5.20 0.00 
C2 3.75 6.00 0.50 
TOTAL 4.33 5.56 0.22 
Mean Scores of Centre -of Influence, Internal Involvement 
and External Involvement in Bureaucracies 
Organizations Centre of Internal External 
n=11 Influence Involvement Involvement 
BI 3.00 3.67 1.33 
B2 2.00 4.20 0.60 
TOTAL 2.55 3.91 1.00 
The small number of decisions per organizations do not allow statistical tests. 
Comparison of means between organizations are thus somewhat specul'ative. 
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INTEREST UNITS AND OTHER GENERAL MANAGEMENT INVOLVED IN 40 
DECISION-MAKING IN BRAZIL 
Organizations Decisions Interest Units 
Other General 
Management 
Cl 01 Administrative Chief Executive 
Accounting Superior Council 
02 Chief Executive 
Superior Council 
03 Administrative Chief Executive 
Accounting Superior Council 
04 Administrative Chief Executive 
Accounting Superior Council 
05 Administrative Chief Executive 
Accounting Superior Council 
C2 06 Production Chief Executive 
Administrative 
Accounting 
Marketing 
Master Organization 
07 Production Chief Executive 
Administrative 
Accounting 
Marketing 
08 Production Chief Executive 
Administrative Deleberative Council 
Accounting r> 
- 313 - 
Organizations Decisions 
C2 09 
Intercst Units 
Production 
Administrative 
Accounting 
Advisory Staff 
Master Organization 
Other General 
Management 
Chief Executive 
Deliberative Council 
Bl 10 
11 
Production 
Production 
Administrative 
Accounting 
Goverment 
Master Organization 
12 Administrative 
Personnel 
Supplier 
13 Production 
Goverment 
14 Production 
Administrative 
Advisory Staff 
Engineering Union 
C) 
is Production 
Administrative 
Marketing 
Advisory Staff 
Administrative 
Council 
Chief Executive 
Chief Executive 
Chief Executive 
Chief Executive 
Chief Executive 
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organizatimis Decisions 
B2 
m 
16 
Interest Units 
Production 
Advisory Staff 
Other General 
Management 
Chief Executive 
Director Council 
Chief Executive 
Director Council 
Chief Executive 
Director Council 
17 Production 
Accounting 
Advisory Staff 
18 Production 
Accounting 
Advisory Staff 
Goverment 
19 Production 
20 Production 
Advisory Staff 
Supplier 
Clients 
21 Production 
Personnel 
Accounting 
Marketing 
Suppliers 
Goverment 
22 Production 
Accounting 
Marketing 
Customers 
Goverment 
- 315 - 
organizations Decisions 
ýn 
M2 
Other General Interest Units Management 
23 Production 
Quality Control 
Customers 
24 Production 
Accounting 
Purchase 
ýbrketing 
25 Production 
Personnel 
Purchase 
Juridical Staff 
Factory Inspectorates 
26 Production 
Marketing 
Customers 
27 Production 
Accounting 
Marketing 
Trade Association 
Competitors 
28 Production 
Personnel 
Union 
Competitors 
29 Production 
Marketing 
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organizations Decisions 
Pi 30 
31 
Interest Units 
Production 
Government 
Production 
Government 
Other General 
ýIanagcment 
Foundation Board 
Foundation Board 
32 Production 
University Department 
Department Council 
P2 33 Accounting Chief Executive 
Director Council 
34 Production Chief Executive 
University Department Congregation 
35 Production Chief Executive 
University Department 
36 Production Chief Executive 
Personnel Director Council 
Accounting 
Advisory Staff 
37 Production Chief Executive 
Personnel Director Council 
P3 38 Production President 
Administrative 
Accounting 
Purchase 
organizations 
P3 
Decisions 
39 
40 
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Interest Units 
Production 
Personnel 
Accounting 
Production 
Personnel 
Accounting 
Other General 
Management 
President 
President 
